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Abstract 
China’s transition from planned economy to market economy (economic liberalization) has 
catalyzed the private sector’s emergence and growth, as well as given birth to new forms 
of business associations within the private sector, such as Non-local Chambers of 
Commerce (NCCs, hereafter). NCCs emerged from mid-1990s, and have proliferated 
rapidly across China’s localities and industries. Unlike traditional official business 
associations, NCCs have significantly participated in local governance and demonstrated 
new types of state-society relations. However, they have not yet reached the attention of 
scholarly researchers, and have been understudied within and outside of China.   
At the same time, political scientists working on policy processes have begun to include 
China as a case to enrich their theory, but find it hard to adapt established models to 
China’s policymaking system. Research on the Chinese policy process have gone from 
elite politics in the 1950-1960s, to “fragmented authoritarianism” in the 1970-1980s, then 
to “fragmented authoritarianism 2.0” after 2000. During the evolution of these theories, it 
has been noticed that more and more non-bureaucratic actors have been involved into the 
policymaking process if not being the prominent actors.  There have been studies on 
“policy entrepreneur”, environmental NGOs, international NGOs, Chinese think-tanks and 
different forms of business lobbying. However, within the spectrum of business lobbying, 
there is a gap in understanding business associations’ influence in policy processes, 
especially the new type of so claimed “grass-roots” business associations.  
This thesis sheds lights on this new type of private sector business association - NCCs and 
their influence in the local urban policy process. NCCs have been widely involved in local 
governance and political engagement. However, their political participation shows great 
variation due to differences in regions, organizational forms, industries and policy spheres. 
So the question of what lead to the variation of NCCs’ policy influence has become the 
highlights of this research project. By using the empirical materials from participant 
observation and interviews, this thesis aims to answer two main questions: How did NCCs 
influence the local policy process and what explains the difference in their policy influence? 
In this thesis, I develop a typology for NCCs by using the dimensions of “origins” and 
“networks”. Thus all the NCCs have been categorized into four types: “Dependent NCCs”, 
“Independent NCCs”, “Coupling NCCs” and “Decoupling NCCs”.  Through in-depth case 
analysis, I argue that NCCs’ networks and their ability to mobilize resources within their 
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networks determine their policy impact. In terms of NCCs’ network orientation, the state 
networks of NCCs directly affect their access to policy lobbying, while the business 
networks directly affect the resources for their lobbying, thus determine NCCs’ lobbying 
capacity in the local policy process. In terms of NCCs’ network strategy, network span 
influences policy making while network intensity influences policy implementations. To 
be specific, NCCs with network span strategy could influence more general policy agendas 
and policy spheres, while NCCs with network intensity strategy could exert more influence 
in specific policies especially in the policy implementation stage. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction and literature review 
1.1 Introduction 
The government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has overseen economic reform 
and opening up since 1978. For the more than 30 year-long transition period from a 
centrally planned economy to a more market oriented economy, a number of private 
entrepreneurs and private enterprises have emerged and are now playing a critical role in 
the economic development of the PRC. According to national statistics, the number of 
private enterprises had reached 10 million and contributed over 60% to the total gross 
domestic product (GDP) in 20121. In addition to its contribution to the GDP, the private 
sector’s tax contribution had risen to 50 %, and provided 90% of the new employment.2 
According to figures released by Unirule Institute of Economics, the private sector 
(including private companies and the self-employed) in China employed around 235.4 
million people until 2012, which was nearly four times the working population in State-
Owned Enterprises (SOEs, hereafter).3  
The private sector’s development has experienced ups and downs since the establishment 
of PRC. It was eliminated during the Mao era from 1956-1978, but regenerated since the 
reform period began. Its development falls into three phases in the post-Mao period. The 
first phase, running from 1978 to 1986, was the initial stage of economic reform, when the 
private sector was positioned as a supplement to the socialist state-owned economy. In the 
second phase, from 1987 to 1996, the basic laws and regulations on private enterprises 
were enacted and the new concept of the “socialist market economic system”4 was first 
introduced in 1992(The Fourteenth CPC Congress Report, 1992). In the third phase, from 
1997 to the present, the private sector was upgraded to an “important component of the 
socialist market economy” (The Fifteenth CPC congress report, 1997) from its previous 
position as “supplement”. In 2000, CCP launched the “Three Represents” (Sange Daibiao) 
                                                 
1See全国工商联主席王钦敏在 2012—2013 年中国民营经济发展形势分析会上透露,03/02/2013, 
http://finance.people.com.cn/n/2013/0203/c1004-20414645.html. last accessed on 27 June, 2016. 
2 More information, please see 中国国家治理现代化 - 国有和民营：两条腿走路，
http://theory.people.com.cn/n/2014/0825/c388253-25532859.html. 
3 More details , see 金融时报中文网 (Financial Times Chinese version), 
http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001047949?full=y, last accessed on 21 June, 2016. 
4 “The socialist market economic system” is the official term to describe the form of economies in the 
People's Republic of China after the reform and opening up. It was put forward by Deng Xiaoping in his 
Southern Tour Speech and finally established in the fourteenth CPC Congress in October 1992. 
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principle5, which straightened out the relationship between CCP and the private sector in 
China. Thus Communist Party membership was opened to private entrepreneurs in 2001 
after Jiang Zemin’s famous “1st  July Speech”6. In 2004, the state constitution was also 
amended to protect private property rights (Constitution of the People's Republic of China, 
2004). Coming into the 21st century, the economic and legal environment for the private 
sector has improved and the weight of private enterprises in the overall economy has 
continued to rise, making it an even more significant part of the national economy. 
During the private sector’s dramatic development over the past forty years, its economic 
contribution and social consequences have been widely recognized, and there have been a 
great amount of studies in this field. However, its political influence initially remained 
relatively low profile and little research was done (Yang, 2010; Fulda, 2015). More 
recently, along with the increasingly diverse demands of Chinese society for a role in 
policy making, more and more attention has been paid to business lobbying and the private 
sector’s political engagement.  
One important aspect of private sector’s political engagement is joining or setting up 
business associations for expression of interest and collective action. Along with the 
private sector’s development after the reform and opening-up policy, various business 
associations have flourished with growing numbers and diversified forms of organization. 
Quite a few new types of business associations have emerged and demonstrated 
significance in the local governance and policy process, with great variation across regions 
and industries. However, current studies of business associations mainly concentrate on 
state-affiliated business associations with a research focus on macro-level state-society 
relations (White, 1993; Unger, 1996; Foster, 2002; etc.). There is rarely empirical research 
focusing on the new types of business associations that emerged during the economic 
liberalization of the 1990s.  
This thesis sheds light on Non-local Chambers of Commerce (yidi shanghui, NCCs 
hereafter), a new type of private sector business association. NCCs emerged in Kunming in 
                                                 
5 “Three Represents” is a guiding socio-political theory credited to Jiang Zemin, which was ratified by the 
Communist Party of China at the Sixteenth Party Congress in 2002, which can be translated as “Our Party 
must always represent the requirements for developing China's advanced productive forces, the orientation of 
China's advanced culture and the fundamental interests of the overwhelming majority of the Chinese people.” 
6 Jiang’s speech in the general assembly to celebrate 80 years anniversary of CCP’s establishment on 1st July, 
2001 first introduced the idea of absorbing qualified private entrepreneurs to join the party and this principle 
was finalized in the sixteenth CPC congress report in 2002. 
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1995, and have mushroomed in almost every city nationwide. By the end of 2010, there 
were 9103 NCCs registered in different level of Civil Affairs departments in China. 7 In the 
past twenty years, NCCs have revealed great potential and influence in the local 
governance and policy process. However, they are understudied due to their short history 
and the dearth of information readily available on them. This thesis aims to show the 
picture of NCCs’ influence in the local policy process, mainly to provide answers to two 
questions: how did NCCs influence the local policy process, and what explains the 
variation of their capacity to influence policy? I argue that, NCCs’ links with the state play 
an important but nonlinear role in their influence to local policy process. Based on my 
analysis of two dimensions - “networks” and “origins” - I categorize NCCs in China into 
four types: “Dependent NCCs”, “Independent NCCs”, “Coupling NCCs” and “Decoupling 
NCCs”. Different types of NCCs adopt different network strategies to influence the local 
policy process: NCCs’ “Network Span” influences local policymaking, while their 
“Network Intensity” influences local policy implementation. Thus NCCs with a Network 
Span strategy may influence more general policy agendas and policy sphere, while NCCs 
with a Network Intensity strategy may exert more influence in specific policies especially 
in the policy implementation stage.  
This research makes three crucial contributions to current studies. First, this study of new 
type of business association, while based on the current studies of business associations, 
goes beyond the statist explanation and state-civil society debate. It explores what kind of 
role state linkages play in NCCs’ influence to the local policy process and how their 
strategies make a difference to their influence. Second, this research concentrates on the 
external actors’ influence in the local policy process in China, differing from central policy 
processes that previous studies have focused on. Third, this research provides much 
empirical evidence of NCCs’ emergence and development, as well as local policy cases 
based on the first-hand fieldwork materials, which contributes to the understanding of the 
complexity of Chinese local politics and operational systems in local China. 
This chapter first sets out the relevant current studies on business associations and external 
actors in the Chinese policy process. It then introduces the subject - NCCs - and the main 
concepts developed in this thesis. The following section explains how my research 
questions emerged from the empirical materials and a presentation of the main findings in 
                                                 
7 Source from “Research Report on Chinese Non-local Chambers of Commerce” (Zhongguo Yidishanghui 
Yanjiu Baogao) published by Chinese Research Group on 19th February, 2011.  
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relation to the two parts of the research questions. The final section explains the 
methodological approach as well as an outline of the remaining chapters.  
1.2 Debate on business associations’ role in state-society 
relations 
Regarding the evolution of business associations over the past 30 years, scholars 
specializing in China have paid quite a lot of attention, expecting to find signs of new 
state-society relations catalyzed from marketization reform. The history of the 
development of China’s business associations is comparatively short. During the Mao era 
(1949-1978) business associations were tightly bound to particular ministries or 
specialized economic management departments. After 1978, a large number of business 
associations were founded, which still had close ties with government (Pearson, 1994; 
Bennett, 1995; Nevitt, 1996; Unger, 1996; Foster, 2002). By the 1990s, several kinds of 
bottom-up business associations appeared, and were recognized as a sign of of potentially 
growing autonomy in Chinese social and economic life by some scholars (Chen, 2003; 
Chen & Wang, 2004). 
Previous scholarship on business associations has examined where the initiatives for their 
formation come from; how much autonomy associations have from the state; and to what 
extent they can represent the interests of their members (White et al., 1996). Answers to 
these questions fall into two main types: on the one hand statist perspectives (corporatism) 
that emphasize state initiative and see associations as instruments of the state, and on the 
other hand a societal view (civil society) that highlights societal initiative and sees 
associations as new social organizations with the potential for expanding democracy. 
The statist view found that the dominant role that the state played in establishing and 
running business associations is a new instrument of control in the environment of market 
economies (Shue, 1994; Pearson, 1994, 1997; White, 1994; Nevitt, 1996; Unger, 1996; 
White et al, 1996; Yep, 2000; Foster, 2002). As Unger and Chan (1996: 112) argue, ”The 
more the economy decentralizes, the more corporatism gets established as subtle control 
mechanisms.” This view sees either no or very limited autonomy for these associations in 
representing the interests of their members. Considering the fact that associations are 
embedded in state agencies, Foster (2002: 42) who investigated the business associations 
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in the coastal city of Yantai, thus concludes these entities are “in essence appendages of 
government or Party Organizations.” Hence, it is considered naïve to imagine any conflict 
between business associations and the state, or associations lobbying the government to 
change policy. However, researchers also found that the corporatist interpretation has faced 
challenges. For example, White et al. (1996) point out that the associations they came 
across in their research exhibit a diversity of relationships with the state, with some 
organizations being more autonomous and voluntary than others, so they are best described 
as forming an organizational continuum stretching from a state-dominated extreme to a 
civil society extreme. Similarly, Pearson’s comparison of three business associations 
shows that “Socialist Corporatism does not exist uniformly in all business sectors” (Person 
1997, 134-135).   
In contrast, the societal view captures business initiative in organizing associations and 
predicts more positive roles for them, though in changing state-society relations that are 
favorable for future democracy rather than influencing policy. The search for civil society 
in contemporary China is driven by an expected link between civil society and 
democratization (White, 1993). As Whyte (1992) observes, “To the extent that a civil 
society develops within a Leninist system, it will produce pressure on elites for democratic 
reform.” Business associations are frequently identified as candidates to fulfill the function 
of civil society because their constituents represent “new social forces” created by market 
reform. Business associations and their members are also seen to have resources that the 
state needs, and thus have special leverage in prompting political change (Pearson, 1997). 
Empirically, some scholars have found evidence that associations exhibit some societal 
initiative, enjoy certain autonomy, voice the interest of their members, and try to influence 
state policy (White, 1993; Pearson, 1994). However, the civil society framework, with its 
emphasis on autonomy of societal actors, has limitations in explaining business 
associations’ development in China. First, Chinese business associations have been 
observed enjoying limited autonomy from the state, and many of them are “in fact hybrid 
organizations in which state and society are interwoven” (Lu, 2009: 12). Second, the main 
view the civil society researchers hold, that civil society organizations are agents of 
democratization, does not square with the discoveries of researchers on the ground. As 
Howell pointed out, apart from the underground organizations, Chinese NGOs “have 
neither an explicit nor an implicit democratic programme” (Howell, 1998: 72). That is why 
Chapter 1 
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few scholars are particularly assertive when they embrace the societal view regarding the 
research of business associations in China. 
The disputes between the two views above continue. Each of them can easily find evidence 
of a single case to support, which makes the debate lengthy and contentious, but with little 
significance. As the analytical value of both civil society and corporatism has been 
challenged, Ma (2006) proposes a way out: applying both concepts simultaneously. She 
argues that economic NGOs that are organized top-down fit the corporatism model, while 
those that are organized bottom-up should be viewed through the civil society lens. Ma’s 
solution can be seen as a variation on the corporatism-civil society continuum thesis. It 
highlights the difficulties scholars have had in using either corporatism or civil society to 
explain the development of NGOs in China.  
No matter whether they adopt the corporatism approach, civil society approach, or a 
particular mix of the two, most of the current studies on business associations in China fall 
into a “state-society paradigm” (Perry, 1994). These studies have three main shortcomings 
in understanding the real operation of business associations in China. First, in reality, the 
boundaries between state and society are often blurred, but under the state-versus-society 
framework, scholars become preoccupied with discussing the degree of autonomy of 
business associations from the state (Lu, 2009). Second, the state-versus-society dichotomy 
is unable to capture the complexity of the relations between business associations and the 
state. “A deep understanding of the nature and functions of Chinese NGOs requires that 
researchers disaggregate both ‘state’ and ‘society’ to take into account the diverse interests 
and goals within them” (Lu, 2009: 8-9). Third, most of the empirical cases in current 
studies are based on old type of state affiliated business associations, and there has been no 
injection of new empirical materials in the past ten years. In a transitional social and 
political environment as in China, the existing studies on business associations and the 
state-versus-society dichotomy research approach have been out of date and need to be 
updated. In this regards, I agree with Fulda’s opinion (2012: 677) that “the analytical 
framework of civil society tends to overemphasize the ability of NGOs to protect their 
autonomy vis-à-vis the party-state. The corporatist framework on the other hand 
exaggerates the constraining power of existing political institutions on NGO agency. While 
both analytical frameworks are useful to capture parts of the bigger picture, they cannot 
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fully capture the fluidity of interactions between the Chinese party state and organized 
members of Chinese society.” 
Reviewing the current studies on Chinese business associations, there is a lack of 
comparative and comprehensive research based on several cases that are geographically 
diverse in both English and Chinese academia, and in researching the state-society 
interaction, very few link them with the local policymaking structure and process. 
Although some studies examine business associations in a broader context (White, 1993; 
Unger, 1996; Foster, 2002), for the reasons noted above, they either fall into the 
contentious state-versus-society debate or are stuck in explaining the variations in the 
relationship between business associations and the state. In order to overcome these 
research constraints, we need to pay closer attention to the diverse interests of the different 
actors within “state” and “society”, and to explore the incentives, opportunities, strategies, 
and constraints that shape business associations’ behaviors in China, which is also the 
rationale behind this thesis. 
This thesis will not fall into the debate of corporatism and civil society, but try to examine 
the interaction of NCCs as a type of private sector business association or economic NGO 
with local states. First, the concept of “civil society” has a lot of problems when being 
translated into Chinese and applied in the Chinese practice (Wang, 2013), and it is hard to 
define the connotation and extension of “civil society” in the Chinese context. Second, 
NCCs are still in the emerging stage. Whether they belong to the private sector, the third 
sector or being incorporated by the local state, still remains a question. However, NCCs 
has demonstrated a continuum relation with the local states at this stage, which provide a 
new angle for us to probe the state-society relations in contemporary China. 
1.3 Studies of the Chinese policy process 
China’s policy process has been a main focus of China studies in western academia since 
the establishment of the People’s Republic of China, and research on various approaches to 
the policy process have been characterized by a number of issues that have parallels with 
the broader study of policy making and implementation.  All the studies in this field can be 
divided into three periods. The first period is the pre-reform era, when the access to 
information in China was really limited. Most research in this period was based on the 
information available through official channels, official newspapers, and the testimonies of 
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those who had defected from Maoist China (for a discussion see Lieberthal and Oksenberg, 
1988; Lieberthal, 1992). The most popular approach was the “rationality and power” 
model, which focuses on the role played by the political elites in the leadership of China. 
This explanation for policy did not view elites as atomized but saw them as groupings or 
factions with the conflicts between factions influencing policy outcomes. These studies 
have shown both the significance of elite leaders’ role in China’s policy process and the 
limitation of studying an authoritarian regime due to the lack of empirical evidence 
(Nathan, 1973,1976; Tsou, 1976; Harding, 1981; Doak Barnett, 1974).  
The second period is the reform era. The reform process has opened up a variety of 
significant new opportunities for data collection and access to government agencies and 
bureaucrats. In this period, the significance of groups and bureaucracies in policy making 
has been salient, and researchers have merged the power, rationality and bureaucratic 
explanations of the policy process into one single model. This has become known as the 
fragmented authoritarian (FA) model, which argues that bargaining among a fragmented 
bureaucracy has led to the policy change and transition in China (Lieberthal and 
Oksenberg, 1988, Naughton, 1992, Lampton, 1987c, Lampton, 1992, Lieberthal, 1992). To 
date, the FA model is the most complete, coherent and influential theoretical attempt. 
However, the FA model could not explain all the policy sectors very well, and did not 
cover the non-bureaucratic actors’ influence in the policy process.  
The third period of studies on the Chinese policy process then started around 2003 after 
Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) 8 outbreak in China. Since the reform and 
transition has got more in-depth and the demands for society as a role in the Chinese policy 
process has been motivated, more and more non-bureaucratic social groups have got 
involved in the policy process. Quite a few studies have supplemented the FA model, and 
‘Fragmented Authoritarianism 2.0’ has been developed by incorporating “Policy 
Entrepreneurs” such as peripheral officials, non-governmental organizations and the media 
(Mertha, 2009). In addition, some studies have focused on other external actors’ influence 
in the policy process by adapting alternatively available policy process frameworks from 
general political science into China’s practice. These studies are far from prevailing, but 
indicate a new tendency for policy process studies in China. As Mertha indicated, “while 
the fragmented authoritarianism framework continues to define the major contours of the 
                                                 
8 This is severe infectious disease caused by member of Corona virus family. 
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policy-making process in China, the playing field is becoming increasingly crowded” 
(Mertha, 2009). Current research has shed light on media, environmental NGOs, 
international NGOs, Chinese think tanks and all different forms of business lobbying. 
(Kennedy, 2005 & 2010; Zhu, 2005 & 2009; Mertha, 2009). 
Chinese scholars took a rather late start on the study of the Chinese policy process, 
compared to the western academia. As a middle range theory, the study of the policy 
process is restricted to a particular context of political institutions, basic variables, 
dimensions and other conditions, which need to be re-evaluated in the Chinese 
policymaking context. In recent years, quite a few Chinese scholars have realized the 
research demand for policy process theories based on China’s experience, and started to 
illustrate the Chinese policymaking model.  For example, “Crossing River by Feeling the 
Stone” (mozhe shitou guohe) (Xu, 2002), “Integrated Democratic Decision Making 
Model” (yitihua minzhu juece moxing) (Hu, 1997), “six models of agenda setting in 
China’s public policy” (Wang, 2006), “Adapting by Doing Model” (xuexi shiying moxing) 
(Wang, 2008 & 2009), “Consensus-centered Model” (gongshi juece moxing) (Chen, Zhao 
& Xue, 2010), and etc. 
Existing literature on the Chinese policy process has several key features. First, most 
studies have focused on the central policy process rather than local policy. As the local 
policy process has much variation among industries and regions, frameworks generalized 
from the central policymaking can hardly be adapted to the local policy practice. For 
example, Andrew G. Walder has noted that a potential flaw for the FA model is that whilst 
its explanation of the policy process for the center seems sound, the necessary 
fragmentation of authority within the bureaucracy in the local level does not appear to exist 
(Walder, 1992). Therefore, to examine the local policy process in China, it is essential to 
develop analytical framework based on the empirical evidence in the local policymaking. 
According the characteristics of Chinese policymaking in economic transformation, 
Heilmann (2008a, 2008b) has summarized the policy experimentation in China, which 
indicates that the government conducts experimental pilots in some areas first and then 
evaluates and scales up the pilots with the necessary changes following an evaluation. Thus 
he puts forward the pattern of central-local interaction in generating policy -
“experimentation under hierarchy”. Heilmann’s research has gone beyond the central 
policymaking, but focused on the interaction between central and local，which reveals a 
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new paradigm to study Chinese policy process (See policy learning model by Wang, 2008). 
However, due to the practical limits on international researchers at the local level, like 
languages, and access to local bureaucrats, systematic research on the local policy process 
is still in the emerging stage and it seems more demanding than the central level.  
Second, the diversity of external actors being studied is quite limited. As mentioned above, 
there has been a series of studies on non-bureaucratic actors’ influence in the policy 
process. However, since the actors getting involved are increasing and diversified, quite a 
lot of other external actors have not been noticed by academia. A crucial gap exists in 
relation to NCCs, the focus of this thesis. Finally, current research has not revealed the 
different logics of external actors’ influence in the policy process. Due to the nature of 
various external actors, they would develop their unique way to interact with the state and 
exert their influence. For example, business associations would take quite a different 
strategy and tactics to influence policy compared with environmental NGOs. Besides, not 
all the influence occurred in relation to specific policymaking, but more generally in the 
interaction with the local state and the local governance system.   
This research on NCCs’ influence in the policy process will fulfill the above mentioned 
research gap of the Chinese policy process studies. On the one hand, the new type of non-
bureaucratic actor -NCC- will be explicitly studied, including its emergence, development, 
historical connection as well as the interaction with the local state. On the other hand, the 
local policy process in China will be carefully examined. The variation will be displayed 
through cases analysis and comparison, and the local state’s role in the policy process as 
well as its flexibility and responsiveness will be systematically demonstrated in the thesis.  
1.4 Policy process in the Chinese local context 
In the discipline of policy science, the policy cycle is the starting point to study policy 
process in general (Birkland 2005; Hill 2014). There have been various ways to break 
down the policy cycle into different key stages. These stages have changed over the years, 
and vary by country. However, the basic ideas remain the same.  Generally speaking, the 
policy cycle includes agenda setting, policy formulation, decision-making, implementation, 
and evaluation (Howlett, Ramesh, and Perl 2009; Cairney 2014; Hill 2014; Wellstead and 
Stedman, 2015). The cycle is of a continuous process rather than a single event. The 
evaluation stage of a policy represents the first stage of another policy, as lessons learned 
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in the past set the agenda for choices to be made in the future. (Cairney, 2014) Within the 
five key stages of policy cycle, policymaking includes the stages of agenda setting, policy 
formulation and decision-making, which differentiate from policy implementation. 
However, in the Chinese local context, local policymaking and implementation has no 
clear boundary, and it is hard to distinguish various stages of policy cycle.  
The policy cycle theory is widely applied in various political systems to explain the policy 
process, as it divides a complicated process into stages and explains what happens during 
those stages. The policy cycle has got a lot of criticism from academia due to its 
oversimplification of a complex world, still, it serves as a basic model to understand policy 
process in different context and examine the influence of external actors in different policy 
stages.  
To overcome the shortage of stages approach, a number of other policy process approaches 
have emerged, such as the advocacy coalition framework (ACF) (Sabatier, 1988), multiple 
streams framework (MSF) (Kingdon, 1995), institutional rational choice, and punctuated 
equilibrium theory (Schlager and Blomquist, 1996; Sabatier and Weible, 2014), etc. These 
frameworks have enriched the studies of policy process in general, and also provided 
reference to study policy process in China. The question of whether these established 
frameworks could be applied in the practice of China, or new frameworks should be 
extracted based on cases of Chinese experience, categorize the research on China’ policy 
process today into two directional genres. The former direction sees research on conditions 
to apply frameworks like ASF and MSF in the policy cases in China (Huang, 2012; Zhu, 
2008; and etc.), and the latter direction has seen richer academic articles in recent years. 
Wang (2008) summarized the model of “Adapting by Learning” (xuexi shiying moxing) by 
studying the evolution of China's rural health care financing, and summarized the six 
models of agenda setting in the Chinese policymaking (Wang, 2006). Chen (2010) 
extracted the “Consensus-centered Model” (gongshi juece moxing) based on the study of 
Chinese health care reform program from 2005 to 2009. Heilmann (2008a, 2008b) pointed 
out the experiment-based policy process in China, and traced the origins of this unique 
policy process. He described this policy process as the central policy-makers encouraging 
local officials to try out new ways of problem-solving and then feeding the local 
experiences back into national policy formulation. The main methodology for policy 
experimentation includes “experimental points” (shidian) and “proceeding from point to 
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surface” (youdian daomian). All these efforts to search for analytical framework of policy 
process based on Chinese experience have not only fulfilled the area of China studies, but 
also the discipline of policy process in general.  
However, reviewing all the aforementioned literature on Chinese policy process, most of 
them focus on national level or specific industrial policy sphere, and very few has shed 
lights on the policy process in the local level. For example, Lieberthal and Oksenberg 
(1988) focus on energy policy in their book Policy Making in China: Leaders, Structures 
and Processes, though they also reflect the feasibility of their theoretical framework to 
other policy areas; Mertha’s research (2009) focuses on the environmental policies in the 
central level; Kennedy (2005) concentrates his analysis of business lobbying in the steel, 
consumer electronics, and software industries in the national level as well. Heilmann’s 
work (2008a, 2008b) is significant as he reveals a pattern of central-local interaction in 
generating policy - “experimentation under hierarchy”. Though this pattern only exists in 
the policies related to economic transformation, yet it has started to unveil the vast 
complex of local policy process in China. In China, the regional variation is no smaller 
than industrial variation, due to its vast geographical differences and huge population. The 
local policy process involves more actors, incentives and constraints, which is why it is 
much more difficult than national policymaking process.  
Local policy process in China has several important features. First, central state and 
national policy makers play a crucial role in the local policy process, sometimes speeding 
up or hindering the normal progress. As a centralized authoritarian state, central 
government is an inevitable role in the local politics, which made local governments have 
limited decision-making power, but substantial discretional power.  Second, stakeholders’ 
interests are very concentrated in the same localities, which are embedded in the 
interwoven local social network. Therefore, social networks (guanxi) demonstrate more 
significance in influencing the local policy process. Third, local policy making in China 
shows huge regional variations. Due to the difference in width and depth of local reform 
and opening-up, different local policy makers hold different attitudes towards the policy 
process, especially in terms of the responsiveness and tolerance to external policy 
participators. Finally, it is hard to distinguish policy-making and policy implementation in 
the local level. In order to achieve the optimal influence, NCCs try to develop their 
influential behavior against the background of the local policymaking features.  
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In this thesis, I will not distinguish between policymaking and policy implementation in 
the local level for the following reasons: First, in local governance, quite a few policy 
implementations (especially the implementation of central government’s policy) are 
enforced in a way of specific policy or regulation making; second, reversely, very often 
local policymaking is another way of executing the central policy or some special policy.  
In the Chinese local policy process, it is noteworthy that the external actors’ network is 
more significant towards their policy influence than in the general policy process. This is 
based on the following reasons. First, in the local level, social capital and resources are 
much concentrate in a limited space, so the interwoven network could help external actors 
to mobilize the essential resources more efficiently. For example, through network, the 
local media can be utilized to arouse public awareness, thereby creating public pressure to 
policy change.9 Second, personal ties are much stronger in the local level. Blood relations, 
colleague relations, fellow relations, comrade relations, etc. are widely distributed in the 
local governance network, which fulfills the scenario of external actors’ interaction with 
local states. Third, the local policy making structure is not as institutionalized as the central 
policy making, which provides much more access points for external actors to lobby 
decision-makers.  
1.5 External actors’ influence in the local policy process 
1.5.1 Business lobbying 
“Lobbying” refers to any activities undertaken to influence the decisions and actions of 
officials regarding national and local regulations and policies. Chinese views of what 
constitutes lobbying are consistent with this definition (Deng & Kennedy 2010). Lobbying 
in China is becoming more institutionalized (Deng & Kennedy 2010); not only are more 
channels being created or formalized, but the content and depth of lobbying is being re-
evaluated. The fragmented nature of policy-making in China and the competing interests of 
the central government ministries provide multiple access points for interest groups to 
lobby decision-makers. In contrast to previous research, recent research suggests that 
business groups’ lobbying in China may be somewhat more institutionalized (Deng & 
Kennedy, 2010) and resource-based than has been recognized (Popovic, 2014). 
                                                 
9  This could be illustrated in the policy case of “The blue print household” for Decoupling NCC in chapter 6. 
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Business lobbying in China demonstrates various facets among sectors and industries. 
Scott Kennedy mentioned in his book, The Business of Lobbying in China, that it is not 
possible to identify one all-embracing pattern or model. The variation in the ways 
government and business interact are related to varying economic circumstances of 
individual firms and sectors (Kennedy, 2005). He especially researched three sectors: steel, 
consumer electronics and software and found that the circumstances of individual firms 
(large or small) and the characteristic of sectors shape the business-government 
interactions. With business expanding its role in the policy process, his later research has 
showed that, first, companies across ownership forms and nationality lobby the national 
government on public policies in a similar fashion. Second, the lobbying style between 
large companies and business associations differs substantially because of the contrasting 
environments in which they operate - a competitive world for companies and a protected 
bubble for most associations. And third, instead of utilizing guanxi in their lobbying, 
companies and associations build their cases through providing information and 
strengthening their public standing (Deng & Kennedy 2010; Kennedy, 2011). Although it 
is not the whole picture of business lobbying in China, Deng and Kennedy’s research 
asserted that lobbying in China is effective and that large companies and business 
associations are having a substantial effect on Chinese public policy.  
Limited studies have been done regarding the factors that shape success of business 
lobbying, but research has shown that business associations’ state links are significant 
towards their influence in lobbying with policy makers. In Kennedy’s another research on 
industrial association, he carried out more in-depth research on the influential factors to 
their lobbying behavior (Kennedy & Deng, 2012) and found that the associations’ attitude 
towards lobbying, the ages, the autonomy and the representative of industrial associations 
could exert significant influence on their lobbying behavior, while the size does not. Here, 
the “autonomy” means “autonomy from the state” and indicates the relationship between 
industrial associations and the states from the perspective of origin. Regarding the debate 
on whether “autonomy” has a positive impact on lobbying, Yu (2014) argues that business 
associations’ lobbying in China does not rely on autonomy, but “privileged access”. The 
“privileged access” here indicates the relationship between business associations and the 
states from the perspective of network building. Therefore, we could conclude that the 
state linkage of a business organization, whatever from origin or network, does play an 
important role towards its lobbying behavior and outcome. 
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1.5.2 Environmental NGO’s influence on policy change  
In the span of nearly three decades, approximately 440,000 officially registered non-
governmental organizations - alongside a greater number of unregistered ones – have 
emerged (Hsu, 2014). Studies on Chinese NGOs’ influence on policy have seen a fruitful 
academic debate, with a number of studies on environmental NGOs. (Yang, 2005; Johnson, 
2009; Mertha, 2009)  
Along with NGOs’ rise and development in China, research on them has gone from NGOs’ 
introverted features, such as their autonomy from the state, to their extroverted engagement, 
such as their influence on the policy process. Early stage research related to the rise and 
political participation of NGOs has been conducted in the political regime studies, and 
focus on whether the CCP’s hold on power is stable or whether there are signs that a civil 
society is emerging to challenge the political status quo. (White et al, 1996; Saich, 2000; 
Yang, 2002; Whyte, 1992; Shambaugh, 2000; Ma, 2002 & 2006; Lu Yiyi, 2008). Due to 
the rising social challenges and developing space being created by the state, NGOs in 
China have developed dramatically and increased in number with increasing influence in 
governance and political life. Scholars in and outside of China have noticed this tendency 
and carried out more in-depth studies regarding this issue within the “local corporatist state” 
paradigm (Hsu, 2014). However, they could not fully address issues of NGOs’ policy 
influence and explain the variation in influence. 
Studies on NGOs are categorized by GONGO studies and civilian NGO studies. GONGO 
studies include official business associations, the Women's Federation, Youth League, 
Disabled Person’s Federation, trade unions etc. Civilian NGO studies include economic 
NGOs, environmental NGOs, labor NGOs, migrant worker NGOs, international NGOs etc. 
It is noteworthy that most GONGO studies adopt the corporatism approach while most 
civilian NGO studies adopt the pluralism approach. Both frameworks evaluate NGOs 
based on their nature rather than specific activities. However, due to the characteristic of 
the reform era and pragmatism existing among Chinese NGOs, analysis only based on 
nature dichotomy, that is, whether government sponsored or grass-rooted, could not 
explain the variation of NGOs’ activities. Some research has started to pay more attention 
to organizations’ actual activities rather than being locked within the debate about the 
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“nature” of organizations (Zhu, 2012). That is why in this thesis, I recommend analyzing 
both the nature and actual behavior towards Non-local Chambers of Commerce. 
Current studies on NGOs’ policy influence highlight environmental NGOs and there have 
been quite a few English language studies (Johnson, 2009; Yang, 2005; Mertha, 2009). 
Environmental NGOs are becoming increasingly visible players in China's environmental 
politics. In addition, they have also acted as significant “Policy Entrepreneurs”10 in several 
key environmental incidents and milestone events11, though they are still subject to the 
vagaries of the Chinese political environment.  
Although the logic of carrying out activities and yielding influence among different types 
of NGOs is unique and distinct from each other, the strategies of NGOs used to represent 
their members’ interests and channel their efforts into the policy process can be 
summarized as shown below (Chou, 2009): 
1 bargaining, influencing or resisting political constraints through an alliance with the 
mass media; 
2 developing independent sources of revenue; 
3 expanding their sphere of activities through the use of the Internet; 
4 appealing to the public and the international community through the prestige and 
social networks of organizational entrepreneurs; 
5 tapping the expertise of international NGOs; 
6 influencing government officials’ attitudes through research dissemination, the 
demonstration of alternative models and training courses for government leaders; and 
7 legal mobilizations (Yang 2005). 
                                                 
10 Policy entrepreneurs can be defined as those who are willing to devote their time, energy, reputation, and 
money to make policy changes (Kingdon, 1995: p. 179; Mintrom, 1997; Hill, 2003). 
11 Events like Nu River Campaign in 2004; Revise of Environmental Protection Law; Yuanmingyuan Public 
hearing mechanism, etc.   
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1.5.3 Think-tanks and experts’ influence on the policy process 
Chinese think tanks can be defined as stable and autonomous organizations that research 
and consult on policy issues to influence the policy process (Zhu, 2009). Regarding the 
think tanks’ influence in the policy process, Zhu (2009) argues that expert knowledge, 
government linkage, and personal ties are the factors that determine think tanks’ influence 
in the Chinese policy process, while different types of think tanks exert influence through 
different mechanisms: by evaluating the internal and external resources that can be 
accessed, they select the roles either as advisors for the authorities or as advocates in the 
public sphere in influencing public policy (Zhu, 2007, 2009, 2011).  Zhu’s later research 
further clarified the involvement of experts in policy changes, and he argued that not just 
experts exert influence to policy changes, but the characteristic of policy changes would 
affect experts’ way of policy participation. Expert participation is not only one of the 
causes leading to policy changes, but also a result of the inherent characteristics of policy 
changes in the Chinese policy process (Zhu, 2012). 
Research on Chinese think tanks indicates that state linkage is important for think tanks to 
deliver their policy ideas. However, it doesn’t mean think tanks without state linkage could 
not exert policy influence at all. As Zhu (2011) point out, different type of think tanks 
evaluates their internal and external resources to choose different ways and mechanisms to 
exert influence in the policy process, which are also under the constraints of policy 
characteristics and institutional context. Here most of their external resources are 
embedded within their wide spread social networks. 
1.5.4 Business associations’ influence in local politics   
In China, business associations are the collective name for the social organizations12 in 
business and economic area, which include industrial associations, trade associations, 
chambers of commerce, professional or united business organizations, and non-local 
chambers of commerce. Chambers of commerce are a sub-category of business 
associations13, so some studies about them were embedded in the business association 
                                                 
12 In Chinese Civil Affair departments’ registration system, they do not use the term of NGO, but social 
organizations (shehuizuzhi). All the social organizations are categorized into four groups: academic, 
industrial, professional, and united (or alliance). This official category is convenient for governments’ 
management, but not suitable of in-depth research, which has got quite a lot critic from academia. 
13 The term “chamber of commerce” in China has connotations relating to their civil character, and 
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studies. However, a great part of research on chambers of commerce employed different 
perspectives and approaches from the general business association studies. In this section, I 
do not distinguish research on chambers of commerce and other business associations, and 
combine all the existing studies both in English and Chinese. 
Research on the role of chambers of commerce in the Chinese local governance is rare in 
the English language literature. Fewsmith has studied chambers of commerce in Wenzhou 
and argued that the growth of chambers of commerce and other trade associations have 
brought about the new form of state-society accommodation, but not challenged party rule. 
Thus, a new ruling elite composed of both party officials and private entrepreneurs seems 
to be emerging in Wenzhou and Zhejiang, which makes policymaking is more consultative 
and better reflects the needs of industry, though political authority still remains central to 
the operation of the system (Fewsmith, 2005).  
Simultaneously, Chinese scholars have done some brief and descriptive studies in Chinese. 
One category of research on chambers of commerce in China focused on discussions of the 
mechanisms of how the chambers of commerce were produced. Scholars argue that they 
were generated in the process of businesses and governments’ pursuit of profit (Jiang, 
2008; Sun, 2008; Chen & Ma, 2007). Having a profit-driven nature, businesses need 
chambers of commerce to represent and safeguard their rights and interests. Meanwhile, 
because of the special role that chambers of commerce played in economic development, 
they became the object of local government to cooperate actively. Such rational choices of 
businesses and governments led to the rise of chambers of commerce and other trade 
groups. Another study has shown that their development is the result of local government 
cultivation (Alpermann, 2006). However, most of the current studies are based on the case 
study of the Wenzhou Chamber of Commerce, and are relatively descriptive by telling the 
story about how the Wenzhou Chamber of Commerce started and what role they played in 
the Wenzhou economy. Hence, there is a lack of theoretical generalization and 
comparative studies about chambers of commerce in different industries and geographical 
areas.  
Another perspective to analyze the chambers of commerce in China is from an economic 
and market angle. This type of research is mainly about the roles that chambers of 
                                                                                                                                                   
sometimes they could be called “non-governmental commercial chamber”, although most of them have 
administrative links to governments. 
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commerce have played. Some articles have shown that chambers have become significant 
actors in local governance and are able to play a role in lowering transaction costs (Qin, 
2003), compensating for government failure (Yu, 2002), co-operating with local 
governments (Li, 2005) and constructing institutionalized channels for expressions of 
interest (Chen, 2003 & Yu, 2004). These studies are comprehensive but no more than a 
general description at the macro level. Owing to a lack of original data and information, 
systematic qualitative analyzes based on case comparisons have not been conducted.  
Finally, the new trend of researching chambers of commerce and other business 
associations’ influence in recent years is focusing on their participation in the political 
process, including lobbying with policy makers and interaction with the political entities. 
Studies of chambers of commerce in the US have noted their influence on policy, both in 
relation to economic development and the welfare state (Friedman, 1947; Werking, 1978). 
These kinds of studies have started to emerge in Mainland China after 2005. A few 
descriptive studies have revealed the business associations’ involvements and mechanisms 
in Chinese local governance at the micro-level (Yu, 2006; Chen & Ma, 2007). One study 
compares the different influence between business individual lobbying and organizational 
lobbying and argues that the lobbying style between large companies and industry 
associations differs substantially because of the contrasting environments in which they 
operate - a competitive world for companies and a protected bubble for most associations 
(Deng & Kennedy, 2010). Young scholars in China have started to pay more attention in 
this field as well. Wang’s study (Wang, 2014) written in Chinese firstly adopted the 
concept of “Vertical Network” and “Horizontal Network” for industrial associations and 
aimed to look for the new approach to explain state-society interaction by using the micro 
mechanism. Huang (2013) has taken an alternative approach to examine how the local 
states’ institutions and policy influenced entrepreneurs’ lobbying behavior and outcome. 
These studies take an opposite research approach and highlight the role of state network 
and political institution’s role towards the behavior and outcome of business lobbying. All 
these works in the Chinese scholarship show young scholars’ efforts to explore new 
analytical approaches and frameworks to explain the transitional and diversified state-
business relationship in China. 
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1.5.5 Summary andcomments 
Reviewing all these research, we could find that few studies have identified and explained 
how business associations participate in Chinese local governance and exert their influence 
in the policy process. This issue is difficult to study, because business association is an 
extensive and comprehensive concept that can be categorized by different dimensions, 
such as official versus unofficial, local versus non-local, or top-bottom versus bottom-up. 
Moreover, due to the wide range of variation, there is no established framework that can be 
adapted to explain the interaction between business associations and local governments. 
Existing studies focus on chambers of commerce in their native locality, but a growing 
number of NCCs are not being studied yet. 
Moreover, it is clear to conclude from the existing studies that state links and network 
functions as significant factors in non-bureaucratic actors’ policy influence. It was the 
common view among researchers before that the majority of business efforts to influence 
the policy process in China rely extensively on personal ties, so the voice of diffuse 
interests has been mostly ignored through the stages of the policy-making process 
(Popovic, 2014). With the evolution of business lobbying, apart from the asserting 
distinctive relationship between government and business, recent research has shown that 
informal interactions with the government are less frequent and valuable than they used to 
be (e.g. Judd 2007). Empirical evidence supports the view that business actors do not just 
depend primarily on guanxi to achieve their aims (Kennedy & Deng 2010). It needs to be 
pointed out that, as government-business interaction are strengthened and more and more 
informal behaviors are institutionalized, the connotation and denotation of “network” has 
been expanded, and is not limited to personal ties any more. Although the personal ties 
may not as significant as before, yet the state links of business associations and whatever 
other type of NGOs are still important for their influential power. For example, Yu (2014) 
asserts the significance of “privileged access” in business associations’ political 
engagement. Kennedy (2012) demonstrates that industry associations’ autonomy from the 
state directly affected their way of lobbying. Other studies on think tanks, environmental 
NGOs, and social organizations have implicitly mentioned or explicitly proved the role of 
state links towards their influence in the Chinese policy process (Zhu, 2009b, 2009c & 
2011; Johnson, 2009; Fulda, 2012; Wang, 2014, Huang, 2013). Therefore, exploring how 
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networks work in relation to business associations’ lobbying at the local level and 
uncovering the mechanisms is of great significance. 
The significance of network towards external actors’ policy influence has started to draw 
attention from academia. Fulda (2012) points out network governance approach adopted 
by a Civil Society Organization (CSO) in Beijing lead to their success in achieving 
influence in the local governance. By building the close network with First-in-Command 
(FIC) cadres the CSO manages to introduce ideas and initiate open-ended processes of 
communication, consultation and cooperation, which help promote cross sector 
collaboration between Chinese civil society organizations and local government agencies. 
Zhu’s survey on think tanks nationwide (2009b) also emphasizes that that expert 
knowledge, governmental linkage, and personal ties are the factors that determine think 
tanks' influence in the Chinese policy process. 
Non-bureaucratic actors are playing an increasing role in the Chinese policy process, 
though variations were revealed among different policy spheres and institutional context. 
Generally speaking, current studies on environmental NGOs and think thanks’ policy 
influence are most based on the central or national policy process, while studies on 
business associations’ political engagement are mostly based on the local level. This is 
primarily due to that the information of business lobbying in the national level is hard to 
access, and furthermore most business lobbying activities in China are embedded in the 
stat-business interaction, which are different from the independent lobbying as in western 
democratic countries. 
1.6 Introducing the research object: Non-local Chambers of 
Commerce (NCCs) 
In this thesis I focus on NCCs, a type of chamber of commerce, to probe the state-business 
interaction and business associations’ influence in the local policy process in China. NCCs 
are a kind of transformative chamber of commerce, which raises particular issues besides 
the ones that other chambers of commerce focus on. Taking NCC as a research object will 
be helpful to understand the most updated state-society relations in China, and accumulate 
to the knowledge of external actors’ participation in the Chinese policy process. Although 
there has been no research directly regarding NCCs in the English literature, current 
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studies of other external actors provide very good starting points and reference. The 
lobbying of external actors demonstrates different behavior patterns but with a similar 
logic, which helps to understand NCCs’ participation and involvement in Chinese local 
policy processes.  
The developing path of how NCCs have started in China is quite clear. With the 
development of China’s private economy and the opening up policy, more and more 
private capital began to flow between regions. Thus there appeared a large number of 
businessmen who did business widely outside their hometowns, who are called “non-local 
businessmen”. “Non-local” indicates that locality is an important identification for citizens 
in China, and reflects the impact of the prevailing household registration system. The 
household registration system is an elementary national institution in current China, under 
which each person has household registration identification - Household Register “hukou”. 
The “hukou” was highly significant for people during the Mao era, because it decided the 
unit where your basic living allowances came from, and it still plays a great role until now. 
If a person has a “hukou” in the city where she lives, she can be called “local”; she would 
be called “non-local” if she does not have it. 
Since the 1990s, these non-local businessmen have begun to set up their own organizations 
- Non-local Chambers of Commerce. As mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, thirty 
years’ economic development has catalyzed the private sector’s emergence hence leading 
to private entrepreneurs setting up new types of business associations. Business 
associations, as representatives of private sectors, are more and more involved in the 
political life and policy scheme in the past twenty years. NCCs, as one of the new 
burgeoning business associations with unique features in the Chinese context, started in the 
mid-1990s, and have proliferated rapidly beyond localities and industries.  
The definition of NCC has not been yet discussed in the scholarship. According to the 
existing provincial regulations, NCC is a kind of business association with the name of the 
original administrative region, and being initiated and established in the registration place 
voluntarily by the foreign invested enterprises (including individual industrialists and 
businessmen) from the same original region.14 For example, businessmen who came from 
different provinces outside of Tianjin established the NCCs in Tianjin. There have been 36 
                                                 
14 From the rules on NCCs in Zhejiang province. 
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NCCs being established in Tianjin by the end of 2014.15 After the first NCC -- Wenzhou 
Chamber of Commerce in Kunming - was established in 1995, thousands of NCCs 
proliferated in various locations nationwide in China. By December 2010, the number of 
NCCs registered in civil affairs departments at all levels had increased to 9103.16 Most of 
them are located in the eastern and central parts of China, especially the provinces that 
have developed private economies, such as Zhejiang Province, Fujian Province, 
Guangdong Province, and Beijing and surrounding areas. Moreover, a tendency of 
expansion to the west has started during the past decade.   
According to the definition of NCC, NCC is rather a private sector business association or 
economic NGO than a civil society organization, according to their organizational forms 
and goals. As quite a great number of NCCs arise from grassroots society, it has the 
characteristics of civil society organizations. However, the great variation within NCCs 
will reveal in this thesis. Some NCCs are closely bounded with local states, and some are 
more public interest based, while others are very oriented to the private sector. At this 
moment, it is difficult to define a clear boundary of NCCs as they are still in the emerging 
stage. 
Due to the short history and the dearth of information readily available on them, the study 
of NCCs both internationally and domestically is still in its infancy and there is no 
systematic strand of literature on this topic. Until the present, there is only one English 
language paper mentioning this new organizational phenomenon written by Deng and 
Kennedy (2010), “The number of trade associations representing domestic and foreign 
companies has grown rapidly, with the greatest expansion recently seen in the proliferation 
of branches and municipal chambers of commerce outside their home localities (yidi 
shanghui)”. Only three published articles in Chinese have specifically focused on NCCs. 
Most of the related articles do not distinguish them from the general chambers of 
commerce. According to the literature, NCC is a type of economic NGO, and is considered 
by scholars as a special product of Chinese economic and social development (Leng, 2004; 
Yu, 2006; Chen & Ma, 2007). NCCs are not only a link between businesses and 
government like other Chambers of Commerce, but also a mechanism through which local 
economies open to non-local businesses (Yu, 2006). Besides the conventional functions of 
chambers of commerce, NCCs have become one of the primary channels for local 
                                                 
15 From transcription of interviews to Director Zhou in Tianjin economic cooperation office. June 2012. 
16 Reports on China Non-local Chamber of Commerce, 2011. 
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government to attract non-local investment. Hence NCCs could provide platforms for 
economic cooperation between local governments.  
I choose NCCs as the objects of this study, mainly based on following two considerations. 
First, NCCs are a new type of business group resulting from private sector development, 
and they have already demonstrated enough political significance compared to other 
societal actors. Whether bottom-up or not, they mainly represent power outside the formal 
institutional framework. Second, NCCs are mainly composed of domestic migrants, which 
relates to one of the tightest institutional constraints for social policy reform in China - the 
household registration system. Examining how non-local people engage in the local policy 
process and generally the local governance helps to shed light on the difficulties in social 
policy integration and how to overcome the integration deficit across the whole country.  
1.7 Research questions and arguments 
In the fieldwork to collect empirical materials for NCCs, I found that NCCs in China have 
proliferated rapidly and demonstrated increasing involvement and influence in local 
politics and governance, with huge variation among regions and industries, which will be 
shown in the following chapters. It is hard to understand this variation without an 
established analytical framework. Since this research is an inductive study and limited 
reference could be got from existing studies, I take the literature on business associations 
and external actors’ influence in the Chinese policy process as a theoretical base and 
develop my research questions and key concepts.   
In this sense, this thesis aims to show the picture of NCCs’ emergence and development, as 
well as their influence in the Chinese local policy process, by answering two main 
questions: First, how do NCCs influence the local policy process (interact with the local 
state); and second, what explains the variation among their policy influences. 
NCCs’ involvement in the policy process is a new emerging phenomenon, with substantial 
resources and political support involved. If unveiled, it would doubtlessly trigger wider 
scholarly interest. First, as a grass-roots business group, NCCs arise with the features of 
both business associations and grassroots NGOs, yet it remains unknown whether their 
influence in the policy process is similar to business lobbying or NGO advocacy. Secondly, 
NCCs’ growth mode and behavior pattern have demonstrated great variation among 
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regions, industries, organizational forms, and policy spheres, which created a huge demand 
for a comprehensive theoretical framework with some degree of explanation to illustrate 
these variations. However, there has been no English literature referring to NCCs’ 
influence in the policy process, and even in the Chinese literature, most research has 
focused on general description and analysis, without substantial empirical evidence being 
provided.17 Thus there is a big gap between the growth of NCCs both in number and size, 
and limited studies of them within and outside of China. Due to the deficit of research 
materials and existing data, I decided to carry out inductive research on NCCs’ influence in 
the Chinese urban policy process. 
In the research towards NCCs and their policy influence, I develop two key concepts: 
NCCs’ “origin” and “network”. NCCs’ origin, indicates where the NCC comes from, from 
state’s initiative or entrepreneurs’ initiative, so in a certain degree, NCCs’ origin reflects 
their state links. In this research, I define NCCs’ origin as its establishment initiatives. 
NCCs’ network refers to the network NCCs discreetly weave after establishment and can 
be categorized into state network and business network in this research. Hence there are 
two new developed concepts: network orientation and network strategy. Network 
orientation refers to the orientation of NCCs’ network building that is state network 
oriented or business network oriented, while network strategy refers to the feature of 
network NCCs aim to achieve. Here in the following text I am going to introduce these 
three important concepts: establishment initiatives, network orientation and network 
strategy.  
NCCs’ establishment initiatives 
NCCs’ establishment initiatives indicate the dominant power and state - society path 
during NCCs’ emergence. In this thesis, it refers to NCC’s original support gained for its 
establishment. NCCs are either initiated by the local state or by non-local entrepreneurs. 
This means they can generally be categorized as top-down and bottom-up. It seems easy to 
clearly define the boundary between top-down and bottom up modes. Nevertheless, some 
NCCs have got support from both the local state and membership entrepreneurs at the 
early stage of their establishment, which might confuse the division. In order to clarify this 
concept, this thesis defines the original initiatives to establish this organization as the key 
                                                 
17 Reference to Chen Shengyong, Yu Jianxing, Jiang Hua. 
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standard to distinguish between top-down and bottom-up types. If NCCs are initiated by 
non-local businessmen or entrepreneurs, I refer to them as the “bottom-up” type; if NCCs 
are initiated by government agencies or any organization with official background, either 
from home localities or host localities, I refer to them as the “top-down” type. 
NCCs’ network orientation 
In this thesis, I define that NCCs’ network orientation as NCC’s orientation in building up 
their networks after their creation, which indicates NCCs’ preference in focal networks. 
NCCs’ networks mainly include business networks and state networks, where business 
networks refer to the network within business circles, and state network refers to the 
network within officialdom of host government, home government, and other levels of 
governments. Network orientation is a relative concept, and it can only indicate NCCs’ 
tendency in weaving their networks. Although most NCCs might simultaneously carry out 
activities to enhance both their state network and business network, eventually they 
develop a preference or orientation for the purpose of maximizing their interests. Therefore, 
NCCs’ network orientation can be divided into state network oriented and business 
network oriented.  In practice, state network oriented NCCs and business network oriented 
NCCs demonstrated different characteristics, which will be specified in the following case 
study chapters. 
NCCs’ network strategy 
NCCs’ network strategy refers to the strategy and methods of NCCs’ network building, 
and it indicates an NCC’s most valued feature of their networks. Based on the empirical 
evidence from this research, network strategies can be categorized into Network Span (NS) 
strategy and Network Intensity (NI) Strategy.  
Network Span means NCCs focus on the breadth of networks they have built up. NCCs 
adopting an NS strategy make great efforts to expand their network coverage, and try to 
include as many social strata as possible in their external network. As mentioned in the 
case chapters, the Zhejiang NCC in Tianjin is a good example of an NCC taking the NS 
strategy. The Zhejiang NCC has built close relations with both its home government and 
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host government since the early stages of its creation.18 It also has strong support from 
membership enterprises in both Zhejiang and Tianjin. Besides, it was the first to set up the 
public and media office and “Zhejiang merchant in Tianjin” exhibition among all the 
Tianjin NCCs, to effectively manage the relations with the media and the public, as well as 
the intellectuals in relevant areas. 
Network Intensity means NCCs emphasize the depth and strength of networks. NCCs 
adopting an NI strategy focus on the key network they rely on, and make efforts to 
formally or informally enhance the established links within this network. A good example 
is the Sha’anxi NCC and the Guangdong NCC in the case chapters. The Sha’anxi NCC 
heavily depends on the Sha’anxi Province’s Tianjin Liaison office financially and 
personally. It does not have a separate office and team at all. However, due to the official 
linkage with the government, their network is much stronger than other NCCs’, which 
gives them more formal or informal channels to deliver ideas and expression although 
there is still doubt about their autonomy. While the Guangdong NCC is also focus the sole 
network, which is entrepreneurs’ business network. This is reflected in Guangdong NCCs’ 
motto “Based on the business and Managing Government”.  
Network orientation and network strategy are important for NCCs. First, they directly 
affect how NCCs build up their external networks, and indicate their initiative in using 
networks and assemble the resources. Secondly, they demonstrate the differences between 
NCCs and conventional business associations. Rather than passively accepting the existing 
network, NCCs have operated proactively and independently on their preference of how to 
interweave their networks, in order to achieve the goal of lobbying. 
Argument of the thesis 
This thesis will show how NCCs’ origin and network have played an important role in their 
policy engagement. The existing literature has shown that state links and network are key 
factors for organizations to exert their influence in policy process (Zhu, 2009; Bian, 2009, 
Lin, 1982; Zhou, 2000), but did not show how. This research will adapt this causal link in 
the case of NCCs, and examine how NCCs’ origin (state links) and network strategy affect 
their influence in the Chinese local policy process.  
                                                 
18  Refer to the note of Zhejiang NCCs founding diary in the author’s fieldwork diary. 
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After comprehensive and comparative case studies, this thesis argues that, NCCs’ links 
with state is playing an important but nonlinear role in their influence to local policy 
process, and their network strategy show more robustness in influencing local policy 
process. Or it can be summarized as, NCCs’ State links determines their channel to access 
policy agenda, while their network strategy determines the substantial strength and 
capacity of their policy influence. 
Based on the two dimensions of “networks” and “origins”, NCCs’ in China are categorized 
into four types: “Dependent NCCs”, “Independent NCCs”, “Coupling NCCs” and 
“Decoupling NCCs”; Different types of NCCs adopts different network strategies to 
influence local policy process: NCCs’ Network Span influences local policymaking, while 
Network Intensity influences local policy implementation. Or it could be interpreted that, 
NCCs with Network Span strategy could influence more general policy agendas and policy 
sphere, while NCCs with Network Intensity strategy could exert more influence in specific 
policies especially in the policy implementation stage.  
1.8 Methodology 
The choice of research methods in this thesis was shaped by my research question and the 
nature of the information needed. Given the lack of previous research on NCCs and the 
open nature of the research question, I choose to use both inductive approaches to carry out 
a qualitative research based on comparative case studies.     
The main purpose of this research is to show the full picture of NCCs’ emergence and 
development in China, and examine their interaction with local state by answering two 
questions of how do NCCs influence the local policy process and what explains the 
variation of NCCs’ influences through in-depth investigation of NCCs in selected case 
localities. Due to the lack of existing academic resources on NCCs, most of the 
information needs to be captured by first hand in the interviews, participant observations, 
internal reports, or relevant newspaper, magazines, internet news reports and NCCs’ 
official website, etc. Therefore, this research has employed documentation analysis, 
individual in-depth interviews, participant observation and case studies. Documentations 
have been used to get knowledge of the background of NCC’s emergence and 
development, while in-depth interviews and participant observation have been used to 
explore NCCs’ lobbying strategies and behavior, and case studies have been taken to study 
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the variation among different types of NCCs or different behaviors of a specific NCC in 
different context. 
I conducted three fieldwork trips to Tianjin respectively in June-July 2011, March-June 
2012 and July 2013, and one fieldwork trip to Hangzhou in July 2012. In Tianjin, I did in 
total 49 interviews with more than 50 interviewees during the three fieldwork trips, and 
conducted participant observation in Tianjin Guangdong NCC for two weeks and Tianjin 
Shanxi NCC for one week in 2012. My interviewees include officials in Tianjin Economic 
Cooperation Office, Tianjin Civil Affairs Bureau, Tianjin Commercial Committee and in 
district level government departments, officials working in the liaison office of 
Guangdong, Zhejiang, Sha’anxi, scholars in universities and research institute, presidents 
and secretory-generals of NCCs as well as their NCC staff, the directors and 
representatives of NCCs’ membership enterprises, etc. In Hangzhou, I did 11 interviews 
with 10 interviewees, including presidents and secretory-generals of NCCs as well as their 
NCC staff, officials in Hangzhou Development Research Center, Hangzhou Brand 
Building Center, Scholars in Zhejiang Provincial Party School and Zhejiang University, 
etc.  
It is worth mentioning that I attended two academic symposiums where I presented my 
preliminary research when I did fieldwork in China. The first one was in Nankai 
University in June 2011, and the second one was in Nanjing University in June 2013. In 
these two occasions, I have received quite a few feedbacks from some established scholars 
and fellow researchers, which all contribute to the empirical materials needed for this 
research. 
The documentations used in this research project include official documents, internal 
reports, NCCs’ annual reports, NCCs’ newspapers and magazines, and related official 
statistics. Most of the internal reports, NCCs’ annual reports and statistics about NCCs ere 
acquired by myself in the field visit, while only small part of the general statistics and 
official documents are publicly published. Moreover, quite a substance of information was 
accessed online from NCCs’ official website. 
The in-depth interviews were conducted in a semi-structured way. In order to adapt to the 
requirement of different respondents, I designed three versions of interview questions list 
respectively towards to interviewees in NCCs, officials and scholars, which are slightly 
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different in the rhetoric of questions being asked and the emphasis of questions. In 
interviewing the officials and scholars, I used the mixed method of introduction through 
common friends and snowball sampling. Especially when interviewing the cases of NCCs’ 
influencing local policies, snowball sampling method did help to restore the course of 
events.  
The participant observation did the biggest contribution to the empirical evidence needed 
for this research. Most of the documentations needed were accessed during the participant 
observation period. Besides, most of the policy cases of Tianjin Shanxi NCC and Tianjin 
Guangdong NCCs were derived from the observation within the organization as well.  
The case studies have been carried out in Tianjin and Hangzhou. However, in order to 
control the effects of local states, all the cases of NCC and the policy cases that I have 
selected in the following chapters are based in Tianjin. This way I can specifically examine 
how NCCs’ establishment initiatives and network strategy influence their lobbying 
behavior in the situation of controlling the constant variables. 
1.9 Chapter outline  
Chapter 2 is based on the empirical materials and examining the emergence and 
development of NCCs with a focus on Wenzhou NCCs, and NCCs’ development status 
quo in selected case localities of Tianjin and Hangzhou. It then analyzes NCCs’ 
characteristic and features, followed by NCCs’ political engagement and policy 
participation in the local policy process. 
Chapter 3 shows NCCs’ variation in registration, position in the local administration 
system, growth mode and behavior strategy. In order to explain these variations, it then 
develops a typology of NCCs by using the dimensions of origin and network. Finally, it 
elaborates on the four types of NCCs: independent NCC, coupling NCC, decoupling NCC, 
and dependent NCC.  
Chapters 4, 5 and 6 specifically introduce each type of NCC using in-depth case studies, 
and reveal the mechanisms of NCCs’ lobbying and interaction with the local state. They 
will explore how establishment initiatives and network strategies affected NCCs’ policy in 
the local policy process by comparing different policy cases. 
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Before drawing conclusions, Chapter 7 makes two comparisons. First, it compares four 
different types of NCCs and demonstrates the significance of NCCs state links and 
network strategy towards their influence in the local policy process; Second, it compares 
NCCs and other external actors, and illustrates in a broader sense the generality and 
individuality of external actors’ influence in the policy process. Finally, it shows the 
implications and limits of the research. 
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Chapter 2 NCCs in China: emergence, development and 
political engagement 
Private sector development increased the numbers and diversified the forms of business 
associations in China. NCCs, as a new form of social organization, have extended the 
spectrum of business associations. However, since NCCs are newly burgeoning and there 
is a shortage of empirical data on them, they are heavily under-studied with scant research 
both in English and Chinese. This chapter will focus on the emergence and development of 
NCCs, and their political engagement in contemporary China. It will provide the basis for 
the analysis in the chapters that follow which examine NCCs’ typology and their various 
influences in the Chinese local policy process.  
Existing studies of NCCs in Chinese are brief and mainly based on descriptive 
introductions to single cases, with an empirical focus on the upsurge of Wenzhou 
Chambers of Commerce and their growing capacity to influence the local governance 
(Jiang, 2008; Yu, 2007 & 2012; Chen, 2010). But we know little about the big picture of 
NCCs’ development in China and their regional variation politically and geographically. 
According to my fieldwork in Tianjin and Hangzhou for this research, NCCs’ variation has 
not just been reflected in the way they have been established, but also in the whole process 
of their development and interaction with local states. Compared to other local business 
associations and trade groups in China, NCCs’ relationship with state has been wide-
ranging, which is why it particularly caught my academic interest. A detailed introduction 
of NCCs’ history and development in China, as set out in this chapter, therefore not only 
helps us to understand the general picture and provides the basis for my own analysis; it 
also provides a foundation for further systematic research. This chapter thus contributes to 
filling this particular empirical research gap. 
This chapter will be mainly based on first-hand data from my fieldwork research in China 
in 2011, 2012 and 2013. In addition, in order to update the existing literature and reflect 
important developments that have occurred in recent years, I also draw on a significant 
amount of primary material, including Chinese government policy documents and official 
communications, NCCs’ annual reports, and a large amount of media coverage. 
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2.1 NCCs’ emergence in the 1990s 
With the initiation of the opening up policy in 1978, China’s private economy began to 
develop after more than 30 years of prohibition, which led to profound changes in the 
Chinese economy and society. Subsequently in the 1990s, marketization catalyzed the 
flourishing of the private sector in China. The private sector’s development has led to 
capital flowing and people migrating among regions. Inspired by Deng Xiaoping’s 1992 
Southern Tour Speech,19 unprecedentedly large numbers of people from many professions 
jumped into the market and started their own business, something that was referred to as 
going “down to the sea” (xiahai) at that time.20 These people became the first generation of 
entrepreneurs after marketization reform in China. Simultaneously, migrant workers and 
self-employed workers inland chose to seek opportunities in southeastern coastal areas and 
vice versa. This boosted the private sector’s rapid development and accelerated business 
people’s mobility, especially in the southeastern coastal area. At that time, 14 coastal open 
cities were enjoying preferential economic policies from the central government,21 which 
attracted business people to these areas as they looked for the best soil to grow their own 
enterprises. The success of private business attracted more and more people to leave their 
home towns and become “non-local business people” (yidi shangren). 
The direct consequence of the rise of non-local business people was the demand for an 
organization to protect their interests. In the beginning, non-local start-ups fought very 
hard to survive, and aimed to settle down in different host cities. With the constant change 
to the market environment, and fierce market competition, individual enterprises found it 
hard to take on this challenge alone. As one Wenzhou businessman put it: “A fist is much 
more powerful than five single fingers”.22 In this context, the demands to set up their own 
business associations became strong among non-local entrepreneurs. In order to achieve 
their goals, different non-local groups adopted various strategies and tactics, influenced in 
                                                 
19 Deng’s Southern tour speech is famous in Chinese history, as it re-confirmed the “Reform and Opening 
Up” Policy and created a clear direction for market economy in China after the 1989 Tiananmen incident. 
20 In the late 1980s and early 1990s, there were also a great number of government officials who quit their 
jobs and got into the business sector, in order to pursue the big interests caused by “double track price 
system” (jiage shuanggui zhi). 
21 The 14 coastal open cities were promulgated in 1985 by the State Council. These are (from north to south): 
Dalian, Qinhuangdao, Tianjin, Yantai, Qingdao, Lianyungang, Nantong, Shanghai, Ningbo, Wenzhou, 
Fuzhou, Guangzhou, Zhanjiang and Beihai. 
22 Source from a speech from a Wenzhou entrepreneur in Wenzhou NCC conference in Hangzhou, June 2012. 
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part by the support from their home governments and host governments23  where they 
resided, as well as their own capacity in mobilizing resources.  
Non-local business people started the lobbying process in order to successfully establish 
their own organizations, and there were different approaches being practiced. First, some 
entrepreneurs tried to seek support from their host government. According to the “Social 
Groups Management Registration Ordinance” (shehui tuanti guanli dengji tiaoli) 
promulgated in 1998，in order to establish a social group it is necessary to abide by the 
“Dual Management System”. 24  This means social groups need to find a supportive 
government agency to be their “Supervision Unit”,25 in addition to registering in the local 
Civil Affairs Bureaus. However, due to the shortage of explicit legal provision and 
ambiguous rules, very few government agencies would like to take the risk, which made 
this route quite difficult for grassroots NCCs, but relatively easy for NCCs with an official 
background.26 
Second, some entrepreneurs sought support from their home government. Take Wenzhou 
entrepreneurs, for example. Since Wenzhou entrepreneurs have long had bases in different 
localities around China, most of them have encountered difficulties in looking for a 
‘mother in-law’.27 Rather than focusing on the host governments, they therefore began to 
look for support to their home government in Wenzhou, which was more open and 
responsive than other city governments in the reform era. The Wenzhou government then 
began in 1995 to represent Wenzhou entrepreneurs to communicate and negotiate with 
different host governments, which facilitated the registration process of Wenzhou NCCs.28 
                                                 
23 In this thesis, “home government” refers to NCCs’ government of origin, which is the local government of 
the place where these non-local businessmen originally come from; “host government” refers to the 
government of the place where NCC get registered and resides. For example, Tianjin Wenzhou NCC’s home 
government is the Wenzhou municipal government, while its host government is Tianjin municipal 
government.  
24 The “Dual Management System” was and still is the main policy for Chinese Authorities to manage civil 
society organizations in China, though some reform of abolishing the “Supervision Unit” has been 
experimented in places like Guangdong, Beijing etc. since 2010. 
25 The “Supervision Unit” for NCCs could be any local government department in principle, but in practice, 
the local ICF, ECO or commercial committee were always being the targets for lobbying. The meaning of 
“supervision” here refers to “management in business”. (shehui tuanti guanli dengji tiaoli). 
26 NCCs with an “official” background refer to those NCCs with a “top-down” establishment initiative. 
27 It means their ‘business supervision unit’ in host localities. 
28 During the process of the first Wenzhou NCC’s establishment in Kunming, which is also the very first 
NCC in China, Wenzhou municipal government had been engaged in the negotiation with Kunming 
municipal government. 
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There is a third situation in some metropolitan regions. For example, in Beijing, the rule to 
find a supervision unit and get registered is more restricted compared to other cities. 
Therefore, non-local entrepreneurs have to lobby their home government’s liaison office in 
Beijing, and try to seek help from them for registration. 29  In order to regulate the 
confusions during NCCs’ registration, Beijing municipal government promulgated the 
decision in 2009, that all the provinces’ Beijing liaison offices are the ‘supervision unit’ of 
different NCCs in Beijing. In practice, the liaison offices are not only responsible for 
NCCs’ business, but sometimes get involved into the personnel arrangements relating to 
NCCs’ administration. This special arrangement has made inroads on NCCs’ independence, 
but it helped to build a strong state network with great political resources for NCCs in 
Beijing.  
After much lobbying and negotiation, the first NCC was established in Southwest China in 
1995. Wenzhou entrepreneurs in Kunming established Kunming Wenzhou NCC, which 
was the first NCC under legal registration in China. During the process of its establishment, 
Wenzhou entrepreneurs encountered many obstacles from legislation and registration. Mr. 
Zhang was the first president, and also one of founders in Wenzhou NCCs’ preparatory 
phase. He recalled, “We had fireworks on the day when we got legally registered. It was 
such great news for us, since we had made numerous communications and negotiations 
over more than a year’s preparatory time.”30 In the early 1990s, there had been more than 
30,000 Wenzhou businessmen in Kunming, and their business strength and influence had 
increased fast. However, when it came to other spheres, such as public facilities, business 
conflict and social welfare policies, they found that they were weak in their ability to 
respond to and resolve businesses’ problems. Then they developed the idea of setting up a 
business union to protect their own interests. However, their application to Kunming Civil 
Affairs Bureau was blocked. Some local authorities feared that Wenzhou businessmen 
would form gangs and monopolize the market. Meanwhile, the big worries about the 
politicization of economic organization as what happened in the Cultural Revolution 
period still widely remained. “We are afraid to be seen as illegal organizations and worried 
                                                 
29 Liaison office is a long-existing mechanism for different level of governments to realise intergovernmental 
communication and lobbying. The most significant liaison offices in China are local governments’ Bejing 
liaison offices, which can be dated back to Tang Dynasty. However, most of the current ones are set up in the 
late 1980s, when the Tax Share System was implemented between central and local governments. Their main 
function is to do lobbying with central ministries for more preferable policies or transfer payments. Other 
functions include promoting local leaders’ visits and stopping local petitioners from making petitions to the 
central government.  
30 More details see南方周末：解密温州商会 娘家、伙伴与情报站, http://finance.sina.com.cn, 15th April, 
2004. 
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to lose everything we have gathered”.31 This is because the Social Groups Management 
Registration Ordinance did not encourage establishing social organizations like NCCs or 
associations of fellow townspeople. And there were no other explicit regulations to legalize 
NCCs’ existence and status. In the year of 1995, the initiators tried to lobby with each 
relevant department in the local authorities and repeatedly stated that they were just 
businessmen and the organized form would be in favor of better management for local 
authorities. Wenzhou Economic Cooperation Office also specially sent officials to 
Kunming to lobby on their behalf. Under the joint efforts of several parties, Kunming CAB 
finally approved the application.32 
It is clear that the first NCC had broken the ceiling of institutional constraint in practice. 
However, it did not mean that the subsequent NCCs have not come across any obstacles 
like this. NCCs were distributed in different localities, and communication between them 
was very rare at the early stage, therefore, almost all the first NCCs in different localities 
were pioneers in breaking the existing institutional constraints and experienced large or 
small obstacles when they sought registration.33 
NCCs’ emergence in the 1990s was not salient but significant, as it smoothed the 
grassroots associations’ registration path and methods of negotiation with the local state. 
After the first Wenzhou NCC was established in 1995, Wenzhou NCCs appeared in 
Shenyang, Harbin, Changchun, Tianjin, Ningxia, Inner Mongolia, Xi’an and other big 
cities in China in the following years. The development of NCCs was not limited to 
Wenzhou NCCs, either. Hundreds of NCCs from elsewhere proliferated in various 
locations. By December 2010, the number of NCCs registered in Civil Affairs departments 
at all levels increased to 9103 (Reports on China Non-local Chamber of Commerce, 2011).  
According to interviews with NCCs’ leaders and relevant entrepreneurs, there are several 
different explanations of why NCCs emerged in the 1990s. Overall, there were three main 
forces pushing NCCs’ emergence. First, due to the policy of “reform and opening-up”, 
much more space was created for different kinds of social groups. Although different 
levels of governments still held strong a control over the whole society, societal vigor and 
enthusiasm were stirred up by the new policy. Second, the private economy’s development 
                                                 
31 Cited from interviewee’s talk in the Wenzhou NCC conference, 17/06/2012. 
32 Interview with WWC in Hangzhou. 
33 Interview with SWF from Guangdong NCC in Yunnan. 
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laid the economic base for NCCs’ appearance. Unlike workers and staff members in state-
owned enterprises and public sectors, private entrepreneurs did not have a fixed unit 
(danwei) to represent their interests; at the same time, they gradually gained significant 
financial power after years of expanding markets in different locations. Third, the 
household registration system acted as an obstacle for non-local businessmen to enjoy the 
same treatment as local people, which stimulated non-local entrepreneurs to explore new 
ways to represent themselves. 
2.2 NCCs’ development in China 
NCCs’ development during the past twenty years has shown a tendency to be unbalanced 
and diversified. “Unbalanced” referred to uneven development geographically and 
economically. Comparatively speaking, NCCs from Southeast China were more active in 
business and influential in local governance; while NCCs from North and West China were 
more conservative and dependent on state affiliation. These unbalanced features were also 
demonstrated in the same locality like Tianjin. “Diversified” referred to the variation of 
NCCs in growth mode, behavior, network building activities, interaction with membership 
enterprises and local state. This new burgeoning business organization was illustrating a 
spectrum in aspects of state-society relations and influence in the local policy process 
(Wang, 2010). 
Since 1995, several events can be regarded as milestones in NCCs’ development. The first 
event is the promulgation of “The Guidance about Relevant Problems of Non-local 
Chambers of Commerce Registration” (Guanyu yidi shanghui dengji youguan wenti de 
yijian)” issued by the MCA in 2003. This guidance specifically illustrated the principles of 
NCCs’ registration, and gave a guideline for local authorities to follow. Before 2003, 
NCCs’ growth was informal and non-institutionalized, which could be reflected on their 
growth mode. Some NCCs evolved from fellow associations (tongxianghui), some were 
existing as the economic development association for the purpose of promoting economic 
communication and cooperation between home governments and host governments, and 
others were tangled with home governments’ liaison offices in host localities in the aspects 
of finance and personnel. Generally speaking, NCCs as a whole had not demonstrated their 
significance in local governance before 2003 (Wang, 2010). However, Wenzhou NCCs’ 
development in various locations was an exception. Due to their increasing economic 
strength and lobbying capacity, Wenzhou NCCs had blossomed everywhere in China from 
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1995 to 2003, not just covering the capitals of different provinces, but also the big 
prefecture-level cities. It was noteworthy, though, that due to the lack of explicit rules and 
regulations, the growth process of Wenzhou NCCs was always accompanied with constant 
haggling and negotiations, and even the “loopholes” (zuankongzi) phenomenon.34 This 
referred to Wenzhou businessmen who made full use of the policy gap in various local 
institutional contexts. In this regard, Wenzhou businessmen became the precedent by 
virtue of their flexible skills and business mind, and significantly contributed to the 
development of the private economy.  
Since 2003 when the guidance was issued, policies regarding NCCs’ registration have 
loosened. As a consequence, NCCs’ development diversified to a certain degree, where 
non-institutional factors continued to play a role, but institutional arrangements have 
appeared everywhere in the country.35 During this period, some local governments realized 
the significant role of NCCs in promoting regional economic cooperation, and introduced 
appropriate policies and regulations to support the establishment and development of 
NCCs. The NCCs’ growth space was multiplied in this way. Since then, they have 
developed rapidly in China. It should be noted that the driving force for NCCs’ 
development in this period came not only from the business community, but also from the 
support of local states, or even the joint efforts of both parties. For example, the creation of 
the Guangdong NCC in Tianjin is mainly attributed to the push from the Guangdong 
business community, while the Zhejiang NCC in Tianjin and Shanxi NCC in Tianjin were 
created due to the joint efforts of both local state and non-local entrepreneurs.36 
The second milestone event was the 2008 financial crisis. In 2008, many private 
enterprises were hugely affected by the financial crisis, and this was particularly severe for 
export-oriented small businesses. A huge number of small and medium enterprises (SME, 
hereafter) in the Pearl River Delta region were even bankrupted.37 In order to resist the 
crisis, private enterprises needed to focus on the domestic market and transfer exports to 
domestic sales, where they urgently needed the information platform and sales channels 
                                                 
34 “Loopholes” here means the institutional gap that central policy and local regulations have not specified, 
which are the best lobbying space for non-local businessmen. Wenzhou non-local businessmen were good at 
looking for these “loopholes” in the local context, and successfully achieved their goals of establishing 
NCCs. 
35 More information, please refer to Hua Wang’s Master Dissertation in 2010. 
36 More details will be specified in chapter 3- NCCs’ typology and Chapter 4 and 5.  
37 See金融危机对珠三角经济转型的影响, 11/05/2009, http://www.china.com.cn/news/txt/2009-
05/11/content_17758919.htm. 
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(Interview with HK, Tianjin Guangdong NCC). NCCs became an effective mechanism for 
doing this. At that stage, NCCs in different cities organized thousands of trade fairs and 
meetings individually or collectively, with the support of local governments. Some of them 
even established microcredit financial institutions within NCCs to deal with the problem of 
capital chains breaking. For example, Tianjin Zhejiang NCC advocated establishing the 
Zheshang Group within its membership enterprises in Tianjin and collectively responding 
to the challenge from international markets. After the financial crisis, quite a few NCCs 
saw their reputation improve due to what they had done in the emergency. Thus more and 
more non-local entrepreneurs found it essential to join in or set up NCCs to face challenges 
from central policies and external markets collectively with other private enterprises 
(Interview with ZL, Tianjin Zhejiang NCC). 
The third event was the decision of the central government to cancel “the Dual 
Management System” for certain categories of social organizations in China.  Although 
NCCs still needed to look for a “supervision unit” and had to be managed by the local 
Economic Cooperation Office (ECO, hereafter), this started the change within local 
institutions and more space was created for NCCs’ lobbying, something which had rarely 
happened before in local China.38 As NCCs have got more public awareness from the 
business community and local states, their space for development has been widened. And 
at the same time, the conflicts between membership enterprises are also getting more and 
more serious (Interview with WSD, Jiangxi Guangdong NCC), as will be shown in 
following chapters. 
NCCs’ geographical spread in China followed a sequential order of from East to West, and 
from South to North. In the early stage, most of the prominent and influential NCCs were 
from provinces like Zhejiang, Guangdong, Fujian, Beijing and surrounding areas. 
Gradually they spread to central China and north China, like Northeast area central China 
and the Yangtze River Area. The logic for non-local entrepreneurs’ flow is looking for 
comparative advantage in their host localities. In recent years, more and more NCCs have 
emerged in the western part of China, like Xinjiang, Gansu, Qinghai, and Sha’anxi.  
However, among the existing 9103 NCCs (until 2010), most of them were still distributed 
in the eastern part of China, especially the provinces that have more developed private 
economies.  
                                                 
38 This will be elaborately introduced in NCCs’ registration within Chapter 3. 
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In the process of NCCs’ development, the significant difference from other grassroots 
NGOs is that NCCs have received unexpected support from local states. Generally 
speaking, under the authoritarian state system, local states at different levels are very 
sensitive to newly established social groups, especially the completely bottom up 
grassroots organizations (Qi, 2001). NCCs, however, have gained great support from host 
and home governments because their emergence coincided with the goal of local 
governments’ development (Leng, 2004). First, with the development of marketization and 
GDP competition within local officials’ Promotion Championship39 in China (Zhou, 2007), 
the main goal of local governments has been to attract investment and achieve GDP 
growth locally. For the home government and host government, the NCCs’ role in 
economic exchange and communication benefited both sides in terms of economic growth. 
Second, with the diversification of social needs, it is impossible for local states to cover 
every corner of society. Therefore, local states are facing various challenges in local 
governance, and they need governance partners from society to realize the multi-
governance (Yu, 2006). This gives the space for NCCs to play a role in coordinating state-
business relations and carrying out public participation in various facets of the local 
governance. That is why NCCs do not only focus on the business field, but are positively 
engaged in the general and broad policy process since the beginning of its emergence. 
In order to better understand NCCs’ emergence and development generally, in the 
following section I choose the most established NCCs in China – Wenzhou NCCs – to 
show the evolution of this particular group of organizations. Furthermore, in order to 
preliminarily explore various NCCs’ development in a particular city and the mechanisms 
for them to wield influence in local policy processes, I choose one city in northern China -
Tianjin - and another in the south – Hangzhou. 
2.2.1 Wenzhou NCCs in China 
Wenzhou NCCs are the inevitable topic when talking about NCCs in China. Wenzhou has 
the most advanced business culture and tradition in modern China, where the history of 
chambers of commerce dates back about one hundred years. Wenzhou entrepreneurs not 
only pioneered the development of private business, but also the development of chambers 
                                                 
39 Local officials’ Promotion Championship is a concept developed by a Chinese Scholar Zhou Li’an. It 
summarizes the Chinese local officials’ promotion mode, and points out the relationship between economic 
growth and officials’ promotion in China.  
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of commerce and other trade associations (Fewsmith, 2010). Regarding their contribution 
to NCCs’ development, Wenzhou entrepreneurs started almost the first NCC in every city 
of China. For example, the first NCC in Tianjin was Tianjin Wenzhou NCC established in 
1997; the first NCC in Sichuan was Sichuan Wenzhou NCC established in 1997. 
Why did Wenzhou entrepreneurs initiate the first NCCs in China? The reasons can be 
traced back to several aspects: First, from an economic perspective, the private sector’s 
early and rapid development in Wenzhou has nurtured the independent market players and 
mutual-benefited contractual relationships (Fewsmith, 2005). As a result, Wenzhou 
entrepreneurs got far more experience than any other group of business people elsewhere. 
This economic context provided the institutional space, economic resources and free-
flowing social elites for NCCs’ emergence. Second, from the local history perspective, in 
the revolution period from 1911 to 1945, Wenzhou was not taken over by armies, thus the 
leaders were more sympathetic to private business than elsewhere (Interview with HHJ, 
Tianjin Wenzhou NCC). After the PRC was established, the central government invested 
very little in the city, contributing to a smaller state-owned sector than in most places. In 
the reform era, the local authorities in Wenzhou did not intervene in the market too much. 
To the contrary, they took the lead to loosen regulatory control and change the policy to 
create opportunities for private enterprises. This unique history produced more 
entrepreneurs in Wenzhou than anywhere else in China in the early 1990s. Finally, from a 
cultural and traditional perspective, Wenzhou developed a unique dialect incomprehensible 
even to those living in cities not far away. This uniqueness in language held the people 
together and cultivated a certain “Us against the world” mentality, which fostered 
Wenzhou businessmen to form communities when they are away from the city (Fewsmith, 
2005). In addition, Wenzhou has had a long history of entrepreneurship and the export of 
talent. Even during the Cultural Revolution, risk-takers from Wenzhou were still buying 
and selling (Fewsmith, 2005). Contemporary Wenzhou NCCs were built on these social 
economic structures and historical legacies. 
By 2013, the number of Wenzhou NCCs around China reached 245,40 and covered 74% of 
cities above prefecture level. Especially in the year 2012 to 2013, the number of newly 
established Wenzhou NCCs reached 37 within a year.41 Below I list the significant events 
                                                 
40 In 2015, the number of Wenzhou NCCs reached 262, and covered 80% of the cities above prefecture level. 
41  See report in 温州异地商会花开全国 www.china.com.cn. 
http://finance.china.com.cn/roll/20130926/1838019.shtml. 
Chapter 2 
 54 
and turning points of Wenzhou NCCs’ development during the past twenty years. It is 
noteworthy that Wenzhou NCCs’ development has demonstrated different features during 
different stages of development. 
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Table 2.1: Wenzhou NCCs' events in 20 years of development 
Time  Events 
The Initial Phase (1995-2000) 
28/08/1995 Kunming Wenzhou General Chamber of Commerce was established, which was the 
first legally registered NCC in modern China. 
11/1997 Sichuan Wenzhou NCC was established, which was the first provincial level 
Wenzhou NCC in China. 
11/1997 Xi’an Wenzhou NCC set up the first Party branch within their organization. 
05/1999 Wenzhou NCCs’ first annual conference was held in Kunming (nationwide). 
18/06/1999 Jiaxing Wenzhou NCC was established, which was the first Wenzhou NCC in 
Zhejiang Province. 
By the end of 2000, 39 NCCs had been established. 
The Promoting Phase (2000-2005) 
05/2000 Wenzhou municipal government issued twenty methods to urge NCCs’ healthy 
development. 
11/10/2003 The first World Conference of “Wenzhouren” was held in Wenzhou, with around 70 
presidents of Wenzhou NCCs doing endorsement for Wenzhou. 
17/11/2004 Ningbo Wenzhou NCC was established, which is the 100 Wenzhou NCCs. 
28/08/2004 “China · Shenyang Wenzhou Day ” was held in Shenyang, which is the first 
“Wenzhou Day” held outside of Wenzhou. 
By 2005, 130 Wenzhou NCCs were established. Comparing with the previous five years, the annual 
increase is 18 at this phase. 
The Normalization Phase (2006-2010) 
27/11/2006 Shanghai Wenzhou NCC joined Shanghai ICF. 
09/2006 Wuhan Weizhou NCC Party branch was upgraded to be party committee, which is the 
first party committee within Wenzhou NCCs. 
05/2007 Beijing Wenzhou NCC was established. 
05/2008 161 Wenzhou NCCs donated millions of dollars to Wenchuan Earthquake. 
08/11/2008 The Second World Conference of “Wenzhouren” was held in Wenzhou, with 170 
Wenzhou NCCs attending. 
10/06/2009 The establishment of the "World Wenzhou Smile Alliance”. 
28/08/2010 The First World Conference of Wenzhou NCCs’ Presidents was held in Kunming. 
Until the end of 2010, 192 Wenzhou NCCs were established, with annual increase of 12. 
Enhancement and Transformation Phase (2011 -present) 
02/2012 The first World Conference of “Wenshang” was held in Wenzhou, with more than 
1300 attendees.  
27/08/2012 The China-Africa cooperation forum organized by Beijing Wenzhou NCC was held in 
Beijing. 
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25/10/2012  The first Party working committee of Wenzhou NCCs - CPC Wenzhou NCC 
Working Committee in Hunan was set up in Changsha. 
20/12/2013 The first non-local Wenzhou Hall was opened in Xi’an. 
05/03/2015 Suzhou “Wen business return" investment committee was established, becoming the 
first one focusing on the return of the Wenshang investment among all the 262 
Wenzhou NCCs. 
Until Apr 2015 262 Wenzhou NCCs have been established.  
Source: The information and data in the table are cited from the website of China Brand (zhongguo pinpai), 
www. pinpai.china.com.cn, accessed on 10/04/2015. The author has made the table. 
In the table above, Wenzhou NCCs’ development in China has been divided into four 
phases, with five-year as an interval. The phases were defined as the initial phase, the 
promoting phase, the normalization phase and the enhancement and transformation phase, 
according to the criteria of NCCs’ development focus in different stages. In the initial 
phase (1995-2000), Wenzhou NCCs started to establish in different locations, most of 
which were bottom-up initiated by non-local Wenzhou entrepreneurs. In the promoting 
phase (2000-2005), Wenzhou municipal government took the step in to support NCCs 
development in various host places and started to interweave the network among all the 
non-local Wenzhou NCCs, which facilitate the process of registration and contribute to the 
increasing influence of Wenzhou NCCs in various local host places. In the normalization 
phase (2005-2010), some problems started to appear in Wenzhou NCCs’ development, for 
example, vicious competition in the election of the second term president, and conflicts 
between membership enterprises in different industries. All these problems made the 
normalization an essential and only choice. In the process of Wenzhou NCCs’ 
normalization, different host governments try to incorporate Wenzhou NCCs in different 
mechanisms. For example, Shanghai Wenzhou NCC joined Shanghai ICF as a group 
member of this government-sponsored business association, while Wuhan Wenzhou NCC 
was enhancing the party branch building within the organization. Finally in the 
enhancement and transformation phase, while continuing to be widely engaged and 
increase the influence of existing mechanism, Wenzhou NCCs tried to figure out their own 
orientation and engagement strategy so as to keep their capacity in mobilizing resources 
and lobbying.  
From the above table, in addition to an obviously increasing growth rate, we can also see 
there are different prominent features in different phases of Wenzhou NCCs’ development. 
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In the first and second phase (before 2005), Wenzhou entrepreneurs established Wenzhou 
NCCs in various locations and NCCs’ geographical reach was significantly expanded; and 
in the third and fourth phase (after 2005), Wenzhou NCCs’ development has got into the 
normalization stage, and the focus has been shift to “quality construction”，which means 
Wenzhou NCCs are not just focusing on the quantity of their organizations, but on the real 
influential strength in local business and society. During the whole process, it is 
noteworthy that the Wenzhou municipal government has played a very important role.  
Wenzhou government has played a significant role throughout the whole process of 
Wenzhou NCCs’ development. As early as in the early 1990s, Wenzhou ECO sent officials 
to lobby relevant host government departments, and facilitated Wenzhou NCCs’ 
registration in different host localities. In 1995, when the first NCC in Kunming sought 
registration, Wenzhou ECO officials played a positive role in lobbying together with 
Wenzhou entrepreneurs. Later in 2000, the Wenzhou municipal government issued “Some 
opinions on strengthening the guidance of the Non-local Wenzhou Chamber of Commerce” 
(guanyu jiaqiang dui yidi wenzhou shanghui gongzuo zhidao de yijian) and specified the 
nature and function of Wenzhou NCCs, which made clear that Wenzhou NCCs were legal 
economic associations, and swept away the biggest worry from the host governments.42 It 
also provided guidance to the construction of non-local Wenzhou NCCs and encouraged 
non-local Wenzhou entrepreneurs to invest back home.  
Wenzhou ECO became the “Mother Home” of non-local Wenzhou NCCs. In particular, it 
initiated an innovation that each non-local Wenzhou NCC had two supervision units rather 
than one. It happened like this. In the early stage, Wenzhou NCCs came across difficulties 
in registration. Due to the suspects of NCCs’ legitimacy among host government 
departments, no one would like to take the offer to be NCCs’ supervision unit. In order to 
overcome this constraint, Wenzhou ECO proactively offered to be Wenzhou NCCs’ 
supervision unit, to show the support from the home government. It finally became routine 
for all Wenzhou NCCs to have two supervision units: apart from the one in the host 
government, Wenzhou ECO became the other one. This mechanism seemly enabled 
Wenzhou NCCs to be under dual control from the state. However, in the early stage of 
Wenzhou NCCs’ establishment, it helped to facilitate the procedure of NCCs’ registration 
and created space for this new emerging social organization to develop.  
                                                 
42 More details, see from 温州市委、市政府出台的《关于加强对异地温州商会工作指导的若干意见》
in 2000. 
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Apart from the substantial support in legislation and establishment, Wenzhou government 
also took actions to enhance the Wenzhou business culture and improve the cohesion 
among Wenzhou merchants. In 2013, the Wenzhou municipal government issued another 
local regulation “The Guidance on Wenzhou Hall Construction Nationwide” (guanyu 
quanguo yidi wenzhou huiguan jianshe de zhidao yijian), which encouraged different 
Wenzhou NCCs to construct their Wenzhou Hall in host localities and provide cultural 
gathering among non-local Wenzhou people in different places. Xi’an Wenzhou NCC took 
the lead and finished the first Wenzhou Hall in Xi’an. Subsequently dozens of Wenzhou 
NCCs in such cities as Chongqing, Shenzhen, Hangzhou, Wuxi, Chenzhou, Jiaxing and 
Qinhuangdao finished the construction of Wenzhou Halls, which helped to foster the sense 
of belonging of non-local Wenzhou businessmen, and expanded the influence of Wenzhou 
merchants nationwide.43 
2.2.2 NCCs in Tianjin  
The first NCC in Tianjin was Tianjin Wenzhou NCC established in 1997. By August 2015, 
Tianjin had 36 non-local organizations organized by non-local businessmen. Among these 
36 organizations, there were 25 NCCs, and 11 other chambers of commerce focusing on 
specific industries, like the Bohai Area Financial Association and the Bohai Entrepreneurs 
Cultural Association (Interview with ZJ, Tianjin ECO). They were all registered with the 
Civil Affairs Bureau and supervised by the Tianjin Economic Cooperation Office. 
According to the information from Tianjin ECO, of these 25 NCCs, 10 NCCs were from 
eastern coastal areas, 6 from the middle parts and 5 from west areas (Annual report of 
Tianjin Economic Cooperation Office, 2011). Most of them were provincial level. By July 
2011 when I visited Tianjin ECO for the first time, NCCs in Tianjin had covered 4253 
membership enterprises and 9383 individual memberships in Tianjin.44 
The development of NCCs in Tianjin has been comparatively slow, but has demonstrated 
great variation in the ways they were set up and their lobbying behavior (Wang, 2010). 
NCCs in Tianjin have two features that make them a good case study. First, NCCs in 
Tianjin were established throughout the whole period of NCCs’ development in China, 
                                                 
43 See异地温州商会风雨 20年 “娘家人”呵护如今再升级, 温州网–温州晚报，
http://news.66wz.com/system/2015/04/03/104405584.shtml. 
44 In 2011, Tianjin only had 18 NCCs, so the data here were based on the existing 18 NCCs by then. In 2015, 
the number of NCCs in Tianjin had increased to 25, and the memberships of enterprises and individuals were 
almost doubled according to an incomplete statistics of Tianjin ICF in 2015. 
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which made them a good sample of the overall situation in China. Second, more than 90% 
of NCCs in Tianjin were provincial level, which provides the essential condition for 
comparison and is suitable to conduct comparative case studies. The wide range of NCCs 
in Tianjin in terms of the date when they were established and their geographical reach 
makes Tianjin a better locality to examine NCCs’ development and external engagement. 
The table below lists all the current 25 NCCs in Tianjin as of 2015, with the date they were 
established and memberships. 
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Table 2.2: Overview of NCCs in Tianjin 
Name Date of creation 
Tianjin Tibet Association 1992 
Tianjin Wenzhou NCC 1997 
Tianjin Zhejiang NCC 1998 
Tianjin Shanxi NCC 1998 
Tianjin Ningbo NCC 2004 
Tianjin Fujian NCC 2005 
Tianjin Liaoning NCC 2005 
Tianjin Sha’anxi NCC 2006 
Tianjin Jiangxi NCC 2006 
Tianjin Anhui NCC 2006 
Tianjin Guangdong NCC 2007 
Tianjin Shandong NCC 2008 
Tianjin Hubei NCC 2008 
Tianjin Shanghai NCC 2008 
Tianjin Sichuan NCC 2009 
Tianjin Jiangsu NCC 2009 
Tianjin Hebei NCC 2009 
Tianjin Hunan NCC 2010 
Tianjin Chongqing NCC 2011 
Tianjin Xinjiang NCC 2012 
Tianjin Guizhou NCC 2013 
Tianjin Inner-Mongolia NCC 2013 
Tianjin Heilongjiang NCC 2014 
Tianjin Bejing NCC 2015 
Tianjin Yunnan NCC 2015 
Data source: The data in this table was update until August 2015, which was acquired by the author through 
telephone interviews with officials in Tianjin ECO in September 2015. 
The distribution of the original places of NCCs in Tianjin was widespread, and covered 23 
provinces and direct-controlled municipalities in China. According to the interview with 
officials in Tianjin ECO, the most active NCCs in Tianjin were those ones come from the 
south and east part of China. As seen in the above table, for example, Tianjin Zhejiang 
NCC, Tianjin Fujian NCC, Tianjin Guangdong NCC and Tianjin Wenzhou NCC are 
significant in their membership numbers (Interview with LX, Tianjin ECO, 2011). Apart 
from the variation in membership scales, NCCs’ development in Tianjin also demonstrated 
various facets in the following aspects. 
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First, as shown in the table above, among the existing 25 NCCs in Tianjin, 23 of them 
came from different provinces and direct-controlled municipalities. However, there were 
three of them coming from the same province, which were Tianjin Zhejiang NCC, Tianjin 
Wenzhou NCC and Tianjin Ningbo NCC. Wenzhou and Ningbo were all municipal cities 
in Zhejiang province, but why this repeated arrangement had appeared in NCCs’ institution 
in Tianjin?  To answer this question, it is necessary to trace back to the history of NCCs in 
Tianjin. In 2003, the Ministry of Civil Affairs issued a policy towards NCCs’ construction, 
“one province, one NCC” (yisheng yihui), which indicated that one province could only set 
up one NCC in the same host locality. But there was an exception, NCCs already 
established could have the choice to maintain status quo. Since Tianjin Wenzhou NCC was 
established in 1997 and Tianjin Ningbo NCC was established in 1998, which were both 
before the year of 2003, they were able to remain, but their attractiveness to membership 
enterprises and political resources have been subject to serious competion by Tianjin 
Zhejiang NCC since then (Interview with ZJ, Tianjin ECO). But it is noteworthy that quite 
a lot of Wenzhou or Ningbo entrepreneurs were not only the members of Tianjin Wenzhou 
NCC or Tianjin Ningbo NCC, but also enjoyed the membership of Tianjin Zhejiang NCC. 
Therefore, these three NCCs’ networks in Tianjin were quite interwoven. For example, the 
current president of Tianjin Wenzhou NCC has simultaneously served as the vice president 
of Tianjin Zhejiang NCC (Interview with HSJ, Tianjin Wenzhou NCC). 
Second, NCCs in Tianjin kept frequent connection and communications with their home 
governments, especially in relation to investment attraction. There were three types of 
interaction between NCCs and their home governments in this regard. The first one was, 
partnered with Tianjin urban district governments (shiqu), NCCs in Tianjin organized a 
group of Tianjin district officials to visit their NCCs’ home place to carry out the 
investment attraction tour, where they introduce Tianjin’s investment environment, 
preferential policy, tax rebates, and financial support policy from different level of 
governments in Tianjin. All these efforts of NCCs were aiming to assist local officials in 
Tianjin to achieve their investment task and then improve NCCs’ influence in local 
governance (Interview with LX, Tianjin ECO, 2011). The second type of interaction 
between NCCs and their home governments was to apply for the financing for their 
activities or compete for reward in relation to their contribution in the intergovernmental 
cooperation. For example, Tianjin Guangdong NCC had gained substantial rewards from 
both Tianjin government and Guangdong government regarding their work in promoting 
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business cooperation between Guangdong enterprises and Tianjin government (Interview 
with WJS, Tianjin Guangdong NCC). The third form of interaction was not so common 
but did happen from time to time. NCCs’ establishment and development in Tianjin was 
somehow closely related to the local top officials’ position change between different 
localities. For example, the CCP official, Zhang Gaoli, used to be the top leader of 
Shandong province and transferred to Tianjin as the CCP party secretary in 2007. Along 
with his position change from Shandong to Tianjin, quite a number of Shandong 
enterprises started or expanded their business in Tianjin. And Tianjin Shandong NCC was 
established in 2008 (Interview with RSS, Tianjin Shandong NCC). Due to the lack of 
direct empirical evident to support the causal link between officials’ mobility and NCCs’ 
development, I could not prove this link. However, this phenomenon reflected may reveal 
the tip of an iceberg of the complex political and business relations in contemporary China. 
Third, NCCs in Tianjin constitute a social network context for non-local businessmen in 
Tianjin, and their activities revealed strong network effects. For example, if an NCC 
initiated a kind of activity with profound social influence and media coverage, it would be 
quick and easy to spread to other NCCs, as other NCCs would copy or follow this initiative 
in a short time. So the “policy learning and policy communication” 45 within NCCs are 
more immediate and straightforward than that within governmental departments. For 
example, when Tianjin Shanxi NCC initiated the party branch building experiment within 
its membership enterprises and got recognition from the Tianjin municipal government, 
NCCs such as Tianjin Zhejiang NCC and Tianjin Shanghai NCC, all started to build up the 
party branches within their organizations.46  
Apart from what I have said about NCCs in Tianjin above, there were also other interesting 
phenomena like NCCs’ preference in interaction with district governments, and the joint 
activities and platforms between NCCs in Tianjin. These will be elaborated in the case 
analysis chapters from chapter 4 to 6 when I illustrate the specific cases there. 
                                                 
45 “Policy learning” and “policy communication” are two concepts in the policy process studies to examine 
how a new policy being learned between different governments and spread to a wider region. Here I just use 
these two terms as a metaphor to describe the spread of behavior strategies within NCCs in Tianjin. 
46 This case will be elaborate in Chapter 4 about Coupling NCCs. 
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2.2.3 NCCs in Hangzhou 
There were 19 NCCs in Hangzhou by June 200947, which included 7 provincial level 
NCCs and 12 municipal level NCCs (Annual report of Hangzhou Economic Cooperation 
Office, 2011). The first NCC in Hangzhou was Hangzhou Wenzhou NCC initiated by 
Wenzhou businessmen in 2000. According to the statistics in Hangzhou ECO, these 19 
NCCs had a total of 4244 membership enterprises. Hangzhou Wenzhou NCC had of the 
largest membership with 1020 enterprises, constituting 24% of the total membership 
enterprises of NCCs in Hangzhou. The second was Hangzhou Invested Enterprises 
Association48 with 710 memberships, which took 16.7% of the total memberships of NCCs. 
For details see table below.49 
  
                                                 
47 Unfortunately, I did not get the most updated data about NCCs in Hangzhou. 
48 Hangzhou Invested Enterprises Association is a special kind of NCC, which gathered non-local 
entrepreneurs from different non-local places, rather than from the same home places like what other NCCs 
did. 
49 The tables from 2.3-2.6 are developed by the author based on the information from participated 
observation in Hangzhou Economic Cooperation Office, Hangzhou ICF and various NCCs in Hangzhou 
between March and June 2012. 
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Table 2.3: Overview of NCCs in Hangzhou 
Name Date of 
creation 
Term length of 
the Council 
Memberships 
Wenzhou NCC in Hangzhou  Dec 2003 4 years 1000 
Quanzhou NCC in Hangzhou Dec 2004 3 years 400 
Anji NCC in Hangzhou Jun 2005 3 years  110 
Deqing NCC in Hangzhou Dec 2005 3 years 70 
Anhui NCC in Hangzhou Jun 2006 3 years 110 
Hunan NCC in Hangzhou Sep 2006 3 years 210 
Confederation of Hangzhou Enterprises in 
Shanghai 
Sep 2006 3 years (the first 
term 1 year） 
170 
HuBei NCC in Hangzhou Dec 2006 2 years 120 
Guangxi NCC in Hangzhou Aug 2007 3 years 60 
Henan NCC in Hangzhou Dec 2007 3 years 130 
Taizhou NCC in Hangzhou Dec 2007 4 years 380 
Jiangsu NCC in Hangzhou Mar 2008 5 years 120 
Chaoshan NCC in Hangzhou Jun 2008 3 years 100 
Quzhou NCC in Hangzhou Nov 2008 3 years 90 
Data source: The data in the table were updated until the end of 2008. The author acquired this data from 
Hangzhou Hubei NCC in March 2012. 
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Table 2.4: NCCs' developing situation in Hangzhou by 2009 
Name Memb
ership 
Enterp
rises 
Indivi
dual 
Directors Executive 
directors 
Full-time Part-time 
Hangzhou Hubei NCC 180 125 55 34 25 2 4 
Hangzhou Anhui NCC 165 25 5 10  2 7 
Hangzhou Henan NCC 94 92 2 21 6 1 8 
Hangzhou Hunan NCC 165 162 3 23  2 1 
Hangzhou Jiangsu NCC 208 205 3 33 21 2 2 
Hangzhou Anji NCC 73 66 7 33 13 2 2 
Hangzhou Jinhua NCC 100 99 1 48 13 2  
Hangzhou Chaoshan 
NCC 
198 198 0 38 3 1  
Hangzhou Deqing NCC 62 59 3   0 1 
Hangzhou Quzhou 
NCC 
66 55 11 26 7 2  
Hangzhou Quanzhou 
NCC 
482 482 0 101 40 3 0 
Hangzhou Taizhou 
NCC 
272 272 0 113 0 2 0 
Hangzhou Guangxi 
NCC 
52 49 3 19 12 1 2 
Hangzhou Sha’anxi 
NCC 
60 56 4   0 2 
Hangzhou Suichang 
NCC 
62 59 3 19 15 2 7 
Hangzhou Lishui NCC 191 171 20 82 22 2  
Hangzhou Wenzhou 
NCC 
1400 1300 30 132 4 2  
Hangzhou Shanghai 
Enterprises Federation 
258 227 31 62 58 8  
Hangzhou Invested 
Enterprises Association 
710   39 25 1  
Total 4798       
 
Source: The data in the table were updated until June, 2009. The author acquired this data 
from Hangzhou Hubei NCC in March 2012. 
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2.2.4 Comparison of NCCs in Tianjin and Hangzhou  
Comparing the development of NCCs in Tianjin and Hangzhou, we can see obvious 
differences in terms of number and size. Due to the fact that Tianjin has a higher 
administrative hierarchy (it is a provincial level city) than Hangzhou (it is a prefecture 
level city), more provincial level NCCs could be established in Tianjin than in Hangzhou. 
In Hangzhou’s case, provincial level NCCs like Hangzhou Hubei NCC, and Hangzhou 
Anhui NCC were established in the early stages, however, along with more and more local 
specification on NCCs, provincial level NCCs could no longer be established at the 
municipal level due to the limit of “one locality, one industry and one association” 
policy, 50  which was specified in ‘Social Groups Management Registration Ordinance’ 
(shehui tuanti guanli dengji tiaoli) promulgated by the State Council in 1998. In terms of 
administration system towards NCCs, NCCs in Tianjin are much more state-dominated 
and organized than those in Hangzhou. Rather than laying down various regulatory 
controls, the Hangzhou municipal government demonstrated much more flexibility in 
facilitating communication channels and cooperating with NCCs. In terms of government 
support, the Tianjin government provides more guidance work while the Hangzhou 
municipal government provides more opportunities and platforms for Hangzhou NCCs to 
participate in local governance. Finally, although sharing some similarities in NCCs’ 
development, Tianjin and Hangzhou could not be rigorously compared, because the 
internal and external resources of NCCs in both localities demonstrate a wide variation. 
However, they did provide important information for us to understand NCCs’ development 
in particular cities and the factors that influence their development.  
2.2.5 Preliminary explanations of NCCs’ regional variations 
A number of factors lead to variation in NCCs’ development in China. From the macro-
institutional level, I found the important factors are different localities’ economic structure, 
cultural context, and the policy context created by different local governments. Here I will 
take Tianjin and Hangzhou as example to illustrate how the macro factors shape NCCs’ 
variation.  
                                                 
50 “One locality, one industry and one association” is a general policy towards social organizations’ 
construction in China, which indicates that in one administrative area or one industry, it is only allowed to 
establish one association of the same nature and scope of business. This policy was designed to avoid 
duplication and waste of administrative resources.   
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In China, different localities have their own business tradition and socio-economic 
structure, which can be reflected in NCCs’ growth mode and behavior strategies. 
Traditionally Zhejiang province had a prominent private sector and small and medium 
businesses. As the capital of Zhejiang, Hangzhou has gathers a greater number of private 
entrepreneurs from Zhejiang province. In Hangzhou, the proportion of private sector to the 
whole GDP is around 59.8% and employees working in the private sector were 37% of the 
whole workforce at the end of 2014. In addition, Hangzhou was among one of the first 
opening cities in early 1980s. Like the renowned Wenzhou entrepreneurs, Hangzhou 
businessmen have started to invest outside and carried out the economic and trade 
exchanges quite early in the reform era. All of these have provided a strong social base for 
Zhejiang NCCs’ emergence inside and outside of Zhejiang Province. In comparison, 
Tianjin is a direct-control municipality and higher than Hangzhou in the administrative 
hierarchy. Due to the short distance from the political center – Beijing – reform and 
opening-up in Tianjin has been carried out more cautious and conservatively. According to 
a report, Tianjin’s growth rate from 1980 to 1990 is among one the lowest province in 
China (Interview with GDJ, scholar in Nankai University). Among Tianjin’s economic 
structure, the share of state-owned enterprises has taken up around 50% in 2012 (Interview 
with CX, Tianjin CAB) and private sectors’ development has been prohibited by the 
uneven development of different sectors. The first group of non-local businessmen to 
Tianjin is from cities in Zhejiang, like Wenzhou, Ningbo, in mid-1990s, and Wenzhou 
business people established the first ever NCCs in Tianjin in 1997. Tianjin NCCs’ 
development in other places, however, is quite small in size and little in quantity. 
Another micro factor is business culture. In China, traditionally people from south are 
more willing to go outside to look for opportunities due to the limit of resources within 
hometown (Interview with ZDM, officials in Hangzhou DRC). However, people from 
north attach more influence to homeland with a custom of “an tu zhong qian”, which 
means, “Hate to leave a place where one has lived long” (Feng, 2003). This could also 
explain why Zhejiang, Wenzhou, Fujian, Guangdong NCCs have been growing so fast and 
exerted such prominent influence in policy processes, while Shanxi, Shandong, Tianjin or 
Beijing NCCs have kept a comparative slower pace in going out, not to mention their 
policy influences. In addition, the thinking “Official Standard” (guan ben wei) is much 
serious in the north, and this philosophy would to some degree prohibit the vigor of 
growing a bigger business network (Interview with ZSL, Tianjin Shanxi NCC). 
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The third factor is most important to NCCs’ behavior strategies locally. Local policy 
context includes policymaking structure, local state’s attitude towards NCCs’ development, 
and the policy sphere that are open to external actors. For example, in Hangzhou, the 
government agencies have started to explore a series of methods to promote public 
participation to deal with social challenges, which has become the so-called “model of 
democracy construction” in local China. At the same time, bureaucrats in Hangzhou bear 
some “Scholar Bureaucrats” tradition, and have kept a comparative open mind to any 
external actors’ involvement in policy process (Interview with SY, official in Hangzhou 
DRC). This structure has left spaces for NCCs’ engagement and this explained why NCCs 
in Hangzhou are quite active in local governance and policy process in Hangzhou. In 
Tianjin, by comparison, for most of the time, the lobbying behavior was done indirectly 
and quietly. Due to a certain degree of political consideration and the long-existing 
conservative attitude of Tianjin bureaucrats, the policymaking structure in Tianjin is quite 
rigid, and no NCCs would like to talk about their real target in policy influence (Interview 
with GDJ, Nankai University). Thus in order to achieve their goal, NCCs in Tianjin have 
developed alternative ways to engage in local governance, like building state network, 
assisting government in investment attraction and trying to convert a high profile to policy 
influence at some stage indirectly, which surprisingly enriched NCCs lobbying behavior 
and provide this research a unique perspective.  
To sum up, the explanation above from the macro level has given a picture of diversity in 
NCCs’ development and the driving forces behind. However, it can only explain why 
NCCs in Hangzhou are more active than those in Tianjin, but could not explain why 
different NCCs still demonstrate no less variation even in the same localities, than that of 
among regions. Thus it is essential to explore the explanation from the micro level, which 
is what I do in Chapter 3 to develop NCCs’ typologies based on NCCs’ two important 
dimensions from micro level. 
2.3 NCCs’ characteristics and features 
From the introduction above of NCCs’ emergence and development, it is noteworthy that 
NCCs have had quite different features, compared to traditional business organizations in 
China. The first important feature for NCCs is they consist of non-local people. Locality is 
much less important in western countries, but very important in China, which reflects 
characteristics of China’s administrative control system – the household registration 
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system (hukou). An NCC is composed of non-local business people who come from the 
same province or district. Because they are non-local people who do not have the “hukou” 
in the city where they live, they cannot enjoy the same social welfare as the local people, in 
terms of social pension insurance, medical care, education, and so on.  
Another feature of NCC is that they are “bottom-up”, which means NCCs developed either 
with an initiative of business entrepreneurs or the joint effort from both local governments 
and business elites (Chen 2007; Fewsmith, 2008). Because NCCs do not have the inherent 
linkage with the state, they need to establish their social network themselves. Actually, 
setting up an NCC is the first step for non-local businessmen to construct their social 
network. Due to the fact that most of them are “non-local” and “bottom up”, NCCs 
members show their identity collectively rather than individually, and in general they title 
themselves under a brand of places where they come from, like “Zhejiang Merchants 
(zheshang)” “Guangdong Merchants (yueshang)” “Anhui Merchants (huishang)”. They 
hope to build up their reputation in a wide range in this collective way, and thus to enhance 
their lobbying capacity. 
Regarding personnel arrangements, before 2010, NCCs used to invite local retired high-
level officials and celebrities mostly in the host places to be the Honorary President or 
Honorary Vice-president in order to raise their profile and improve their influence. 
Actually these kinds of presidents were not formal staff and could not get a salary for this 
job, but they found a place to continually exert their influence after stepping down from 
important official positions. NCCs fulfilled this gap and set up the informal relationships 
with officialdom through all these Honorary Presidents and Vice Presidents. However, this 
arrangement led to complicated and vague business-politics relations, and produces the 
official-business collusion and money politics to certain degree.51 Although the central 
government has not initiated an explicit plan of social organizations’ reform, it encouraged 
local governments to explore suitable methods to regulate NCCs’ development within their 
jurisdictions. In March 2015, the Shandong Provincial government issued the new 
regulation towards NCCs in Shandong province - “Non-local Chamber of Commerce 
Administrative Methods” – and stipulated that retired civil servants are not allowed to take 
any position part time or full time in NCCs within three years of their retirement. 52 
                                                 
51 Interview with ZDM in Hangzhou, Jun 2012. 
52 Cite from www.people.cn,  http://politics.people.com.cn/n/2015/0313/c70731-26690661.html,last entry on 
13 Mar 2015. 
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Subsequently, such provinces as Guangdong, Jiangsu and Anhui have continuously 
promulgated similar regulations, and specified the local administration of NCCs and other 
kinds of social groups. 53 
Another prominent feature of NCCs is their flexibility and pragmatism. The emergence of 
NCCs is a new phenomenon among the third sector in China, and they exist in a constantly 
changing and specific political environment. Some scholars recognize them as a possibility 
of growing autonomy in Chinese social and economic life (Chen, 2003; Chen & Wang, 
2004). However, despite the fact that NCCs have grown out of civil society, there has been 
no institutionalized channel for them to contact the government (Yu, 2006). Because 
China’s rapid economic transition has brought many uncertainties to businesses, including 
political and administrative uncertainty (Guthrie, 1997), NCCs made up of non-local 
businessmen have to be very flexible when they engage in the policy process for the sake 
of their own interests. Through fieldwork in Tianjin and Hangzhou, I found that in 
different policy circumstances, NCCs change their roles very swiftly. This reflects that in 
economic and business issues, NCCs act as equivalent of interest groups to negotiate with 
and lobby policy makers through formal or informal methods. On the other hand, when it 
comes to social issues, like social welfare, they are much more like a force of social 
movement, and regard themselves as the vulnerable group to fight for the same treatment 
as the local people. These extraordinary behaviors are mostly rooted in the dramatically 
changing social environment of China. However, this thesis has uncovered significant 
variation in different localities and even between different NCCs in the same locality. 
These variations are examined in the following chapters to explain why NCCs’ influence 
in the local policy process varies. 
2.4 Private sectors’ political engagement 
NCCs have demonstrated significant motivation to participate in local governance and the 
local policy process. There are at least two reasons for this. First, NCCs are composed of 
private enterprises. Unlike state-owned enterprises and multinational corporations, private 
enterprises in China have fewer political resources and are usually small and operate in a 
single locale. Their attention is also typically directed at their interaction with local 
                                                 
53全国首个社会组织地方性法规即将在广东出台,  cite from China Daily, last entry 27 August 2015 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/hqgj/jryw/2015-07-31/content_14061850.html. 
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government rather than the central government in Beijing.54 Comparatively speaking, the 
local policy process is more accessible and useful to NCCs. Second, the members of NCCs 
are non-local people, who have a stronger motivation to get more attention in social policy 
making. If they want to enjoy the same treatment as local people, they have to set up some 
connections directly with the host government or indirectly with their home government.55 
Regarding this, private entrepreneurs in NCCs have diverse strategies and mechanisms. 
In the following section, I will summarize the three most common ways of private 
entrepreneurs’ political participation, drawing on both the existing literature on the private 
sector in China and empirical evidence from my fieldwork observation.  
2.4.1 As representatives in political organizations  
Private entrepreneurs actively participate in political entities like the National People’s 
Congress (NPC) and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC). 
According to the existing studies, the primary motivation for private sector participation is 
economic, in other words to protect and promote their economic interests through close 
relationships with various authorities (Yang, 2010; Chen, 2003b). In connection with this, 
it should be noted that market intervention by authorities deeply affects the economic 
activities or entrepreneurs, and results in bribery and corruption among bureaucrats (Chen, 
2010; Yu, 2004). Second, political motivations are also significant to private entrepreneurs’ 
willingness to join political entities, for example gaining promotion to senior governmental 
positions and being recognized as prestigious members of society (Yu, 2004).  
Since the private sector got legal status from state law in 1992, there has been increasingly 
active participation by private entrepreneurs in political organizations. According to the 
“Fifth sample survey on private enterprises” in 2002, 17.4% of private entrepreneurs 
become representatives of the NPC, and the ratio of Party members to total private 
entrepreneurs rose from 19.8% in 2000 to 29.9% in 2002. It should be noted that here 
‘entrepreneurs’ includes managers of privatized SOEs (Toshiki Kanamori & Zhijun Zhao, 
2004). However, businessmen care more about business than politics according to their 
preference. The aim of their participating in political processes is to get access to political 
resources and then serve their own business. So in spite of joining the party or becoming 
                                                 
54  Interview with W in Guangzhou NCCs conference held in Changchun, May 14-15, 2012. 
55  From the inner report of Zhejiang NCCs’ Development in Tianjin, June, 2012. 
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the representatives of CPC or CPPCC, they also keep demands for establishing business 
organizations for protection (Yu, 2004; Jiang 2008). There is a survey finding that although 
private entrepreneurs had become active participants in formal political processes, once 
their businesses developed, their interest in politics seemed to diminish (Feng, 2003).  
2.4.2 Business lobbying in China 
Business lobbying is a common phenomenon in western countries, but it is still a new term 
in the Chinese political dictionary. Nevertheless, during the past decade, business lobbying 
entered the stage from behind the scenes, and there is a growing recognition that business 
lobbying is an integral part of the country’s policy process at both the local and national 
levels (Deng & Kennedy, 2010). The organizations involved in business lobbying include 
state-owned companies, multinational corporations, private companies and all kinds of 
business associations and chambers of commerce. They are becoming active in every stage 
of the public process, from setting the agenda to identifying policy options and shaping 
regulatory implementation.  
Studies of business lobbying in China started to emerge in the 21st century. For private 
businesses, lobbying plays an important role in operations. Compared to State-Owned 
Enterprises (hereafter SOEs), private businesses lack the natural linkages to policy makers 
within the governmental system; and compared to Multinational Corporations (hereafter 
MNCs), Chinese local private businesses cannot enjoy tax-free and preferential policies. 
Thus private business has much more motivation to do business lobbying if conditions 
permit. Nevertheless, private business’ lobbying has encountered various hinders in formal 
institutionalized channels, thus quite a lot of informal ways of lobbying have been 
revealed, such as bribery and corruption. Consequently, small and medium private 
businesses lack the resources and institutionalized channel to do lobbying on their own, 
which leads them to join in or set up organizations to lobby collectively. 
2.4.3 Joining in or setting up business associations 
The Chinese private sectors’ development catalyzed the emergence of different business 
associations in the third sector. These business associations gradually demonstrate their 
potential political significance in the contemporary Chinese policy process. Private 
entrepreneurs are inclined to join in or set up organizations to collectively push for better 
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government service and to seek advantages. Compared to a state-owned enterprise or 
multinational corporations, a private company is generally smaller in size and weaker in 
power, and most of the private businesses are located at the local rather than the national 
level. Thus it is much more difficult for them to exert influence in the policy process. But 
they have their own advantages, of which the primary one is that they are flexible and 
creative, and easily adapt to different environments (Zheng & Yang, 2009). There are two 
options for private entrepreneurs to become a member of an organization: either choosing 
to join in the official or semi-official business associations like the Federation of Industry 
and Commerce (FIC), the Private Enterprises Association (PEA) and the Self-Employed 
Laborers’ Association (SELA) or trying to found new bottom-up business associations 
along with other advocators, like Non-local Chamber of Commerce (NCC). The usual 
practice of large-scale private companies tends to be to initially join the FIC to gain official 
status in the business association system, and then tries to set up their own associations to 
protect the membership interests by working together (Kennedy, 2005). 
Other research has also mentioned the reasons why private entrepreneurs seek political 
engagement. It was in 1997 that the Fifteenth National Congress of the CPC explicitly 
confirmed that the non-public sector was an important constituent of the Chinese socialist 
market economy, signifying a breakthrough in ownership theory and cognition of the non-
public economy.56 Then private entrepreneurs got recognition and legal status from the 
state. Due to the transitional feature of China’s economy, entrepreneurs need to depend on 
various levels of government in many ways, including accessing critical resources such as 
land and opportunities. At the same time, the government is not always accountable and 
the abuse of power is not uncommon. This situation creates uncertainties for private 
business (Zhang & Zhang, 2005). Private entrepreneurs thus have a strong motivation and 
interest to participate in the political process and exert their political influence. As outlined 
above, the main ways in which private entrepreneurs get connected to politics are by 
becoming representatives in local and national legislatures and consultative bodies, by 
lobbying governments, and by joining or setting up business associations. 
                                                 
56 Cite from a discussion paper of Hongliang Zheng, ‘Chinese private sector development in the past 30 
years: retrospect and prospect.’ The University of Nottingham, China Policy Institute. 
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2.5 NCCs’ participation in the local governance and policy 
process   
NCCs are a new phenomenon among the third sector in China, and they exist in a 
constantly changing and specific political environment. NCCs emergence in 1990s and 
their development afterwards was recognized as a possibility of growing autonomy in 
Chinese social and economic life by some scholars (Chen, 2003; Chen & Wang, 2004). 
Thus, examining NCCs’ participation in the local policy process is of great significance in 
the aspects of theory and practice. During the fieldwork in Tianjin and Hangzhou from 
2011 to 2013, I found much more methods are used by NCCs to participate in local 
governance of different localities, apart from the ones that other business associations have 
already adopted. 
Generally speaking, all these tactics NCC adopted could be divided into three categories. 
The first was building the internal capacity and enhancing the internal resources, which 
included attracting more members from their original localities, improving professional 
expertise to provide market information and advice to relevant policy making departments. 
The second category was establishing and enhancing social networks (guanxi). As NCCs 
held a transitional position from business to governments, from the local economy to non-
local investors, social networks become more essential and significant for them to build 
their influence. Here the social network refers to the relationships with the local 
government and the home government as well as other types of business associations, but 
it also refers to relationships with social elites, the media and the public. The third category 
is building their brand and reputation through different layers of platforms. During the past 
ten years, NCCs located in different provinces tended to cooperate with each other and 
held their annual conference or high-level forum by inviting distinguished officials, 
scholars and celebrities. The outstanding conference brand like “The World Zheshang 
Conference”, “The World Wenshang Conference” has attracted entrepreneurs from all over 
the world to attend. The cross-regional cooperation among NCCs was more and more 
prosperous. Starting from 2005, there was a tendency for NCCs that come from the same 
places of origin to organize the national president annual meeting or secretary-general 
annual meeting. Most of these meetings were initiated by their common home 
governments, however, this mechanism was revealed its effectiveness in coordinating 
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business cooperation and dealing with major crisis in NCCs’ development, as will be 
illustrated in Chapter 5. (Interview with WJS, Tianjin Guangdong NCC). 
During the participatory and engaging behaviors of NCCs, they formed their own style to 
deal with the relations with the local state. According to NCCs’ self-positioning about the 
relationship between themselves and the state, together with their practice, I preliminarily 
describe different kinds of NCCs with various focuses. The first kind of NCCs focused on 
rear service provision. NCCs pay attention to the requirement of memberships and provide 
some rear services, in order to satisfy all the memberships and enhance their internal 
solidarity. For example, Tianjin Shandong NCC. The second kind of NCCs focused on 
attracting investment. All the NCCs’ activities were centered on attracting investment from 
their place of origin. They worked with the commerce committee or merchant groups in 
the local host government to go back to their home places to do the investment attracting 
promotion. For example, Tianjin Guangdong NCC. The third kind of NCCs worked as a 
business elites club. This kind of NCC focused on the social activities among memberships, 
rather than carrying out a lot of political activities. They acted as an active coordinative 
role in harmonizing the relationship of different member enterprises, and provided a 
platform for the non-local enterprises to establish their social network in this way. For 
example, Qingdao Guangdong NCC. This is a very rough description based NCCs’ 
performance from the surface, and each NCC properly includes all the three kind of 
behaviors. A more detailed categorization based on the nature and action of NCCs will to 
be made in the following chapter. 
 I was fortunate to carry out participant observation in Changchun during the Guangdong 
Chamber of Commerce presidents meeting from 30 provinces or cities on 17th-19th, May 
2012. There are several findings from the observation. First, I found that the Guangdong 
provincial government gave substantial support to the Guangdong NCCs’ establishment in 
different places. An interviewee from the Guangdong NCC in Qingdao told me that NCCs’ 
interaction with the government has changed the officials’ behavior pattern to some degree 
(Interview with LZM, Qiangdao Guangdong NCC). However, the institution of president 
annual meeting or secretary-general annual meeting try to discuss and solve some tricky 
problems encountered by NCCs, which is an effective way to regulate their development 
(Interview with LZM, Qingdao Guangdong NCC). Second, internal conflicts are more 
prominent over time. Most of the Guangdong NCCs were established from 2005 to 2010, 
with the first president selected from the initiators. After four or five years’ (one 
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presidential term) development, when it comes to the term of office change, some conflicts 
between presidential candidates have become evident, and there are some cases showing 
the cutthroat competition among the candidates, which in some cases has weakened the 
NCCs’ influence.57 Apart from Guangdong NCCs, such conflicts also appeared in other 
NCCs in different localities (Interview with LM, Zhejiang Guangdong NCC).Third, it is 
hard to look for a suitable secretary-general for quite a lot of NCCs I have interviewed. 
The secretary-general is a very important role in the growing influence of NCCs’. 
Currently, almost 70% of the NCCs’ secretary-generals are retired people from 
government in Tianjin. party organizations and military committees. Because of this, 
NCCs can make use of their social capital to establish the contact with government 
officials easily. However, this kind of person is hard to find and it is hard to convince them 
to work for the NCCs for a long period, as they can just get a low salary. 58  
NCCs’ participation in local governance has some achievements, and I will elaborate all 
these points in the later chapters. 
 Preference policy or policy exception 
 Accumulate social and political capital 
 Policy influence or change 
In Tianjin, most of NCCs have the target to get policy exceptions in the aspects of land 
lending or tax exemption, as in the context of strong government management, they do not 
even think about the policy change. In Hangzhou, the city has promoted a lot of 
mechanisms to call for social cooperation. As a result, the NCCs have opportunities to 
work with other social organizations, such as universities, media, and other civil society 
organizations, to improve their influence. To some extent, they are demonstrating their 
power in influencing the policy process by different way of interaction (Duckett & Wang, 
2013). Moreover, in both, Tianjin or Hangzhou, they are accumulating their social and 
political capitals by initiating or participating in a lot of activities, which will be illustrated 
in the case analysis chapters. During this process, their political significance is displayed in 
different aspect of social lives.  
                                                 
57 Interview to Shi Wanfeng, the secretary-general of Guangdong NCC in Yunnan. 
58 Interview to Wang Jingsheng, the secretary-general of Guangdong NCC in Tianjin.  
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2.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has provided a comprehensive analysis of the emergence of NCCs and their 
development since the early 1990s, as well as their characteristics and historical 
connections in Chinese history. Finally, it has also illustrated NCCs’ wide engagement in 
political life and local governance.  
NCCs’ emergence is a break-through in the institutional system in the 1990s and their vital 
development and spreading out nationwide has shown their potential in lobbying and local 
governance. By pointing out Wenzhou NCCs’ development within the past twenty years, I 
traced back the evolution of NCCs’ in China. And by comparing NCCs’ development in 
Tianjin and Hangzhou, I highlighted the influence of different localities on NCCs’ 
emergence and development.  
Throughout the whole process, NCCs have shown their uniqueness and characteristics. 
Apart from the obvious feature of being “non-local” and “bottom-up”, NCCs’ features are 
also exemplified by their flexibility, pragmatism and shifting role between “consultants” 
and “advocators” (Zhu, 2009)  
 It is doubtless that NCCs have demonstrated great vitality and significance in the private 
sector’s political influence; however, they are still constrained by the lack of legislation, 
resources, as well as the disorder within their own organizations. Most importantly, their 
relations with local governments hugely affect their behavior. That is also why they are 
showing great variations among different localities and even different NCCs in the same 
locality.  
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Chapter 3 Explaining NCCs’ variation and NCCs’ typology  
As mentioned in the previous chapters, NCCs have proliferated in China over the past 
twenty years and have been participating and demonstrating influence in the local policy 
process, with huge variations showing among different NCCs. This chapter will focus on 
these variations and explain why these variations occurred, and it will then develop an 
explanatory typology for NCCs. In order to show all aspects of NCCs’ variation, I will 
elaborate on Hangzhou and Tianjin as case localities, where I have done substantial field 
research. Before coming to the variation in NCCs’ policy influence, this chapter will first 
introduce NCCs’ registration, organizational structure, as well as growth mode and 
behavior strategy. By illustrating all these variations, we can understand NCCs’ emergence 
and development in more depth and get a clearer picture of NCCs’ interaction with local 
state in China. 
To explain NCCs’ variations, it is necessary to comprehensively consider all the relevant 
factors from various perspectives. In Chapter 2, I have provided the preliminary 
explanations from the macro level – the environment in which NCCs work. However, in 
order to understand deeply the spectrum of NCCs’ variation, it is essential to focus on the 
micro level – the NCCs themselves – to explore the underlying causes. As outlined in 
Chapter 1, existing studies have revealed that state links and network play a significant role 
in non-bureaucratic actors’ lobbying in the policy process. My empirical studies in Chapter 
2 also show that NCCs’ networks with local governments and business are significantly 
correlated to their capacity of lobbying. Hence in this chapter, I take NCCs’ “origins” and 
“networks” as the two main dimensions to develop a typology of NCCs in China.  
The main contribution of this chapter is to develop an analytical framework for the whole 
thesis by addressing two important issues in: NCCs’ variation and their typology. Based on 
the understanding and analysis of NCCs’ variations, I developed NCCs’ typology based on 
my inductive and deductive studies. By referring to the existing literature on other external 
actors’ influence in the Chinese policy process and empirical observation on NCCs in the 
field research, I developed several concepts regarding NCCs’ typology: NCCs 
Establishment Initiatives, Network Orientation, and Network Strategy, which include 
Network Span strategy and Network Intensity strategy, as well as four type of NCCs of 
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Independent, Coupling, Decoupling and Dependent.  The second part of this chapter will 
elaborate on these concepts.  
3.1 NCCs in the Chinese local administration system 
3.1.1 NCCs’ registration 
NCCs have been growing fast both in quantity and quality nation-wide in China during the 
past decades, with great variations among each other. Until 2011, there have been 9103 
NCCs registered in civil affair bureaus at different levels (Report on Non-local Chamber of 
Commerce in China, 2012)59. However, due to the vagueness of their legal status and 
insufficient direct connections with public life, public awareness of this new type of 
business association is still limited. NCCs’ registration has been plagued with problems 
throughout the journey since 1995. One reason is that the relevant regulations of NCCs are 
limited, and another reason is that NCCs’ development is fast with various changes in 
organizational forms and procedures. 
Current laws and regulations at the national level towards NCCs are limited, and there are 
only two national official guidelines relating to the establishment of NCCs. The first one 
regarding NCCs’ registration - “Opinions on Relevant Problems of Non-local Chambers of 
Commerce Registration” (Guanyu yidi shanghui dengji youguan wenti de yijian) was 
promulgated by the Ministry of Civil Affairs in 2003. It is the first and only national level 
official document focusing on NCCs (Interview with LWK, official in Tianjin CAB). It 
stipulates three principles for NCCs’ registration: first, the registration of NCCs at the 
provincial level must be controlled by the provincial Civil Affairs Bureaus, and provincial 
level NCCs are not allowed to develop district branches within the same province. 
Principally NCCs can only accept enterprise membership, but not individual membership. 
Second, it encourages provincial governments to initiate pilot projects regarding NCCs’ 
registration when conditions permit. Third, those who have started the registration pilot 
project should further facilitate NCCs’ relations with their “supervision units”.  
Another official document is the Social Groups Management Registration Ordinance
（ shehuituanti dengji guanli tiaoli, the Ordinance, hereafter) that applies to the 
                                                 
59 There was no nation-wide statistics about the total number of NCCs in China after 2012, so I could not get 
the most updated data. 
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registration of all NGOs in China.60 Guided by these two documents, different provinces 
subsequently promulgated their own specific policies towards NCCs’ registration. For 
example, Tianjin issued the specification in 2005 and 2008; Shandong, Zhejiang and 
Yunnan issued their own specifications respectively in 2009. In these specifications, such 
things as the title of NCCs, their organizational structure, registration procedure, the 
conditions to develop branches, the reporting policy for major events, and party branch 
building policy were specifically illustrated. However, because the legislation was far 
behind NCCs’ actual development, these terms could not be applied to current NCCs 
effectively, and were hard to implement. For example, the rule of “one province, one NCC” 
in these specifications regulated that one province could only establish one NCC from the 
same place of origin (provincial level), but many NCCs had been established far before 
this rule was promulgated. In Tianjin, there were three NCCs from Zhejiang province: 
Tianjin Zhejiang NCC, Tianjin Wenzhou NCC, and Tianjin Ningbo NCC (Interview with 
LWK, official in Tianjin CAB). 
In late 2013, the MCA announced it would relax the “dual management system” on four 
categories of social organizations,61 including guild and chambers of commerce; scientific 
NGOs; philanthropic NGOs; and NGOs that provide community services within urban and 
rural areas. The Minister of Civil Affairs, Li Liguo, explained in the press conference that 
these four categories of social organizations can be directly registered at the Civil Affairs 
departments and do not need to find a “supervision unit”. This policy will be implemented 
progressively both at the national level and the local level with pilot projects being 
prioritized and then spreading out.62 It indicates that the principle of “dual management 
system”, which has existed for 25 years, has been loosened and this might trigger the 
reform in policies towards social organizations in China. In response to this central 
decision, provincial governments have taken actions to issue relevant regulations to 
implement this policy in the registration of social organizations at the local level. Shanxi 
Province enacted interim measures towards the direct registration of social organizations63 
in July 2015, and specified the different ways of registration among these four categories. 
Guangxi Autonomous Region formulated interim measures as well and allowed “one 
                                                 
60 The State Council issued this regulation in 1998. 
61 Social organizations here are equivalent to NGOs. The definition of social organizations in China, see Yang 
Guobin, 2005. 
62 From Chinanews site 05/12/2013,http://www.chinanews.com/gn/2013/12-05/5583640.shtml. Last entry at 
08/09/15. 
63山西省四类社会组织直接登记管理暂行办法, cite from http://www.ngocn.net/column/364106.html, last 
entry 08/09/2015. 
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industry, several associations” (yi ye duo hui). It means that more than one organization 
may be established within the same industry, in order to promote moderate competition 
and break the monopoly of resources. 64  Shandong Province promulgated a regulation 
towards NCCs’ management - “Administration of non-local chambers of commerce in 
Shandong Province” in late 2014, and stipulated that the retired civil servants are not 
allowed to take any position part time or full time in NCCs within three years of their 
retirement. 65  
However, when it comes to the registration of chambers of commerce and guilds, this 
policy came across a series of obstacles when being implemented. First, the Ordinance 
limits associations to a single group, dealing with one industry, in only one locality (“one 
locality, one industry and one association”, yidi yiye yihui). It prohibited the competition of 
business associations within the same industries and localities. Although the registration 
process has been simplified, local Civil Affairs Bureaus could also deny the new 
applications on the account of the already existing associations in a similar industry or 
locality. 66  Second, after calling off the supervision unit, some local Civil Affairs 
departments classified social organizations internally and attributed their registration duties 
to different divisions respectively within the bureau, which increased the workload of the 
local CAB and reduced efficiency.67 Third, the contradictions between different policies 
brought about difficulties in the implementation of local policy. The State Council 
promulgated the Ordinance in 1998, which has been the only national law for the 
registration of NGOs in China. Since it is quite outdated, the State Council has announced 
to start the revision since 2009. However, the revision had not been completed when the 
MCA made the decision on loosening the “Dual Management System” on four categories 
of social organizations in late 2013. The MCA’s administrative level is lower than the 
State Council, so if its policy contradicts with the existing Ordinance, it would be really 
hard to implement in practice as a result of lacking relevant supporting policies and 
specifications (Interview with ZJ, Official in Tianjin ECO). 
                                                 
64广西省四类社会组织直接登记管理暂行办法, cite from http://www.ngocn.net/column/364106.html, last 
entry 08/09/2015. 
65 Cite from Shandong Government net. http://www.shandong.gov.cn/art/2015/3/5/art_286_663.html, last 
entry 08/09/2015. 
66 Refer to the twelfth session CPPCC proposal No. 0873 
http://www.cppcc.gov.cn/zxww/2015/03/06/ARTI1425612693671137.shtml. 
67 Refer to interview to Yangtuan, 社会组织登记“开闸” 15/04/2015, 
http://www.xuehuile.com/blog/4f00906448cb4525ada660223c5505be.html. 
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The registration of NCCs still follows the “Dual Management System”, although there 
have been reforms underway. To establish a NCC, non-local entrepreneurs need to register 
in the Civil Affairs Bureaus in the registration locality, and at the same time they have to 
find a “mother-in-law” (supervision unit) to supervise its daily business and administration. 
At the initial stage, NCCs have quite a lot of options in choosing their supervision unit, 
from the ICF to the home governments’ liaison office. However, this was dealt a setback in 
February 2002 when the MCA promulgated the “Notice Re-Confirming the Management 
Units for Social Groups” (Guanyu chongxin queren shehui tuanti yewu guanli danwei de 
tongzhi). This regulation gave the authority to supervise social groups to 22 departments, 
but not to the ICF (Fewsmith, 2008). Currently, NCCs’ supervision units also show 
regional variations. Some previously established NCCs are subordinated to local ICFs, 
some other NCCs are supervised by local commerce bureaus, and the most newly 
established ones are managed by the economic cooperation departments (Interview with 
XXX, official in Hangzhou ECO). For example, Guangdong Economic and Information 
Commission supervised NCCs in Guangdong; Tianjin Economic Cooperation Office 
subordinated NCCs in Tianjin; and NCCs in Beijing are under the management of different 
provincial liaison offices in Beijing (zhujingban).   
The variation of NCCs’ registration and their relationship with supervision units directly 
reflects the feature of NCCs’ state networks, though the intensity of these state networks 
needs to be illustrated in the following case studies. NCCs’ registration was plagued with 
lots of problems, and it was the first lobbying case with local states for most of NCCs. Due 
to the variation in support and controls from supervision units, NCCs did show a variation 
in lobbying for registration. For example, as the Guangdong government loosened the 
registration procedure and it was comparatively easy and straightforward to register an 
NCC, NCCs in Guangdong were selective when approaching local states. They 
intentionally kept distance from the general Guangdong local bureaucracies, but 
maintained a close relationship with the Guangdong Economic and Information 
Commission and the Guangdong Liaison Office in relevant districts, because NCCs could 
seek financial support from these two departments, which had the budget to reward 
outstanding NCCs for their work in attracting investment (Interview with YDF, official in 
Guangdong Economic and Information Commission). NCCs in Tianjin were more 
inclusive in approaching local bureaucracies when seeking registration. Apart from the 
interaction with the Tianjin ECO, they also approached the Tianjin ICF and local business 
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committee at different levels in order to facilitate all the stages of the registration 
(Interview with LX, official in Tianjin ECO). 
3.1.2 NCCs’ position in the local administration  
NCCs are positioned in a complex administrative context. Due to their “bridge” function 
between home governments and host governments, they have to be more capable to 
coordinate the different requests from both home and host governments, as well as both 
home and host society. This is reflected in their organizational features. Figure 3.1 takes 
Tianjin Zhejiang NCC as an example to show NCCs’ position within the local 
administrative structure, and for comparison, Figure 3.2 shows the position of local 
chambers of commerce in Wenzhou’s administrative structure. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1: NCCs in the local administrative structure 
Source: author’s elaboration 
Zhejiang Provincial 
Government  
Tianjin Zhejiang NCC 
Tianjin CAB Tianjin ECO Zhejiang’s Tianjin 
Liaison Office 
jiang’s Tianjin 
Liaison Office 
Tianjin Municipal 
Government 
Zhejiang ECO 
Chapter 3 
 84 
 
Figure 3.2: Wenzhou Chamber of Commerce in the local administrative structure68 
Source: Yu 2006, pp. 68. 
Comparing Figure 3.1 and 3.2, we can see that the biggest difference between NCCs and 
other local business associations is their position in the intergovernmental relationship. 
Through the local administrative links with local bureaucratic departments, NCCs 
successfully connected their home governments with host governments. In Figure 3.1, 
Tianjin Zhejiang NCCs are supervised by Tianjin ECO and registered in Tianjin CAB, 
while at the same time; they are under the guidance of Zhejiang ECO and Zhejiang 
government’s Tianjin Liaison office (Tianjin Zhejiang NCC was initiated by this liaison 
office in 1997). It seems like NCCs are under double supervision from both home 
governments and host governments, although there is still sufficient developing space due 
to the “Intergovernmental Gap”. The “Intergovernmental Gap” here refers to the 
developing space arising from the asymmetry of information and policy differences 
between different local governments. The concept of “Intergovernmental Gap” was put up 
                                                 
68  Wenzhou chambers of commerce in the thesis include industrial associations and conventional chambers 
of commerce. They are all registered in civil affair bureaus, but subordinate to different supervision units. 
Cite from郁建兴等：民间商会与地方政府——基于浙江省温州市的研究，经济科学出版社，2006，P 
68. 
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the first time by the author. Due to the information asymmetry and policy difference, local 
government always come across gaps when dealing with intergovernmental relations, 
which leads to poor communication or failed cooperation. I define these kinds of gaps as 
“Intergovernmental Gap”. In Figure 3.2, Wenzhou has developed the most completed 
structure to manage business associations so far in China. The industrial chambers of 
commerce are under the supervision of Wenzhou ICF or as members of the Wenzhou 
General Chamber of Commerce, and the industrial associations are under the supervision 
of the Wenzhou Economic and Trade Commission or other authorized organizations. 
However, all these local business associations are registered in Wenzhou CAB. This 
administrative structure has made clear the relationship between local Chambers of 
Commerce and government departments as well as other external actors, which has 
fostered the prosperity of the Wenzhou Chamber of Commerce and the development of the 
private sector in Wenzhou.  Unlike the local Chamber of Commerce, the administrative 
structure for NCCs was still far from perfect, which to some degree has left space for 
NCCs to develop their own growth mode and behavior strategy, but at the end it has 
hindered the further development of NCCs in local China (Interview with Wang, Scholar 
in Zhejiang Provincial Party School).  
Apart from sharing some general features with other business associations, NCCs also 
have their own unique specialties regarding their organizational structures: First, NCCs are 
not only links between local business and states, but also links between the local 
governments and foreign investments. Second, in addition to the conventional functions of 
chambers of commerce, NCCs have also opened new windows for economic cooperation 
between different local governments. This means they connect the economy of their home 
localities with the host locality’s economy. Third, NCCs have demonstrated a great 
diversity in behaviors. Because of the difference in NCCs origins and networks, as well as 
the institutional context created by the different local governments, some NCCs have 
focused on the provision of public services and information support for members; some on 
promoting economic cooperation between the governments, and others focus on political 
engagement and influencing local policy. 
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3.1.3 NCCs and local liaison office 
In China, the local government’s liaison office is an important mechanism to gather policy 
information, coordinate intergovernmental relations, and carry out intergovernmental 
lobbying on behalf of its government. The most prominent liaison offices are local 
governments’ Beijing Liaison Offices (zhujingban). Due to the centralized political system 
and unbalanced central-local authority in China69, the Beijing Liaison Office has been an 
important institution for local governments to lobby for more political and financial 
resources and preferential policies from central ministries and committees. At the same 
time, it has become a hotbed for corruption as a result of the unrevealed informal 
negotiations. According to recent statistics, until 2010, the number of liaison offices in 
Beijing was 971, which included 50 liaison offices at the level of deputy provincial and 
above, 304 municipal level liaison offices and 374 county level liaison offices, as well as 
the liaison units of government departments at all levels, state-owned enterprises and 
universities, etc.70 In order to regulate the misconduct of local governments’ liaison offices, 
the State Council issued “The Guidance to Strengthen and Standardize the management of 
Local Governments’ Beijing Liaison Offices” on January 19, 2010. According to the 
Guidance, 625 liaison offices needed revocation within six months. However, because of 
the institutional soil of “lobbying central ministries to get resources” (paobu qianjin) still 
existing71, the Guidance could not be effectively implemented. By 2011, some liaison 
offices had claimed to be abolished; however, the local governments set up other 
institutions in other names like investment attraction office, etc. and still kept their 
substantial presence in Beijing  
Apart from the Beijing liaison office, local governments also set up other liaison offices in 
different cities based on the needs of liaison services, especially in big cities like Shanghai 
and Shenzhen. As a result of the close geographical distance between Beijing and Tianjin, 
some provincial governments did not set up liaison offices in Tianjin, but entrusted their 
Beijing liaison offices to cover the liaison business in Tianjin. For example, the Zhejiang 
                                                 
69 In 1994, China has started the “Tax Sharing System”, which gave the central government and especially 
some central ministries and committees great flexibility in managing and distributing the transfer of 
disbursement funds. In order to seek more resources, a large number of local governments set up their liaison 
offices in Beijing. 
70 Data from the Caixing Net: 裁撤“驻京办”能否一劳永逸？27/01/2010 http://opinion.caixin.com/2010-01-
27/100189520.html, last entry on 4th July, 2016. 
71 The central ministries and committees are still holding great power in the management and allocation of 
disbursement funds, and the whole approval process is not transparent at all. Besides, there is no effective 
mechanism to supervise the whole policy making process at the central level.  
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government had its liaison office in Tianjin, while the Guangdong government only had a 
liaison office in Beijing, and entrusted its Beijing Liaison office to be in charge of the 
coordination issues in Tianjin.  
Local governments’ liaison offices had a direct effect on NCCs’ establishment and 
development. Some NCCs were initiated by liaison offices. For example, the Tianjin 
Zhejiang NCC was initiated by the Zhejiang government’s Tianjin Liaison Office. Some 
NCCs got financial support from the liaison office in the development process, which can 
be exemplified by the Tianjin Guangdong NCC. Some NCCs were under one roof with 
liaison offices and sharing the staff and office area. For example, Tianjin Sha’anxi NCC 
were under one roof with Sha’anxi Province’s Tianjin Liaison Office, even the office 
director also served as the president of Tianjin Sha’axi NCC. Some other NCCs might not 
keep close relationship with liaison offices, or there were not even any liaison offices in 
their host cities. However, the role of liaison offices in NCCs’ establishment and 
development was inevitable, and it also provided the links for NCCs to enhance their 
connections with home governments.  
The relationship between NCCs and liaison offices demonstrated great variations, which 
were reflected to be the regional variation and individual differences. Regarding the 
regional variation, generally speaking, Beijing liaison offices took more political functions 
to supervise NCCs in Beijing, especially in terms of maintaining stability (weiwen). 
Therefore, NCCs’ development in Beijing was under more control than in other places. 
Liaison offices in other places were more business-oriented. Regarding the individual 
difference, for example, in Tianjin, different NCCs showed various relationships with their 
home government’s liaison office as outlined above. These differences stemmed from 
historical and institutional factors, and also from different NCCs’ behavior preferences and 
strategic choices. To systematically understand and explain this variation, we need to 
develop our analysis from the micro level. 
3.1.4 NCCs’ organizational structure 
Generally speaking, the complete organizational structure of NCCs is composed of several 
essential parts, which include the member congress, president, council, board of 
supervisors, and the Secretariat. The member congress is the top decision-making body 
and elects the president, vice-president, council members, and board of supervisors. The 
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council is the executive body of the member congress, and can represent the member 
congress to implement decisions being made in the member congress. If the members of 
the council have reached a specified number, the standing council can be set up. The 
Secretariat is in charge of routine administrative operations, and can be elected by the 
member congress or appointed by the council or member congress. Another part with 
Chinese characteristics is the Communist Youth League branches within NCCs, which 
started around 2000, with the function of “uniting young employees in the private 
enterprises”.72 In recent years, there is a tendency of party cell building within social 
organizations. Patricia Thornton has carried out research on this phenomenon and 
developed the concept of Party-organized NGOs or PONGOs (Thornton, 2013). 
3.2 NCCs’ growth mode  
Although most NCCs arise from the bottom-up and have got great support from non-local 
businessmen at the emerging stage, the dominant driving forces differ between NCCs. The 
success of non-local Wenzhou chambers of commerce can be attributed to both, the 
pioneering spirit of non-local Wenzhou entrepreneurs and the Wenzhou government’s full 
support. However, not all the regions in China have the conditions to effectively copy the 
Wenzhou model. In the process of development, NCCs from other places have developed 
their own growth mode.  
Due to the difference of driving force in the process of NCCs’ emergence, NCCs can be 
divided into a top-down mode, bottom-up mode, and interim mode (Wang, 2010).  As the 
name suggests, top-down mode means that NCCs are established on the initiative of 
industry authorities or government agencies, while bottom-up mode means the initiative of 
establishing NCCs comes from private entrepreneurs or non-local migrant businesses. 
Interim mode is in-between top-down and bottom-up mode, and combines the private 
initiative together with substantial support of local agencies.  In the following case analysis, 
the representative for top-down mode is Tianjin Shaanxi NCC, and bottom-up mode is 
Guangdong NCC, and interim mode includes Tianjin Shanxi NCC and Tianjin Zhejiang 
NCC. 
                                                 
72 Interview with SWP in Tianjin Zhejiang NCC, 14/05/2012 
Chapter 3 
 89 
3.3 NCCs’ behavior strategies 
NCCs’ behavior strategy means a series of actions, thinking and choices carried out by 
NCCs in the development process in order to achieve their goals. The ultimate goal for 
NCCs is seeking to maximize benefits for their membership enterprises through a variety 
of ways and methods, like collective expression, business lobbying, providing services, 
etc., as claimed in their constitutions (Wang, 2010). Nevertheless, NCCs in China are still 
in an emerging stage, and bearing with lots of characteristics of transitional society. Some 
NCCs originated in the government's authorization. For example, Tianjin Sha’anxi NCC 
was transformed from the Sha’anxi liaison office in Tianjin in 2010. Other NCCs 
originated from the business group demands on collective lobbying. For example, Tianjin 
Wenzhou NCC was established in order to collectively express their interest in building up 
a clothing and shoes ‘city’ within the Central Business District (CBD) area in Tianjin. 
There are also some other NCCs that originated from single enterprises, and then expanded 
to cover more memberships progressively. Due to the variation in the origin, NCCs in 
China do not have common goals and have different directions in their behavior strategies.  
According to the findings from the fieldwork research, I summarized the orientations of 
NCCs’ behavior. One direction of their behavior is to serve government requests. NCCs 
proactively provide services for local government departments, like constructing a 
platform and mechanisms for intergovernmental cooperation, becoming partners with local 
governments in attracting investments, and advising government policymaking. Most 
prominently in practice, the role of NCCs in investment attraction has been very much 
valued by local agencies. In this scheme, NCCs’ activities focus on attracting investment 
for the host government. They work with the commerce committee or merchant groups in 
the local government to go back to their home places to promote the investment 
opportunities in host cities. 
The second direction of NCCs’ behavior goes to serving the interests of their members. In 
order to achieve this, they collectively lobby for government resources, and provide 
members with public service and information support. Focusing on the requirement of 
memberships, NCCs provide any rear services to satisfy all the memberships and enhance 
their internal solidarity. The first and second directions appear in the early stage of NCCs’ 
development, when NCCs have not yet stabilized to develop their own independence.  
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The third direction of NCCs’ behavior is on influencing policy. This is the most aggressive 
strategy, but it is not being extensively used by NCCs. When NCCs have developed to a 
certain level and have stabilized their income and structure, they aimed to increase their 
power and finally exert influence in policymaking and policy implementation. That is why 
this research started from NCCs’ influence in policy process in the early stage. 
The final direction is to serve a small group people, like a business elite’s club. This kind 
of NCC focuses on the social activities among memberships, rather than carrying out a lot 
of political activities. They act in an active coordinative role in harmonizing the 
relationships between different member enterprises, and provide a platform for the non-
local entrepreneurs to establish their social networks.  
This is a general categorization, and in practice each NCC engages in all the four types of 
behaviors. However, the categorization is valuable because it helps us to understand the 
variation of NCCs’ actions and the different development stages of NCCs in China. The 
emergence and development of NCCs shows various facets of transitional China, which 
make it a hard subject to study. However, it has provided a highly interesting field to 
examine the evolution of state-society relations in China. In the following section, a 
categorization based on NCCs’ nature and action will be elaborated. 
3.4 NCCs’ interaction with local states  
Empirical evidence has shown that NCCs’ lobbying strategies and behaviors have their 
own characteristics, which is to some extent different from business lobbying and other 
NGOs’ lobbying (Kennedy, 2005; Popovic, 2012; Yang 2008). Through interviews and 
participant observation carried out in Hangzhou and Tianjin in summer 2012, I found some 
significant characteristics and great variations in NCCs’ interaction with local states. 
NCCs have demonstrated different roles in the interaction with local states regarding 
different issues. There have been reasons for that. NCCs have grown out of civil society, 
but there has been no institutionalized channel for them to contact the government (Yu, 
2006). Due to China’s rapid economic transition, which has brought many uncertainties to 
businesses, including political and administrative uncertainty (Guthrie, 1997), NCCs made 
up of non-local businessmen have to be very flexible when they engage in the policy 
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process for the sake of their own interests. Empirical evidence in this research73 shows that 
in different policy circumstances, NCCs change their roles and range swiftly. It reflects 
that on the one hand in economic and business issues, NCCs act as the equivalent of 
interest groups to negotiate with and lobby policy makers through formal or informal 
methods. On the other hand, when it comes to social issues, like social welfare, they regard 
themselves as a vulnerable group to fight for the same treatment as local people, which is 
similar to grass-root NGOs.  
In addition, NCCs have engaged in a vast range of social activities in order to increase 
their influence. In Tianjin, since 2008, NCCs started to engage in education, media, 
philanthropy, corporate social responsibility, public advocacy and social welfare issues. In 
Hangzhou this trend started earlier. The increase of social protests has given local 
governments much more pressure and force them to be more responsive to public requests, 
and even promote public participation in local governance. As a result, more space has 
been created for non-bureaucratic actors to get involved in a wide range of local issues. 
Like other social organizations, NCCs need to engage widely so as to raise their profile 
and improve their influence. Within these engagements, huge variation has been observed 
in different localities and even between different NCCs in the same locality. NCCs have 
developed their own discourse to interpret their relations with local states during the 
lobbying process. 
 “Assisting Government”.  NCCs’ activities are government centered, and most of their 
attention is put on assisting local government, aiming to establish a close link with official 
institutions. There are still two ways of doing it: One focuses on the rear service to both 
local government and membership enterprises, such as assisting receptions of high-level 
officials’ visits, providing information and survey data to decision makers in the local 
bureaucracy, and help local officials to organize meetings with private enterprise directors, 
etc.  But these NCCs never take initiatives or dominate in any projects. Another type 
focuses on investment attraction for commercial departments in local governments, based 
on their sound understanding of local demand. The representative example is Shandong 
NCC and Shanxi NCC in Tianjin. As a member of the Shanxi NCC in Tianjin explained: 
                                                 
73 These empirical evidences will be elaborated in chapter 4-6 when talking about the cases of NCCs’ 
influencing local policy. 
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“As a social group, we might embed our interest into the local state, by this way 
we could get more support from them, and you know, most of us came from the 
governmental departments, and we are also trying to get financial support from 
both home and host government”. (Interview with Shanxi NCC in Tianjin, May 
15, 2012) 
An interviewee from the Shandong NCC in Tianjin outlined: 
“We are valued by the Tianjin government, just because we can bring lots of 
investment from Shandong. Since Zhang Gaoli (the former Shandong Party 
Secretary) took his office in Tianjin, hundreds of enterprises followed him here. 
This is good for us, as we will be credited for this achievement” (Interview 
RRS and MJH with Shandong NCC in Tianjin). 
“Managing Government”. NCCs regard both governments and enterprises as their 
consumers, and their function is docking the resources from both sides. As government is 
the biggest resource owner, they concentrate on governments, and try to seek more 
resources for membership enterprises. Guangdong NCC in Tianjin is a perfect 
demonstration of this kind of NCC: 
“What we are doing now is being smart and flexible. Do I listen to the 
government? No. The truth is they need us as a tool, and we need them as a 
platform. Do I listen to the enterprises? Not exactly. Of course, we need to 
represent and protect their interests collectively. But to some degree, we are 
making business with each member. Most importantly, they are quite happy 
with it, as this way could really solve their problems genuinely.”  (Interview 
with WJS in Guangdong NCC in Tianjin) 
“Entrepreneurial Cooperation”. NCCs are inclined to build up their own social network 
and accumulate social capital, rather than relying on the resources from local states. As one 
interviewee explained: 
“We just focus on what we are doing now, and seize each opportunity to 
expand our market. Although we are not so involved in political activities, we 
are quite interested in policy change or even just a tiny adjustment in local 
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regulation, which we think would be good opportunity to make money” 
(Interview with HHJ from Wenzhou NCC in Tianjin) 
“We are now having a museum on Zhejiang NCC’s development in Tianjin, 
where you could see most of the successive top leaders having come to visit 
us. However, it is not because of our PR job, but the local government finds it 
essential and important to include us in the local development.”  (Interviews 
from the seminar held in the museum of Zhejiang NCC in Tianjin) 
Most of the NCCs in this discourse are from places where the private economy is 
developed and cooperation in the market is very common. Non-local businessmen in the 
NCCs are not good at establishing social networks with governments, and they do not 
think governments can be quick enough to respond to their requirements, thus they form a 
very solid cooperation between members and realize self-governance. This group of NCCs 
is relatively independent. The cooperation is manifested in many shades of economic life, 
like joint companies, bank service, etc.  However, they believe that after they have enough 
influence and reputation, based on the collective power, the door that provides access to 
local governments will naturally open. Business people from Zhejiang enjoy a high 
reputation around China and even in the world. Wenzhou people in particular are good at 
establishing and enhancing their networks in business. In this sense, Zhejiang NCC in 
Tianjin and Wenzhou NCC in Tianjin show their uniqueness and specialty from other 
NCCs. 
“Ideology propaganda and promotion”. NCCs work closely with the propaganda 
departments in local governments and attach great emphasis to establishing party 
organizations within their membership enterprises. Shanxi NCC has been given many 
awards at the municipal and national level as a result of their work in the specific area. As 
one interviewee explained: 
“We are the first NCC ever in China who has innovated the method of 
establishing party organizations in private enterprises, and we have already 
had more than 30 party groups among our membership enterprises. At the 
beginning, there were no rules to follow, but we created effective principles 
and rules. Since we were awarded the ‘excellent social organization’ title 
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from the Ministry of Civil Affairs, other NCCs have started to visit and learn 
from us.” (Interview with GSP in Shanxi NCC in Tianjin) 
Most of the NCCs in this discourse probably have a president or secretary-general who is a 
retired official and inherited the way of working with the local bureaucracy and who is 
good at social mobilization. Definitely it is a good way to improve influence in the city and 
even around the nation. As the most important goals for contemporary local governments 
are GDP and maintaining stability, these NCCs just cover the gap that is hard to reach for 
local governments - the non-local private sector. By establishing the branches of party 
organization or the communist youth league, NCCs help local governments to become 
more accessible to the group of non-local people and enhance their control power. An 
example is the Shanxi NCC in Tianjin. 
3.5 Explaining NCCs’ variation  
The factors leading to NCCs’ variation in their way of interaction with local states can be 
better examined from the micro level, which is the approach taken by this thesis. In order 
to demonstrate the importance of taking a micro level approach, I will provide an overview 
of the current relevant research as a basis for my following analysis.  
As I mentioned in chapter 1, the emergence of bottom-up business associations has drawn 
much attention from scholarship in recent years, with an empirical focus on the upsurge of 
the Wenzhou Chamber of Commerce’s growing capacity in local governance (e.g. Yu, 
2004a, 2004b, 2006; Jiang, 2008; Chen, 2007 & 2003c). Unlike traditional emerging routes 
for businesses associations, NCCs developed either as an initiative of business 
entrepreneurs or the joint effort of both local governments and business elites.  This 
development intrigued a broad range of scholars doing China studies.   The “Civil Society” 
school, which usually holds an optimistic view on China’s civil society, claimed that the 
emergence and political involvement of a civil chamber of commerce was a milestone for 
the development of civil society in China (White, 1993; He, 1997; Brook & Frolic, 1997; 
Hayhoe & Zhong, 1997; etc.). However, the “Corporatism” school gathered evidence from 
the Wenzhou Chambers of Commerce and argued that they are just another form of 
extension of governmental agency and the new phenomenon is still restricted within the 
realm of “corporatism” (Wank, 1995, 1998; Saich, 2000; White, 1993, 1996; Ma, 2007). 
With the development of business associations in China, researchers found limitations with 
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both approaches (Lu, 2006; Fulda, 2012; Wang, 2014; Huang 2013). In the transitional era 
of China, neither the macro theory, whether Corporatism or Pluralism, could give a 
comprehensive explanation of state-society relations in China, nor could the political 
structure and institution analysis explain the variety of new emerging political phenomena. 
Therefore, research on state-society interaction needs to be shifted from “structure dispute” 
to “action research” (Zhang Jingen, 2012). Therefore, to analyze NCCs’ rapid spread and 
development, as well as their variations, I need to shift from the grand theory to micro 
logics and mechanisms. 
Different business associations could exert various levels of influence during their political 
engagement, which would provide a reference for us to study NCCs’ influence in the local 
policy process of China. To explain NCCs’ influence in the local policy process, the key 
question is what are the determinants that shape NCCs’ different ways of lobbying and 
lobbying success or failure. Reviewing the existing studies on business associations, 
researchers have found that the state links or official network is the key resource for 
business associations or other social organizations to improve their capacity and increase 
influences over government policy. Wang (2014) has talked about how provincial and 
municipal industrial associations use vertical and horizontal state networks to carry out the 
interaction between local state and society. Kennedy (2005) also mentioned that the 
national industrial associations did policy lobbying based on the networks that have been 
discreetly weaved. Zhu (2009a) argued that expert knowledge, governmental linkage, and 
personal ties are the factors that determine think tanks’ influence in the Chinese policy 
process, and in another article (Zhu, 2009b) he argued that guanxi (personal network) with 
bureau chiefs is the most important network resource for policy experts in China’s think 
tanks seeking to exert influence over government policy-making in contemporary China. 
Fulda (2012) used a case study to reveal the network governance approach for Chinese 
civil society associations to take in order to realize good governance at the local level. All 
these studies have revealed the positive role of state links of social organizations for their 
influence over government policy. However, whether this finding applies to NCCs or not, 
still remains a question. This is the main issue I am going to examine in this thesis.  
NCCs’ internal capacity and resources may attribute their success in influencing policy to 
some degree. However, my fieldwork suggests that for most NCCs the biggest source for 
NCCs’ influence comes from outside, especially their external network, and the resources 
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that they can mobilize within these networks. This point was confirmed by Huang Dongya 
in her research on private entrepreneurs’ influence in local policy process (Huang, 2013). 
Compared to other kinds of business associations, industrial associations, or even 
individual enterprises, NCCs possess more choices to weave their networks, due to their 
unique position and special traits in local governance. 74  Examining relations between 
NCCs’ lobbying behavior and their influence on policy outcomes, I can indicate that 
guanxi (personal network) is no longer the only and key resource,75 but a toolkit extended 
from this social connection has shown a strong relevance between lobbying and policy 
outcomes.  
The origin and network of an NCC directly determine it state links. In this thesis, NCCs’ 
origin indicates where an NCC comes from, from state’s initiative or entrepreneurs’ 
initiative. An NCC’s network refers to the network they discreetly weaved after their 
creation, which can be dichotomized into state network and business network in this 
research.   
The different origins of NCCs can be regarded as a spectrum from bottom-up to top-down. 
Different from other government-sponsored business associations, NCCs’ relationship with 
the state is not definite from the very beginning. Some NCCs have developed as an 
initiative of business entrepreneurs, some have stemmed from the joint effort of both local 
governments and business elites, and some others may come solely from the local 
governments’ initiative. These differences in NCCs’ origin lead to NCCs’ variation in the 
interaction with local states in their later development. Therefore, the origin of an NCC is 
an important factor to explain their variation in policy influence. 
The network context of NCCs is unique among all the business associations. Unlike other 
types of business associations, NCCs face double the amount of networks that other 
business associations have, due to their relations with the host governments and society, as 
well as their home governments and society. This means NCCs are part of a complex 
network context.  NCCs’ networks include the innate network when they were established, 
and also the network that they endeavored to build and expand in their development. 
                                                 
74 Here this refers to NCCs’ position in linking the original government and the local government, as well as 
linking the local state and the market, which leads to a broader space than other business association to yield 
abilities and exert influence. 
75  Examining the literatures on business associations and the empirical evidence from field research are the 
source for this indication. Specific details see literature review in chapter 1. 
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Supported by the empirical evidence of this thesis, NCCs’ network is far more significant 
than that of other types of business associations. It not only covers the extensive state 
network with both home government and host government, but also includes the extensive 
business and societal network. The current study on business associations and other NGOs 
leads to the hypothesis that NCCs’ orientation and strategy towards network building 
directly affects their engagement in local governance and the way they interact with local 
states. For example, state network oriented NCCs have more channels to get access to the 
political process, while business network oriented NCCs have to find an indirect way to 
make their voice heard. Therefore, systematically examining NCCs’ network will help to 
understand the variation of NCCs in exerting influence in the local policy process. 
In the process of NCCs’ expansion, the role of a group of activists cannot be 
underestimated. These people with pioneering spirits are willing to devote their time and 
energy to promote NCCs’ growth and development. Their role is crucial at the stage of 
NCCs’ emergence, when there are lots of negotiations with both home and host 
governments. It is also important at the developing stage when there are significant 
changes in policy context, organizational structure and development strategy. These 
individuals or group of people will be defined as “NCC activists” in this thesis. They could 
be the president or secretary-general of some NCC, or local officials in the local 
bureaucracy.  The common feature of NCC activists are that they have directly or 
indirectly raised the profile of NCCs’ influence and engaged NCCs to be active actors in 
local governance.   
In order to explain NCCs’ variation in policy influence, we need to consider the macro 
factors like regional difference, policy area, institutional context, as well as industrial focus, 
etc. However, these factors could not reveal the real mechanism of NCCs’ lobbying in the 
local policy process and then answer the question of what shapes NCCs’ success in 
lobbying. That is why this research is taking the micro-level approach to examine NCCs’ 
origin and network, and how these two important factors contribute to their influence in the 
Chinese local policy process. Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning that NCC’s 
development is still at an early stage, with lots of problems entangled. It is far more 
challenging and far too early to develop an overarching framework to explain all the 
variations. After combining the current study on business associations and other NGOs, as 
well as comprehensively analyzing all the lobbying activities from fieldwork research, this 
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thesis defines NCCs’ origin and network as the two main dimensions to explain NCCs’ 
various policy influences. Yet, other factors like NCC activists, and institutional context 
will be mentioned in the analysis as well. In order to illustrate how these factors affecting 
NCCs’ policy influence, a typology for various NCCs is developed in the following 
sections. 
3.6 Two dimensions to categorize NCCs: “Origin” and “Network” 
Using the dimensions of origin and network to categorize all the NCCs in China, I need to 
develop measurable variables to represent NCCs’ origin and network. An NCC’s origin, as 
mentioned above, indicates where the NCC comes from, from state’s initiative or 
entrepreneurs’ initiative. So in this research, I define NCCs’ origin as its establishment 
initiatives. An NCC’s network refers to the network NCCs discreetly weaved after 
establishment and it can be categorized into state network and business network in this 
research. Hence there are two new developed concepts: network orientation and network 
strategy. Network orientation refers to the orientation of NCCs’ network building, which is 
state network oriented or business network oriented, while network strategy refers to the 
feature of network that NCCs aim to achieve. Here in the following text I am going to 
introduce these three important concepts: establishment initiatives, network orientation and 
network strategy.  
NCCs’ establishment initiatives  
NCCs’ establishment initiatives indicate the dominant power and state - society path 
during NCCs’ emergence. In this thesis, it refers to NCC’s original support gained for its 
establishment. NCCs are either initiated by local state or non-local entrepreneurs. This 
means they can generally be categorized as top-down and bottom-up.  
It seems easy to clearly define the boundary between top-down and bottom up modes. 
Nevertheless, some NCCs have got support from both the local state and membership 
entrepreneurs at the early stage of their establishment, which might confuse the division. In 
order to clarify this concept, this thesis defines the original initiatives to establish this 
organization as the key standard to distinguish between top-down and bottom-up types. If 
NCCs are initiated by non-local businessmen or entrepreneurs, I refer to them as the 
‘bottom-up’ type; if NCCs are initiated by government agencies or any organization with 
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official background, either from home localities or host localities, I refer to them as the 
‘top-down’ type. 
NCCs’ network orientation 
NCCs’ network orientation refers to NCC’s orientation in building up their networks after 
their creation, which indicates NCCs’ preference in focal networks (Wang & Zhang, 2012). 
NCCs’ networks mainly include business networks and state networks, where business 
networks refer to the network within business circles, and state network refers to the 
network within officialdom of host government, home government, and other levels of 
governments. Network orientation is a relative concept, and it can only indicate NCCs’ 
tendency in weaving their networks. Although most NCCs might simultaneously carry out 
activities to enhance both their state network and business network, eventually they 
develop a preference or orientation for the purpose of maximizing their interests. Therefore, 
NCCs’ network orientation can be divided into state network oriented and business 
network oriented. In practice, state network oriented NCCs and business network oriented 
NCCs demonstrated different characteristics, which will be specified in the following case 
study chapters. 
NCCs’ network strategy 
NCCs’ network strategy refers to the strategy and methods of NCCs’ network building, 
and it indicates a NCCs’ most valued feature of their networks. Based on the empirical 
evidence from this research, network strategies can be categorized into Network Span (NS) 
strategy and Network Intensity (NI) Strategy.  
Network Span means NCCs focusing on the breadth of networks they have built up. NCCs 
adopting an NS strategy make great efforts to expand their network coverage, and try to 
include as many social strata as possible in their external network. As mentioned in the 
case chapters, Tianjin Zhejiang NCC in is a good example of an NCC taking the NS 
strategy. Tianjin Zhejiang NCC has built close relations with both its home government 
and host government since the early stages of its creation.76 It also has strong support from 
membership enterprises in both Zhejiang and Tianjin. Besides, it was the first to set up the 
                                                 
76  Refer to the report of Zhejiang NCCs founding diary in the author’s fieldwork diary. 
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public and media office and “Zhejiang merchant in Tianjin” exhibition among all the 
Tianjin NCCs, to effectively manage the relations with the media and the public, as well as 
the intellectuals in relevant areas. 
Network Intensity means NCCs emphasize the depth and strength of networks. NCCs 
adopting an NI strategy focus on the key network they rely on, and make efforts to 
formally or informally enhance the established links within this network. A good example 
is the Sha’anxi NCC and the Guangdong NCC in the case chapters. The Sha’anxi NCC 
heavily depends on the Sha’anxi Province’s Tianjin Liaison office financially and 
personally. It does not have a separate office and team at all. However, due to the official 
linkage with the government, their network is much stronger than other NCCs’, which 
gives them more formal or informal channels to deliver ideas although there is still doubt 
about their autonomy. Tianjin Guangdong NCC also focuses the sole network, but 
differing from Tianjin Sha’anxi NCC, their network is entrepreneurs’ business network. 
This is reflected in Guangdong NCCs’ motto “Based on the business and Managing 
Government”.  
Network orientation and network strategy are important for NCCs. Firstly, they directly 
affect how NCCs build up their external networks, and indicate their initiative in using 
networks and assemble the resources. Secondly, they demonstrate the differences between 
NCCs and conventional business associations. Rather than passively accepting the existing 
network, NCCs have operated proactively and independently on their preference of how to 
interweave their networks, in order to achieve the goal of lobbying. 
3.7 NCCs’ typology 
As indicated above, two characteristics of NCCs – their origin and network - do make a 
difference to their policy influence. Thus this thesis develops a theoretical framework 
based on the existing literature on business associations (Kennedy, 2005, 2011 & 2012; 
Wang, 2012; Huang, 2013; Yu, 2014) and my own empirical studies by using NCCs’ 
“Origin and Network”, which were operationalized as Establishment Initiatives and 
Network Orientation in the process of classifying NCCs.  Empirically, Establishment 
Initiatives include top-down mode and bottom-up mode, and Network Orientation shows 
two trajectories of “local state network oriented” or “business network oriented”.  
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Following these two dimensions, four types of NCCs have been categorized: Dependent 
NCCs, Coupling NCCs, Decoupling NCCs, and Independent NCCs.  
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Table 3.1: NCCs' typology 
Typology of NCCs Establishing Initiatives  
Top-down Bottom-up 
 
Network 
 
Orientation77 
Local State network 
oriented 
A: Dependent  
（依赖型） 
Sha’anxi NCC 
B: Coupling 
    (挂钩型) 
Shanxi NCC 
Business network oriented C: Decoupling 
 （脱钩型） 
Zhejiang NCC 
D: Independent 
 （独立型） 
Guangdong NCC 
Note: In order to control the constant factors, all the four NCCs in the table are based in the same locality 
Tianjin.  Source: The author developed this typology for NCCs in China. 
The classification of NCCs shown in table 3.1 is based on two important features of NCCs: 
their origin and network. Hereby the “Origin” refers to whether NCCs are bottom-up 
initiated or Top-down initiated, and it reflects an NCCs’ nature from its creation; while the 
“Network”, including both, Network Orientation or Network Strategy, reflects NCCs’ 
action in their development. This classification combines two dimensions of NCCs’ nature 
and action, which effectively overcomes the limitations of using only one dimension. 
NCCs’ nature could no longer solely account for its various interactions within local state 
and society. Most of the previous research on business associations took a structure 
analysis approach and focused on business associations’ nature such as their official 
linkage and background, to show how the state has controlled and encroached their 
autonomy. This approach can easily adapt the model of corporatism in China, but it cannot 
display more in-depth logics and mechanisms of state-business interactions. Hereby, more 
recent research has shifted to micro action researches based on empirical studies. (Zhu, 
2009, 2012; Yu, 2014; Huang, 2014). NCCs’ origin alone cannot provide answers to 
questions like why even some top-down NCCs are so eager to be engaged with business 
networks and improve their representativeness among membership enterprises, like 
                                                 
77 For the network orientation, there is no accurate measurement to see how much they are oriented towards 
the local state network or business network, just an indicator for their tendency. 
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Zhejiang NCC in Tianjin; and why some bottom-up NCCs have endeavored to be linked 
with official institutions, like the Shanxi NCC in Tianjin. Therefore, in order to give a 
comprehensive understanding to NCCs’ variation in political engagement and policy 
influence, we have to include “action” factors in the explanation.   
However, an analysis only focusing on NCCs’ “action” factors could also hardly give a full 
picture. Unlike the pure grassroots NGOs, the function of NCCs in the local economy has 
driven them to be the objects of cooperation for local states in China. Although they have 
their own interest independent of the local state, they do not enjoy absolute autonomy due 
to local state’ penetration. Therefore, the role of the local state in NCC’ policy influence is 
significant and cannot be underestimated. In this thesis, analysis only using NCCs’ 
network could explain why NCCs with a broad social network and resources hardly get 
access to local policy process, due to the limit of channels, while dependent NCCs could 
have a comparatively strong but invisible voice in the local policy process. 
This framework combines NCCs’ nature and action factors – NCCs’ Origin and network, 
which will overcome the limitations of taking solely one factor into account.  
Divided by NCCs’ establishment initiatives and network orientation, all the NCCs can be 
categorized into four types: Dependent NCCs, Coupling NCCs, Decoupling NCCs, and 
Independent NCCs. The concepts of “Coupling” and “decoupling” reflect the movement 
where NCCs try to attach to or detach from the local state. The term “Decoupled” was first 
used in the Public Service Unit reform (normally called PSU reform, shiye danwei gaige), 
which has been experimented by local authorities in the past ten years (Interview with FXZ 
& LJY, Tianjin CAB). The aim of the PSU reform is to promote the decoupling movement 
and break the administrative and financial linkage between local bureaucratic agencies and 
GONGOs, especially industry associations and other business associations with an official 
background.  As the movement is a moving process rather than a stabilized state, I take the 
concept of “Coupling” and “Decoupling” to illustrate those NCCs that are trying to extend 
their network from state to society or from society to state. 
Before elaborately describing and analyzing the four types of NCCs with empirical cases 
in the following chapters, I will introduce the main features for each type of NCCs and 
provide some examples as well. 
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3.7.1 Dependent NCC 
Like traditional business associations, the dependent type of NCC was initiated by host or 
home government departments, and had the natural linkage with official institutions. They 
are mostly combined with non-local liaison offices (zhuwai banshichu or zhuwai 
bangongshi), a system called “two names (organizations), one management team”. As a 
consequence, their functions are mainly focused on dealing with inter-governmental 
relations, including cooperation, official visits, regional negotiation etc. Due to the 
specified obligation and financial and personnel dependency, they are highly dependent on 
their home government and act as an extension of bureau agencies. However, because of 
this natural linkage with the home government, dependent NCCs have more channels 
within the system to get access to local policy processes. Through hidden lobbying, they 
can exert a certain level of influence in local policy processes especially in policy 
implementation, although this is hard to examine for scholars.   
Regarding the network building, dependent NCCs adopt the network intensity strategy (NI 
strategy). 
3.7.2 Coupling NCC  
‘Coupling’ refers to the process where bottom-up NCCs try to attach themselves with local 
states, and endeavor to build up a strong link with local bureau agencies. This type of NCC 
was initiated by non-local entrepreneurs, scholars or retired officials (They are defined as 
NCC activists in this thesis) voluntarily. Initially their functions are quite similar to 
hometown associations (tongxianghui) or Guild Hall (huiguan), which provides life and 
information support to townsmen from the same region. With the increase of economic 
exchange and business cooperation among regions, they have developed the interest to 
play much more important roles in host localities’ local governance.  In order to engage in 
a more extensive policy agenda and express collective interests, Coupling NCCs seek ways 
and take actions to enhance the link with the local state. Coupling NCCs have the wide 
basis of non-local communities’ support, and make an effort to extend their network within 
the local bureaucracy, so as to raise the profile in local political processes. 
Regarding network building, dependent NCCs adopt the network span strategy (NS 
strategy). 
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3.7.3 Decoupling NCC 
Decoupling NCCs act just the opposite way as coupling NCCs.  Decoupling NCCs develop 
from the local bureau agencies or they are initiated by both home and host governments’ 
Economic and Cooperation Offices (jingji hezuo bangongshi, Hereafter ECO). Some of the 
early-established ones even had an official status before 2000.  As a result of official 
support, they are developing very fast with increasing influence in local governance. As a 
result of the call of Public Service Unit reform78, they had to give up their official status, 
and “detach from the state”. In order to maintain their influence, decoupling NCCs 
multiplied their efforts to build up networks within business and the market. In spite of 
giving up their official status, decoupling NCCs still keep frequent connections with local 
state bureaus. However, different from dependent NCCs, they do not rely on the 
governmental resources, but expand their network within non-local entrepreneurs and 
private sectors. 
Regarding network building, dependent NCCs adopt the network span strategy (NS 
strategy). 
3.7.4 Independent NCC 
Independent NCCs develop from the market, and run like profit-driven enterprises. They 
function like agents, doing business with local governments and membership enterprises.  
Independent NCCs try to fill the gap between the market and the state, but detach 
themselves from both. ‘Managing government’, ‘managing membership enterprises’ are 
principles for them to deal with related relationships. Apart from the routine work, they 
also seek opportunities to make profit by themselves. Among all the four types of NCCs, 
they are most independent and flexible, either financially or in terms of personnel, but 
hardly exert substantial collective influence in policymaking, or probably never thought 
about this. 
Regarding network building, dependent NCCs adopt the network intensity strategy (NI 
strategy). 
                                                 
78 The recent reform is a new decision by the MCA after the 18th party conference, which stipulates that four 
types of GONGOs need to be gradually separated from the state. This includes industrial and business 
association, scientific NGOs, Charitable NGOs and community service NGOs. 
http://www.mca.gov.cn/article/mxht/mtgz/201312/20131200556602.shtml. 
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3.7.5 The spectrum of NCCs 
This thesis aims to demonstrate and analyze the spectrum of NCCs in current China. I have 
already described NCCs’ variation in registration, organizational forms, growth mode and 
lobbying behaviors in the first part of this chapter, where we can see the wide range of 
NCCs. These variations provide the outer framework where the actual mechanism is 
embedded. A good theoretical framework will help us to uncover the underlying causes 
that lead to NCCs’ variation, and understand the wide spectrum of NCCs’ behavior.  
These four types of NCCs will be subsequently discussed in the following three chapters. 
Each chapter will focus on one type with a specific case of an NCC in Tianjin.  The 
analysis will focus on NCCs’ nature, network building, lobbying behavior and policy 
influence, and try to explore the causal mechanism between NCCs’ features and their 
influence in local policy processes.  In this thesis, I will not distinguish between policy 
making and policy implementation for the following reasons: First, in local governance, 
quite a few policy implementations (especially the implementation of central government’s 
policy) are enforced in a way of specific policy or regulation making; second, reversely, 
very often local policymaking is another way of executing the central policy or some 
special policy.  
3.8 Conclusion 
NCCs develop in a complex context in the transitional era in China. Due to great regional 
variation, culturally, politically and economically, it is difficult to draw more general 
conclusions regarding NCCs just based on one locality’s empirical data and material. 
Consequently, more empirical studies from different regions in the field are needed in 
order to understand the growth modes and behavior patterns for NCCs in different 
localities better.  In order to develop a more systematic understanding of NCCs’ variation, 
and to conduct a more in-depth analysis in the following chapters, this chapter elaborately 
introduced NCCs’ variation in registration, organizational forms, growth mode and 
behavior strategy and then categorized all the NCCs by two dimensions. Finally, it 
explained the inherent differences as well.  
Two issues mentioned earlier in this chapter have been dealt with. NCCs’ variation is 
reflected by various phenomena existing in different localities. To understand these 
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variations, macro level explanations, like geographical localities, industry, the local 
political context, economic structure and cultural tradition, are not adequate to give a 
satisfactory answer to the research questions. In order to better understand NCCs’ lobbying 
in local China, I developed a typology of NCCs based on two dimensions at the micro-
level: NCCs origin and network strategy.  Due to the interaction between NCCs’ origin and 
network, four types of NCCs emerged: Dependent NCCs, Coupling NCCs, Decoupling 
NCCs and Independent NCCs. These four types of NCCs behave differently in lobbying 
and exert various types and levels of influence in local policy processes, which will be 
displayed in the following case analysis chapters. 
This chapter has therefore linked empirical data with a theoretical framework. Since there 
is no established research on NCCs, this thesis has taken an inductive research approach. 
Hence a detailed empirical study will provide the basis to develop a good theoretical 
framework. In chapter 2, I have introduced NCCs’ emergence and development, as well as 
their historical connection and political participation. In this chapter, I have systematically 
described NCCs’ registration, organizational form, and growth mode as well as behavior 
strategies. Based on these empirical data and analysis, I developed a theoretical framework 
according to two of their important features: origin and network. The typology of NCCs 
has been created, including four types of NCCs respectively representing four different 
modes of state – society relations. 
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Chapter 4 Coupling NCCs’ lobbying in the local policy 
process - the case of Tianjin Shanxi NCC 
Coupling NCCs, as mentioned in chapter 3, are NCCs with strong bases in local society, 
but which are in the process of building up their network with officialdom in order to 
achieve more influence in social governance. As shown in NCCs’ typology, Coupling 
NCCs were bottom-up established and local state network oriented. Compared to other 
types of NCCs, Coupling NCCs are very politically engaged, and demonstrate an 
interesting interaction with local states. In order to show how Coupling NCCs engage with 
local policy process and exert influence, this chapter will use Shanxi NCC as an example.   
Shanxi NCC in Tianjin is a classic Coupling NCC. There were several reasons why it was 
chosen as a case to illustrate Coupling NCCs’ interactions with the local state. First, 
Shanxi NCC in Tianjin was established in 1997 and has an almost 20-year history. It is a 
good example of NCCs’ development at different stages. Second, Shanxi NCC in Tianjin 
has transformed from a pure grassroots organization “Tianjin Shanxi Economic 
Development and Promotion Association” (Tianjin shanxi jingji fazhan cujinhui) in 2004 
into an organization with strong local state links, and it has also build up a strong network 
within Shanxi provincials and business community. Third, Shanxi NCC has proactively 
practiced its political engagement in the local state, and has enormously enhanced its 
profile with local officialdom. All these features made Shanxi NCC in Tianjin the most 
representative of the Coupling NCCs I identified.  
This chapter will set out the emergence and development of Tianjin Shanxi NCC in with 
their historical and cultural context, followed by an outline of Shanxi NCCs’ two main 
dimensions of establishment initiative and network strategy, and finally do an analysis of 
specific policy cases to examine how Tianjin Shanxi NCC was engaged into the local 
policy process and exerted policy influence. Through case analysis, I found that Coupling 
NCCs exerted influence both in the local policymaking and policy implementation, but 
their influence in policymaking was constrained within a specific policy area, and their 
influence in policy implementation was weak and limited. This variation was attributable 
not only to their origin (state links), but also its state-network oriented strategy. Moreover, 
by analyzing how NCCs’ establishment initiative and network strategy functioned in the 
process of NCCs’ interaction with the local state, I argue that Coupling NCCs’ network 
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strategy of binding with local party-state did broaden the channel for their participation in 
local policy process. However, due to the fact that the channel only covered specific issues, 
Coupling NCCs’ influence was quite limited within specific policy areas and could not 
exert influence more widely. 
4.1 The current situation of Shanxi NCC in Tianjin  
Tianjin Shanxi NCC, as the earliest Shanxi NCC domestically, was established in 1997, 
and has become the biggest and most influential Shanxi provincial NCC in Mainland 
China. 79  It has a membership of over 1000 enterprises and individual members, and 
included six branches by 2014,80  including a construction industry branch, a logistics 
branch, the Jinzhong branch, a construction materials branch, an Enterprise Economic 
Development Branch and a Young Entrepreneur Branch (Interview with GSP, Tianjin 
Shanxi NCC). The establishment of Tianjin Shanxi NCC was proposed by a group of 
Shanxi Provincials in Tianjin, including entrepreneurs, officials, military carders and other 
professions. Originally, it was named “Tianjin Shanxi Economic Development and 
Promotion Association” (Tianjin shanxi jingji fazhan cujinhui), and was aimed at 
promoting economic communication and cooperation between Shanxi and Tianjin. In 2004, 
under the current leadership, it changed to “Tianjin Shanxi NCC” and has expanded its 
membership range since. Currently, its membership is open to Tianjin entrepreneurs from 
Shanxi province and people who have worked or studied in Shanxi before, as well as any 
to other entrepreneurs who are willing to acknowledge their organizational constitution and 
join (Ibid.). The enterprise members range from new energy, environmental science, E-
commerce and software service outsourcing, to modern logistics, biomedicine, modern 
finance and IT. Their investment in Tianjin had reached 100 billion yuan RMB by 2013.81  
By 2014, Tianjin Shanxi NCC had 29 full time staff, and over 1300 square meters of office 
space. The organization was structured into a Secretariat, Membership Department, 
Department of Economic Cooperation, Department of Rights Protection, Department of 
                                                 
79 Report on North Net ( beifangwang) www.enorth.com.cn, last log in on 14th April, 2014. 
80 Source from Shijie Jinshang Wang (世界晋商网), http://www.wsxm.net/article-22007-1.html, last log in 
on 8th April, 2016. 
81 Online interview with the Presdident of Tianjin Shanxi NCC-ZSL, cite from 
http://www.022net.com/2013/7-13/515448232870817.html, last accessed on 2nd, May, 2016 
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Propaganda, Department of Finance, Department of Party Committee, Department of 
Youth League Committee, and Transitional Development and Information Centre.82  
Tianjin Shanxi NCC developed a preference for hiring retired officials in Tianjin for 
presidents, which was an important strategy for them to connect with Tianjin officialdom 
and get access to local politics. The first ever president for the first session of Shanxi NCC 
in 1997 was a previous member of Tianjin Municipal Party Standing Committee83; the 
second president was the head of Transportation and Industry Committee, with a very high 
appointment in the official rank of the party municipal committee.  The third and also 
current president is ZSL. He came to office in 2004, and is still in post. ZSL is the previous 
deputy director of HD district,84 which is one the six districts in the urban area of Tianjin. 
He was also given the glory title of “national model worker nationwide” in 1980s, just 
after the reform and open-up policy commenced in the urban areas, and has been granted a 
meeting-up by the top leaders Deng Xiaoping in 1986 and later Jiang Zemin in 1990.  
Shanxi NCC has experienced a three-stage development (Interview with ZSL, Tianjin 
Shanxi NCC). The first stage was from 1997 to 2004, when Shanxi NCC (then “Tianjin 
Shanxi Economic Development and Promotion Association”) acted as a townsmen group 
and most of the memberships were individual members. The association got some limited 
support from the Shanxi’s liaison office in Tianjin, but did not have full-time staff and 
independent office space.85 It mainly convened influential Shanxi provincials working in 
Tianjin, and tried to inspire them to help with the economic communication between 
Shanxi and Tianjin. That is why it mainly focused on cultural and recreational activities, 
like getting together to cerebrate Spring Festival or Mid-Autumn Festival, and introduce 
new members to each other. Generally speaking, Shanxi NCC was based at that time on 
informal networks and was far from institutionalised and systematised. Though the range 
and influence of their activities were limited, they have built up a very good membership 
base and social networks within Shanxi provincials in Tianjin.  
                                                 
82 Source from Shijie Jinshang Wang (世界晋商网), http://www.wsxm.net/article-22007-1.html, last log in 
on 8th April, 2016. 
83 The Municipal Party Standing Committee is composed of several important and powerful officials in a city, 
who are the main policy makers for key policies and decisions in the city. 
84 The city of Tianjin includes 6 urban districts, 4 suburban districts and 5 counties, while HD district is one 
of the urban districts there. 
85 Shanxi’s Liaison office was set up in 1990s. For information about the liaison offices’ main functions, 
please refer to Chapter 3 about the relations between NCCs and the liaison offices.  
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The period from 2004 to 2010 is the second stage of Tianjin Shanxi NCC’s development, 
when there was an effort to enhance the interaction with the local party-state, create 
attachments to officialdom and build up formal and institutional channels for participation. 
In 2004, ZSL became the president and initiated change in the Shanxi NCC’s operation. 
He said that NCCs could not achieve political influence without binding their operation in 
line with local state’s development. Due to his official background, ZSL explored various 
methods to build up Shanxi NCC’s internal capacity, and explored possible paths and 
channels connecting with local state externally. Among the tactics he adopted, the most 
important and efficient way to raise their profile was namely they adopted the same 
discourse as the local party state, and to convince them that Shanxi NCC was an important 
and efficient organization to manage private economy in Tianjin.86 For example, Shanxi 
NCC developed quite a few activities for its membership enterprises, like the “Three 
Representativeness” study tour from enterprise to enterprise of Shanxi NCC 87 , and 
workshops on “Scientific Development Perspective of Hu Jintao”. The latter were 
compulsory for public servants and party members only.   
Shanxi NCC’s development entered its third stage from 2010. In this stage, more NCCs 
have been established and operate actively by different group of provincials in Tianjin. 
They have also demonstrated various ways of networking with the local state. Shanxi NCC 
has encountered unprecedented challenges in an increasingly competitive environment. 
Until July 2015, 36 NCCs had been established in Tianjin.88  Some of them came with 
strong economic capacity, like Tianjin Wenzhou NCC and Tianjin Guangdong NCC, or 
strong state linkages, like Tianjin Zhejiang NCC and Tianjin Shaanxi NCC. In order to 
maintain their political influence in local governance, Shanxi NCC proactively set up the 
party organizations within the NCC and membership enterprises, which drew the attention 
of the central party committee to local party organizations. Shanxi NCC was rewarded 
with titles and prizes for this initiative, and became the model for other social groups. 
Although under the leadership of ZSL, Shanxi NCC is still trying to keep its character and 
exert influence in this new era, its operation with strong ideological propaganda and 
bureaucratic features have been challenged by its members’ resistance and by the external 
                                                 
86 Interview with ZSL in Tianjin, 14 May 2012. 
87 The concept of “Three Representativeness” is the main contribution of Jiang Zemin, which tries to enhance 
party members’ awareness of Communist party’s advancement. 
88 Refer to the reports of Tianjin Economic Cooperation Office official website, http://www.jjhz-
tj.gov.cn/hzjl/shfc/20150716/t20150716_11480.html last log in on 7th April, 2016. 
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economic environment. This has made their influence in the local governance more limited, 
rather than engaging with broad policy agenda.  
4.2 The historical and cultural Context 
In China’s economic history, Shanxi merchants (JinShang) were a prominent business 
group since the Song Dynasty, more than 1000 years ago, but they reached their peak 
during the Ming and Qing dynasties with a symbol of establishing Shanxi Guild Halls 
around the country. They creatively initiated the first banking institutions (Piaohao) in 
China in the early 19th century, which was the prototype of China’s modern finance 
industry.89 They have been regarded as one of the five prominent merchant groups in 
Chinese history together with Zhejiang merchants, Canton merchants, Anhui merchants 
and Suzhou merchants.90  
Shanxi province enjoyed a long history of business investment. The trade emerged in the 
southern part of Shanxi even before the Qin Dynasty (221-206 BC). According to accounts 
of the period: "The market starts at midday, when people from all directions meet together 
with all kinds of commodities. People trade with each other until everybody gets what he 
or she wants."91  After centuries of development, the rise of Shanxi merchants could be 
dated back to the "Kai Zhong Policy" in Ming Dynasty,92 in which government officials 
commissioned merchants to transport food supplies. Besides, Shanxi had rich mineral 
resources, while the handicraft and manufacturing industries also achieved considerable 
scale, which provided a substantial base for the merchants' development. At the same time, 
due to the dense population in southern Shanxi, merchants had to travel to other parts of 
China to gain their living. As a result, Shanxi merchants could be found all over China. 
Around the year of 2000, there was a saying in Beijing that "Most of the rich merchants in 
Beijing come from Shanxi."  Business competition became ever more furious over time. 
So in order to strengthen their own power, Shanxi merchants began to organize into 
merchant groups. Although Shanxi merchants emerged as a regional group during the 
Ming Dynasty, yet it was during the Qing Dynasty that they particularly flourished, with 
                                                 
89 More details about the history of Shanxi merchants and their initiative in Chinese finance, see 黄鉴晖:山西
票号史, 1998. 
90 China Central Television created an eight-episode documentary about Shanxi merchants in 2006, which is 
also mentioned in GSP’s interview on 15/05/2012. 
91 Source from A Brief History of Shanxi Merchants, http://www.chinaculture.org/gb/en_madeinchina/2006-
02/20/content_79460.htm, last log in on 10th April, 2016. 
92 Refer to明洪武（1368-1398）初年为了供应北部边防粮食供应而实施纳粮中盐的开中法. 
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the set-up of the guildhall as a symbol. The guild hall was designed for the communication 
and connection of Shanxi people at the beginning; later it became an organization of self-
protection for the merchants.93 
Shanxi merchants became one of the, if not the most, successful and powerful merchant 
groups in China in Qing Dynasty. The development of business not only brought people 
wealth, but also changed the traditional belief of "He who excels in study can follow in the 
career of an official." The saying went that, "It's better to have a connection in a teahouse 
than to have a large amount of money" and "To be a government official is not as good as 
to work in a teahouse or bank."94 Teahouses and banks were both hot industries at that time. 
In the Qing Dynasty, Shanxi merchants were listed at the top of merchant groups in China, 
with a good reputation in Asia and even Europe. They were excellent especially in three 
industries: camel teams, ship teams, and draft banks. 
The history and business culture of Shanxi merchants have left today’s Shanxi NCC great 
heritage and legitimacy to inherit, especially in Qing Dynasty, the institution of Shanxi 
guildhalls around China have set up a great model for today’s Shanxi NCCs to follow.  In 
history, Shanxi guildhalls as an organization of self-protection for Shanxi merchants have 
played a great role in connection and communication among Shanxi merchants doing 
business in different places; and they also functioned as a platform to build up links with 
Qing’s officialdom (Zhu, 2010). However, they were different from other merchant groups 
from East China or South China. Shanxi Guildhalls were not enthusiastic about promoting 
democratic revolution in late Qing China, but sponsored the Qing government to repress 
the revolutionary movement and peasant uprisings.  
Shanxi merchants in history had showed strong state links as it had unusual mutual trust 
relationship with Qing governments. These links had been demonstrated in several aspects. 
First, they approached Qing officials, partnership with them in a special political and 
business collusion and monopolised several key industries due to the privilege given by 
Qing Government, Second, they sponsored the military spending of Qing government and 
worked as a main tool for Qing Government to implement their fiscal policy. Third, the 
profits Shanxi merchants had achieved were not being used to investment or reproduction, 
                                                 
93 The main points here source from Zhu Ying, “ 商会与近代中国” and “近代中国商人与社会”, “近代中国
商会、行会及商团新论”. 
94 See more details in A Brief History of Shanxi Merchants, in Zhu Ying, The Merchant Groups and 
Contemporary China, 1996. 
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but returned to their hometown to repair their houses or buy land. Therefore, as the feudal 
government went to collapse, Shanxi merchants could not be able to sustain their 
prosperity and also declined. 
4.3 Institutional context of Tianjin Shanxi NCC 
After the introduction about Shanxi merchant group’s historical and cultural background, 
this section will focus on the current institutional environment of Shanxi NCCs in Tianjin, 
which will provide a good base for us to understand the political context where Tianjin 
Shanxi NCCs try to interact with local states and exert influence in the local governance.   
Since 1990s, the Chinese central government started to attach importance to improving the 
policymaking democratization and scientificness (juece minzhuhua kexuehua) 95  and 
encouraged local governments to explore new ways of improving public participation. 
Public participation in policy process started with the implementation of “Price Law of 
People’s Republic of China” on the 1st May 1998, which specified public hearing as the 
format of public participation on pricing utilities and public services. 96  Price public 
hearings drew great attention and subsequently the mechanism of public hearings has been 
expanded to other public services that directly related to public interests. Until now, public 
participation has been institutionalized in the areas of public sector pricing, urban planning, 
environmental protection, social construction and management. Besides public 
participation, the institutional context also gave non-political actors more channels and 
opportunities to get involved into the local policy process. Even though the breadth and 
depth of their influence in policy process is still very limited, and even though China is still 
keeping a high degree of authoritarianism, the process of policy making is not only 
confined to elite groups any more.  
NCCs as a new emerging non-political actor in local governance have been given more 
opportunities in government consultation and political participation. As local governments 
claimed to include more actors into the policy process, more opinions and voices got heard 
                                                 
95 “Policy making democratization and transparency” was firstly put forward by Wan Li in July 1986，when 
he made s speech on “Policy making democratization and transparency is an important subject for political 
institution reform” on a work forum of National Science Committee; And this policy has been confirmed in 
2004 年 9月中共十六届四中全会通过的“中共中央关于加强党的执政能力建设的决定”. 
96 Source from 刘淑妍，朱德米: “当前中国公共决策中公民参与的制度建设与评价研究”，中国行政管
理，2015. 
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from society, which led to a more vibrant lobbying phenomenon in NCCs’ sphere. NCCs 
have been “feeling the stones” to experiment various strategy and tactics of lobbying in 
this context. Tianjin Shanxi NCCs, like any other NCCs around the country, was 
enhancing the links with both their home government and host government in order to 
realise more successful lobbying. However, the smooth and successful lobbying was not 
only attributed to NCCs themselves, but was also very much depended on the institutional 
context in which the NCCs were based.  Hereafter, I will set out Tianjin Shanxi NCC’s 
institutional context from the perspectives of its home government and host government, 
which are Shanxi provincial government and Tianjin municipal government. 
Shanxi Government attached importance to promoting Shanxi NCCs’ development in 
other localities nation-wide. By 2009, there were five million Shanxi merchants doing 
business outside Shanxi province, and 29 Shanxi Chambers of Commerce located in 22 
provinces.97 As a bridge of cooperation and communication between Shanxi Governments 
and other governments where they were located, Shanxi Chambers of Commerce convened 
the Shanxi merchants in all these provinces, and transformed Shanxi merchants’ ways of 
doing business from “individual operations” to “group operations”.98 As in the Ming and 
Qing Dynasty, the traditional successful Shanxi Merchants were based on family-owned 
businesses, which were much individually operated. However, this way of doing business 
is not adaptable in the new era for the new Shanxi merchants. Among all the 29 Shanxi 
NCCs in Mainland China, Shanxi NCCs in Tianjin got the award of “China’s top ten most 
expressive Chambers of Commerce” from China General Chamber of Commerce in 2010. 
According to the local officials in Tianjin, the Economic Cooperation Office said that 
Shanxi Chamber of Commerce has played an important role in Tianjin’s Opening Policy 
and regional economic cooperation.99  
The Shanxi Board of Investment Promotion (shanxi touzi cujin ju) is the supervisory 
management unit for all the Shanxi NCCs located in different places, and has a strong 
focus on attracting non-local Shanxi merchants to come invest in Shanxi. It is a newly 
established government department, which integrates the investment function from Shanxi 
                                                 
97 Cited from Shanxi News site 04/09/200, 服务 500万在外创业的山西人,异地山西商会在并座谈,  
http://www.sxrb.com/sxjjrb/yiban_0/2821231.shtml, last entry 24/06/2015. 
98 This is just a metaphor to describe Shanxi merchants’ way of doing business from separation to 
cooperation. 
99 Interview with Tianjin ECO officials, 20th May, 2016. 
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Economic Commission and Shanxi Department of Commerce.100 The Shanxi Board of 
Investment Promotion (Provincial level) together with the municipal Investment Bureau 
made efforts to do better service for Shanxi merchants with investment capacity and 
willingness, as well as other substantial investors, to attract them to making investments in 
Shanxi. They combined to be the “mother home” of all Shanxi NCCs around the country. 
From the empirical evidence collected, it was easy to conclude that Shanxi Government’s 
policy towards Shanxi NCCs was much focused on investment attraction and other related 
areas.  
Tianjin government had an open but not proactive policy towards NCCs development in 
Tianjin. Due to the distance with Beijing geographically and politically, Tianjin 
government was more conservative in policy innovation compared to some provinces in 
East China and South China, like Zhejiang and Guangdong. However, as a response to the 
rapid development of NCCs both in number and size in the Tianjin municipal area, the 
CPC Tianjin Municipal Committee and the Tianjin Municipal Government jointly issued 
“the Opinions on further accelerating the development of private economy” in late 2013101, 
which specified the concrete measures to promote the development of private economy in 
Tianjin.  Among all the measures, they specially emphasize the role of non-local chambers 
of commerce in Tianjin, and offer more favorable policies regarding financial allowance, 
lands, banking service and tax refunding issues. 
Tianjin Economic and Cooperation Office （ECO） is the supervisory administration unit 
for all the NCCs in Tianjin, and it promulgated the implementing of regulations for all the 
NCCs and lower level investment bureaus.102 It further illustrated the clear investment 
attraction targets for all the relevant department and groups. Tianjin ECO is a deputy 
prefectural level department and its approach towards NCCs includes: support and 
encouragement to NCCs in Tianjin to carry out the investment attraction work together 
with local government; rewards and subsidies to the outstanding NCCs that provided good 
services to private economy and assisted the local government in investment attraction; 
support and encouragement to NCCs to purchase or construct Chamber of Commerce 
                                                 
100 See the website of Shanxi Board of Investment Promotion, http://www.shanxiinvest.com. 
101 Tianjin Government official site, 中共天津市委、天津市人民政府关于进一步加快民营经济发展的意
见,09/12/2013, http://www.tj.gov.cn/zwgk/zcjd/bdzc/201312/t20131209_226167.htm . 
102  http://www.tjdpc.gov.cn/fzgggz/tzgl/tzzc/201407/t20140701_51715.shtml 市合作交流办贯彻落实《中
共天津市委 天津市人民政府关于进一步加快民营经济发展的意见》的实施细则, 01/07/2014. 
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headquarter buildings with preferential policy; and lastly, support to the NCCs to improve 
the ability of coordinating complaints and to build up their own mechanism of complaints 
coordination to solve the reasonable demands within membership enterprises of  NCCs. 103 
4.4 Shanxi NCC’s establishment initiatives 
Tianjin Shanxi NCC was established from the bottom-up mainly by Shanxi Entrepreneurs 
in Tianjin in 1997. According to the interviews with staff in Tianjin Shanxi NCCs, the 
significant efforts during the establishment of Shanxi NCCs came from active Shanxi 
entrepreneurs and some retired government and military officials living in Tianjin. Though 
there was some evidence that some Tianjin Officials proposed the original name of Tianjin 
Shanxi NCC104, there was not enough evidence on how much substantial support they got 
from both Tianjin government and Shanxi government when they firstly set up. In the 
period from 1997 to 2004, Shanxi NCC did not have much public and political engagement 
with local governance, and its function mainly focused on convening the Shanxi merchants 
in Tianjin and any people who had worked or studies in Shanxi before, in order to provide 
a platform for knowledge and information exchange. Before 2004, Shanxi NCC had 
limited financing of activities that mainly came from membership fees and some members’ 
donations. At that stage, most of the memberships were individual members, and the 
frequency of activities was not intense. However, due to nostalgia and shared local accent 
the network of members was very much enhanced through this platform and a lot of 
Shanxi merchants had found very helpful business information and even long-term 
business partners. (Interview GSP and ZSL in Shanxi NCC, May 2012) 
4.5 Shanxi NCC’s network strategy 
NCCs’ network strategy indicates the key networks for NCCs to build up, and the methods 
they employ to enhance the networks in this thesis.105 Network strategy is important for 
NCCs, as it directly affects how they build up their external networks and subsequently 
influences their lobbying behaviour. In this thesis, as stated in Chapters 3, network strategy 
                                                 
103 The same source as above. 
104 One staff of Tianjin Shanxi NCC mentioned this in a workshop, organized by Tianjin ECO on June, 2012. 
105 The concept of Network Strategy is put forward by the author to describe NCCs’ effort to build up their 
networks. 
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includes NCCs’ orientation in their network building, either local state oriented, or 
business oriented, as well as their focus on Network Span or Network Intensity. 
 
Before 2004, Tianjin Shanxi NCC had a clear orientation towards business networks, 
which is reflected on their routine activities at early stages. At that stage, they had not 
engaged with governmental activities due to their limited capacity in mobilizing resources 
and official networks. One retired part-time staff of Shanxi NCC recalled the history of 
that time:  
 
“All of us have our own job, and we just use some spare time to organize activities.  
You know, the money is limited, so we have to spread the words to all our 
members, to see who could offer the venue for the coming events. It was hard to 
have a clear plan and strategy at that time. We were doing it out of interests and the 
love to our hometown.” 106 
  
However, the situation changed after ZSL became the president of Shanxi NCC and started 
the reform, which led Shanxi NCCs go towards local state network orientation. Therefore, 
Shanxi NCC’s development demonstrated a significant personal style that ZSL has brought 
along.  
 
In approaching their local state network strategy, Shanxi NCC has successfully found an 
efficient way to build the connection: hiring retired officials as their president. The 
president and the secretary general are the two most important positions within NCCs. 
Most of the time, the president acted as the bridge to connect the networks with local state 
and business. ZSL is a classic 'charismatic leader’ in Chinese context. He used to work in a 
state-owned factory in the planned economy era before reform and the open up policy, and 
was promoted to be the factory director before coming to work in the district government. 
He finally retired from the position of deputy-director of HD district of Tianjin, and came 
to Tianjin Shanxi NCC as the president107. Thanks to his enthusiasm and resources, Shanxi 
NCC got its first ever full time staff and fixed office area, and the organizational operation 
got onto the right track. Later in the process of reforming the Shanxi NCC, ZSL made full 
use of his personal “guanxi” to mobilise the official resources and raised the profile of 
                                                 
106 Details from interview with JXW on 24 April, 2013. 
107 ZSL was originally from Shanxi province and had strong connections with Shanxi, but moved to Tianjin 
when he was young.  
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Shanxi NCC in Tianjin local officialdom. As he used to be the old generation of CCP cadre 
before 1978, and continued to stay in the officialdom during the reform era in 1980s and 
1990s, his personal leadership style inevitably bore strong ideological characteristic. This 
style had also been replicated in Shanxi NCC’s operation, which formed the unique style 
of today’s Tianjin Shanxi NCC, and explained why they are so much focused on the work 
of party building and Youth League building in NCC and their membership enterprises. 
 
To sum up, Tianjin Shanxi NCC’s network strategy was local state network oriented with a 
focus on network span rather than network intensity. Shanxi NCC was bottom-up initiated 
and born with a strong base of business network. In its early stage, Shanxi NCC had 
focused on the construction of formal and informal business network, which benefited their 
membership enterprises and individual members quite a lot.  In its later stage after 2004, in 
order to realize bigger influence in the local governance, ZSL proactively started the 
reform and shifted its orientations from local business network towards local state 
networks. This process is described as “coupling” in this thesis. The “coupling” process 
successfully connected Shanxi NCC’s business network with its new established state 
network and enormously expanded their network span.  In the following section, I will 
undertake case analysis to discuss how this expanded network span helped Shanxi NCC to 
engage with much broader local policy agenda, and how successful it could be.  
4.6 Comparative case analysis: Coupling NCCs’ influence in the 
local policy process 
4.6.1 Case selection 
Tianjin Shanxi NCC’ bottom-up establishment initiatives and network span strategy have 
affected their way of lobbying with the local state. Before coming to the case analysis, we 
should be aware that, unlike the way lobbying takes place in western democratic countries, 
in China it is much related to the attitude of state and the institutional context. At the local 
level, the local state’s attitude and policy towards NCCs’ participation in policy process 
enormously affects the outcome of lobbying. Therefore, in order to control the effects of 
local states all the cases I have selected here and in the following chapters are based in 
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Tianjin. This way, I can specifically examine how NCCs’ establishment initiatives and 
network strategy influence their lobbying behavior.108 
I have chosen two cases regarding Tianjin Shanxi NCCs’ engagements in the local political 
process in Tianjin. The first one is the Shanxi NCC’s proposal to change the party 
subordinate units of private enterprise party members in Tianjin. This policy is actually a 
policy related to party organization, not a typical local policy as scholars assumed. 
However, this policy had a wide range influence on all the party members working in 
private enterprises in Tianjin.  This case showed the successful engagement of Shanxi 
NCC in the whole process and the ways in which they promoted policy change, indicative 
of the kind of influence they exerted. In contrast, the second case is the proposal of 
amending the rules for the implementation of “The Labor Contract Law of People’s 
Republic of China”, which was a failed case in the local policy process, where Shanxi 
NCC did not find the best strategy and tactics to exert policy influence. Through the 
comparison of these two cases, I hope to get some interesting findings regarding NCCs’ 
involvement in policy change. 
4.6.2 Case 1: The proposal to change private sector’s party member 
subordinate units 
Party building has been an important task for local party committees in China. Before the 
1990s, due to unit management system, all party members were subordinate to the party 
committee or party branch within their working unit or residential community unit.  In 
1990s, with the development of market economy, a great number of people migrated to 
work in non-local areas while their household registration and party relationship still 
remained in their previous work place. In 2001, Jiang Zemin made the famous “1st July 
speech” in the general assembly to celebrate 80 years anniversary of CCP’s establishment 
and decided to allow qualified private entrepreneurs to join the party.109 This decision 
enormously boosted the number of party members in the private sector. However, the 
policies regarding party membership management in the private sector were still lagging 
behind, especially in the non-local private enterprises.  
                                                 
108 In this thesis, NCC’s lobbying behavior includes their lobbying to local state and also the lobbying to 
local party organizations, as in local China, the decision making power is not just limited within state 
institutions. 
109江泽民在庆祝中国共产党成立八十周年大会上的讲话 (full text), 01/07/2001, 
http://www.china.com.cn/chinese/jianghua/43378.htm. 
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In Tianjin, problems with party membership management in private sectors were 
prominent around 2005. Quite a lot of party members working in non-local private 
enterprises could not find the appropriate local party committees to affiliate, and they had 
to carry their party relationship110 with them wherever they went. These people were called 
“Pocket Party Members”, which indicated the floating status of their party relationship. 
Under central party guidance, local party committees were seeking ways to cover the 
management of party members in the private sectors by setting up party branches in 
enterprises, or encouraging them to join the party committee in local ICF or other state-
affiliated business associations. But these efforts did not have good effects, as party 
members in the private sector were quite scattered and hard to coordinate in the same 
platform.   
As introduced above, Tianjin Shanxi NCC shifted their orientation in approaching local 
authorities and enhanced the interaction with local party-state after 2004, when ZSL 
became the president. ZSL had a good political sensitivity and realised the party 
management problems that local party committees were faced with. He recalled:  
“I was just retired from the position of vice-director of Hedong District 
government and appointed to be the president of Shanxi NCC. To be honest, I 
did not have a clue how to lead this organization, as it had nothing, no money, 
no staff, and no office. But I know, to move this organization forward, I had to 
build a good relationship with local government and party committees. How to 
achieve that? Like what we did to membership enterprises, we could get trust 
only after we tackled the practical problems for them. It also applied to the local 
officials. We needed to do something to get the recognition from them.” 
(Interview with ZSL, Tianjin Shanxi NCC) 
In this light, ZSL carried out investigations in the membership enterprises and found that 
the immediate problems within these enterprises were the existence of “Pocket Party 
Members”. He then realized this would be a chance to link non-local enterprises with the 
local party-state. Then in 2006, Shanxi NCC drafted a proposal to Tianjin ECO in order to 
set up the first party branch within an NCC in Tianjin.111 The proposal was soon approved, 
                                                 
110 The party relationship is a document that specifies the party members’ basic information, the time when 
they have joined the party and previous party relationship changes in the previous working places. 
111 Source from inner report of Shanxi NCC 01/2006. 
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and ZSL became the party secretary of Shanxi NCC Party Branch. Tianjin ECO paid 
considerable attention to this initiative and even the director attended the inaugural 
ceremony of Shanxi NCC party branch’s establishment. After the party branch was set up, 
Shanxi NCC took a great number of activities to coordinate the party members within 
membership enterprises and filed their party relations within Shanxi NCC party branch. In 
2008, with the expansion of party members, Tianjin Shanxi NCC party branch was updated 
to be a party committee 112 that included three general party branches and 30 enterprise 
party branches. The total number of party members was 146.113  By 2008, Shanxi NCC had 
achieved full coverage of party organizations, and all the grass-roots party members in 
membership enterprises were fully integrated into the management. From 2008 to 2011, 
Tianjin Shanxi NCC sent party-building instructors to 75 membership enterprises that were 
not qualified to set up party branches, and encouraged the small enterprises to set up 
provisional party groups. Thus, Tianjin Shanxi NCC achieved the comprehensive cover of 
all its membership enterprises regarding party members’ management and party 
building.114 
Shanxi NCCs’ initiative in managing and integrating private sector party members quickly 
got recognized by the local government and the central government and party committee. 
Tianjin ECO drafted a report about Tianjin Shanxi NCC’s practice to Tianjin Party 
Committee. Then the Party Committee regarded Tianjin Shanxi NCC as the model of 
innovation in aspects of social organization party building, and they tried to promote its 
successful experience to other NCCs and social organizations in Tianjin. This trend was 
soon spread at the national level. In September 2009, Xinhua News Agency issued an 
internal reference to the central party committee about the practice of scientific 
development in Tianjin Shanxi NCC. In October 2009, the Ministry of Civil Affairs issued 
a briefing to the Party’s central study practice leading group and to the Vice Premier Hui 
Liangyu on Tianjin Shanxi NCC’s practice of strengthening grass-roots party building. In 
November 2009, this briefing was transferred to President Xi Jinping and other top leaders 
in Party Central. Finally, in February 2010, Tianjin Shanxi NCC was awarded as “National 
Advanced Social Organization"(quanguo xianjin shenghui zuzhi) and "The advanced unit 
                                                 
112 The Party Constitution regulates that only when party membership is over 100, can the party branch be 
qualified to be upgraded to a party committee. 
113天津山西商会党委书记、会长张世伦在市非公有制企业党建工作座谈会上的发言, 
http://www.tjfic.com/jyjl/115470.jhtml  10/04/2012; 天津市河东区着力构建社会组织党建工作新格局 
http://dangjian.people.com.cn/GB/15656407.html 14, September, 2011 中国共产党新闻网. Last accessed on 
15 May, 2016. 
114 Ibid. 
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in social organizations in-depth study and practice the scientific concept of development 
activities”(shehui zuzhi shenru xuexi shijian kexuefazhanguan huodong xianjindanwei), 
and ZSL as the representative of Tianjin Shanxi NCC was met with the top leaders in 
Beijing Great Hall.115 
As a model in social organization party building, Tianjin Shanxi NCC’s profile was raised 
up by extensive media coverage, and it took this opportunity to build up a strong state 
network with Tianjin municipal government and party committees, especially the 
Organization Department and the United Front in Party Committees, Tianjin ICF, as well 
as some district governments. Based on their successful experiment and the support from 
Tianjin Local Party Committees, Tianjin Shanxi NCC drafted the proposal to change the 
party members’ subordinate unit within private sectors, and integrated all the “pocket party 
members” into “Attribution Management”, which means no matter where the private sector 
employees’ household registration is, and where their previous party relationship attached, 
they could all be subordinated into the NCC party committee’s management, and enjoy the 
equivalent treatments as local party members in Tianjin.116 This policy proposal would 
help Tianjin local governments and party committee to strengthen their management of and 
penetration in private sectors, and also benefit private sector employees to create additional 
channels for interest expression. So it soon became a decision within Tianjin Party 
Committee to promote Shanxi NCC’s practice and spread their success within all the 
NCCs in Tianjin.  In July 2011, this decision was issued to all the NCCs, 117 then NCCs in 
Tianjin started the upsurge of establishing Party branches within their organizations and 
learning Tianjin Shanxi NCC’s experience in coordinating party members’ management 
within their membership enterprises. 
4.6.3 Case analysis 
The case above was not a typical case of NCC influencing policy making in local China. 
First, the “policy” mentioned was not a “policy” as defined in the common sense, but a 
practice in local party building. Second, the party decision making process was taking a 
different mechanism from local policy process, so talking about the party decision making 
                                                 
115 红色晋商张世伦, 中国联合商报, 26/11/2010, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/leadership/crz/20101126/19539017600.shtml. Last accessed on 15 May, 2016. 
116 Interpretation by GSP in the interview. 
117 各省区驻津办党委发出学习我商会"四无三提高"通知, 21/07/2011, 
http://www.scct.com.cn/news/index/id/1683.html. Last accessed on 15 May, 2016. 
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process may not illustrate the local policy process. However, at the provincial and 
municipal level of China, local governments and local party committees were more 
interweaved than those in the central level, and the local party committee had an inevitable 
role in the local policy process. 118 In studying NCCs’ influence in the local policy process, 
I included all the interaction between NCCs and local party-state, in order to illustrate in 
full NCCs’ influence on local governance. Therefore, the case above helps us understand 
the wide engagement of NCCs in the local China. 
In this case, Tianjin Shanxi NCC made full use of its business network and newly 
established state network in exerting their influence to change the policy.  First, Shanxi 
NCC’s business network was based on its establishment initiatives. Due to its bottom-up 
initiative, it had a strong and supportive business network, which made its experiment of 
party building welcome in the membership enterprises, and helped Shanxi NCC become 
the model of social organization party building in Tianjin, and later in China. Second, 
Shanxi NCCs’ state network was not innate, but accumulated with their increasing media 
coverage and public awareness. When Shanxi NCC’s initiative of party building in private 
sectors got noticed by local government and party committees, they took every chance to 
enhance the interaction with local party-state and tried to stand by the perspective of local 
government to “manage bosses”119 in private enterprises. By doing so they established 
good relationships with Tianjin ECO, Tianjin ICF, and Organization Department and 
United Front Department in the Party Committee, which provided channels for Tianjin 
Shanxi NCC to deliver their successful experience and other policy ideas. For example, 
Tianjin ECO was the first official department to report Shanxi NCC’s practice in managing 
private sector party members to the upper level bureau, and departments in Tianjin Party 
Committee made Tianjin Shanxi NCC as a local model of party building to seek credits 
from central government, which gave Tianjin Shanxi NCC the chance to boost their 
influence on the interaction with the local party-state. Therefore, the fact that Tianjin 
Shanxi NCCs’ practice in changing private sector party members’ subordinate unit became 
Tianjin’s local policy in managing private sector party members demonstrated Tianjin 
Shanxi NCCs’ successful lobbying based on their establishment initiatives and local state 
network oriented strategy. This case demonstrated the whole process and mechanism of 
Shanxi NCC’ lobbying and interaction with membership enterprises and local party state, 
which reflected the complexity and characteristics of local policy process in China. 
                                                 
118 There is no much study about the role of local party committee in the local policy process yet. 
119 “Manage bosses” was mentioned several times in the interview with ZSL in 2012. 
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However, we could not simply say that Shanxi NCC had strong lobbying capacity in the 
interaction with local state just based on the case above. There are three reasons for this. 
First, Shanxi NCC did not have a clear lobbying target in this case. The case of enhancing 
private sector party building was just a way for Shanxi NCC to build up and expand their 
state networks. Second, Shanxi NCC did not demonstrate independent lobbying based on 
the members’ interests. All the activities it undertook were aiming to meet the interest of 
local party state and hook up with the state. Third, this policy change took place in a 
specific area of party building, which contained many elements of ideological and political 
mobilization and differentiated from the local policy process in the general sense. In order 
to probe more about Coupling NCCs’ influence in the local policy process, we need to 
compare more cases in the following section. 
4.6.4 Case 2: Tianjin Shanxi NCC working as bridges to link local 
governments and local enterprises  
Looking through all the cases of Tianjin Shanxi NCC’s engagement in the local 
governance, it was hard to find a typical policy case of Tianjin Shanxi NCC influencing 
the local policy process. However, its engagement in the local politics was not less but 
much more than other NCCs. What they had mostly participated in was centered on 
working as the bridge between local governments and their membership enterprises, with 
the focus on assisting local governments to manage local business. Below I will introduce 
some examples to illustrate how Tianjin Shanxi NCC has worked with the local 
government to straighten out the relationship between government and enterprises. 
The first example of Tianjin Shanxi NCCs’ bridging local government and enterprises was 
helping local district government to organize “one-stop field service day”120 meetings with 
enterprises in Hedong District of Tianjin (Interview with GSP, Tianjin Shanxi NCC). 
Along with the private business’ development in Hedong district, the private entrepreneurs 
had higher requirements towards the management and services that local government 
should provide. Besides, different districts in Tianjin faced fierce competition on 
investment environment and attraction to foreign investors. So in order to keep private 
                                                 
120 “One-stop service” is one of the consequences of “public service oriented government construction” 
reform in China.  Before, citizens and enterprises need to go to different government office to deal different 
issues in terms of household registration, tax rebate etc. In order to improve the efficiency, local government 
gathered all the offices from different government departments in the same place, and carried out the public 
service to citizens and enterprises. 
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business staying in the district, the local district government had to improve their service in 
terms of enterprises registration, essential documents for operation, taxation procedures, 
etc. Tianjin Shanxi NCC’s office was located in Hedong district, and it kept a good 
relationship with Hedong District Government. Moreover, the president of Tianjin Shanxi 
NCC used to be the deputy-director of Hedong District government before retirement. In 
2011, Tianjin Shanxi NCC proposed to the Commercial Committee of Hedong District 
Government to carry out some field service to Shanxi NCC’s membership enterprises, in 
order to closer the relationship between government and enterprises (Ibid). The 
Commercial Committee then passed on this idea to the deputy-director of Hedong District 
who was in charge of business. This proposal was quickly responded with feedbacks from 
government office, which designated Tianjin Shanxi NCC to organize this “one-stop field 
service day” to Shanxi NCCs’ membership enterprises in Hedong District, and asked 
relevant government departments to provide necessary assistance (Ibid). Therefore, later in 
2011, this “one-stop field service day” activity was carried out among membership 
enterprises of Tianjin Shanxi NCC.  
In this “one-stop field service day” activity, Tianjin Shanxi NCC was responsible to select 
sites, promote the activities among membership enterprises, inquiry with enterprises to 
understand their business requirement and finally coordinate public servants from relevant 
government departments to the field service site. This activity was usually held in a big 
hall or public place. On that day, the membership enterprises got direct feedbacks or 
answers of the questions from officials in the relevant department, and established good 
communication atmosphere between two sides. And the government department got to 
understand the needs of business more efficiently, and gathered the first-hand business 
information from private enterprises. As same as the first case in this chapter, the “one-
stop field service day” initiative also became a routine event for Hedong District 
government and Tianjin Shanxi NCC afterwards, and this practice was spread to other 
NCCs and district government in the following several years as well (Interview with ZSL, 
Tianjin Shanxi NCC). 
4.6.5 Case analysis 
In the above case, Tianjin Shanxi NCC bridged the local government and enterprises 
through coinciding their interests and requirement. In the policy area focusing on policy 
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implementation and alike, Tianjin Shanxi was very skilled in approaching local 
government and exerting its influence. In the interaction with local government, Tianjin 
Shanxi NCC secured its role in the local governance and the limited influence in the local 
state-business relations. However, this was not policy lobbying in represent of membership 
enterprises’ interests.  
In practice, Tianjin Shanxi NCC summarized their way of survival in the Chinese local 
political ecology. They were active in assisting local governments to “manage the bosses” 
(Interview with ZSL, Tianjin Shanxi NCC) in private sectors. Based on their state network 
oriented strategy, they frequently cooperated with local governments to improve the level 
of management and service towards private enterprises, and smoothed the state-business 
relationship on the local administrative level. However, their partnership with local 
governments also helped local governments to enhance the state’s control to private sectors, 
which to a certain degree hindered private sector’s long-term development. 
There was another case to show that Tianjin Shanxi NCC tried once to influence policy 
making in the case of proposing to amend the “Rules of Implementation of “The Labor 
Contract Law of People’s Republic of China’” (zhonghua renmin gongheguo 
laodonghetongfa shishi tiaoli) (the New Rules, hereafter) in 2009,121 but it failed. In that 
case, some representatives of membership enterprises of Tianjin Shanxi NCC reflected in 
NCCs’ regular meeting that the New Rules promulgated in 2008 by the State Council was 
hard to implement in practice, and some items in the New Rules were contradicting with 
the existing system. And they proposed to let Tianjin Shanxi NCC to draft a report 
regarding this issue to Tianjin Government and legislature bodies. Tianjin Shanxi NCC 
took this offer but did not put this work into priority. It took quite a long time for them to 
finish the report. At the end, they did not find an appropriate government department to 
submit this report, and this proposal was suspended (Interview with RJH, members of 
Tianjin Shanxi NCC). 
From the above case, it was easy to see that Tianjin Shanxi NCC did not have attempts to 
lobby policy makers, which reflected the insufficient incentives to push them to conduct 
lobbying activities. Though Tianjin Shanxi NCC was initiated bottom-up and had a strong 
base in Shanxi business circle, yet in its “coupling” process with state, its independence 
                                                 
121 See details in中华人民共和国劳动合同法实施条例（全文), 中国网 china.com.cn, 2008-09-18 
http://www.china.com.cn/policy/txt/2008-09/18/content_16501695.htm, last accessed on 28th July, 2016. 
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was gradually eroded by local state’s advancement, which eventually lead to the 
decreasing of their lobbying motivation and capacity.    
4.7 Comparison and analysis 
Comparing the case 1 and case 2, some characteristics of Coupling NCCs’ lobbying in the 
local policy process could be summarized as follows. 
First, Coupling NCC did not demonstrate a typical independent lobbying in the local 
policy process. Due to “coupling” process, Coupling NCC got too close to the state, which 
wrecked Coupling NCC’s lobbying motivation and capacities. Though Coupling NCC had 
a “bottom-up” establishment initiative, yet its network strategy was very much state 
network oriented, so the essential resources for lobbying embedded in Coupling NCC’s 
network were limited. This explained why Coupling NCC could not exert independence 
influence towards the local policy process. 
Second, Coupling NCC exerted influence in both policymaking and policy 
implementations in the above cases, however, its influence in policy making was 
constrained within a special area, and its influence in policy implementation was 
embedded within the interaction with local states. As outlined in case 1, Coupling NCC 
influenced the policy change in relation to private sector’s party member subordinate units, 
but it was one special case regarding party policy, and the mechanism and logics were 
quite different from the normal local policy process. Therefore, Coupling NCC’s strategy 
and tactics used in this case might not be able to adapt in other local policy cases. 
Moreover, as outlined in case 2, Coupling NCC’s influence in the policy implementation 
was limited and embedded within its cooperation with local governments, and it was hard 
to distinguish whether it was an influence in policy implementation or just an influence 
toward local government’s practice.   
Third, Coupling NCC’s network span contributed its success in influencing local policy 
making as showed in case 1. Coupling NCC’s network span including business network 
and state network, and the resources within these networks helped Coupling NCC to exert 
influence in the party management policy in Tianjin. However, Coupling NCC did not 
focus on network intensity, so Coupling NCC did not have close partnership relations or 
links within both their state network and business network. This also explained why 
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Coupling NCC could only exert limited influence in the policy implementation, as there 
was no close sponsor to help push forward its policy ideas.  
4.8 Conclusion 
This Chapter has systematically introduced the representative of Coupling NCCs -Tianjin 
Shanxi NCC and its engagement in the local policy process. Tianjin Shanxi NCC was 
established with a “bottom-up” initiative, but developed its state-network oriented strategy 
in the interaction with local states. In terms of the features of its network, Tianjin Shanxi 
NCC had a broad network span but weak network intensity.  
Regarding Tianjin Shanxi NCCs’ influence in the local policy process, there are rare cases 
to show Tianjin Shanxi NCC to do lobbying in represent of membership enterprises. Most 
of the time, Tianjin Shanxi NCC assists local government to improve the level of 
management or service to enterprises, which might not be an influence towards the local 
policy influence but a kind of political engagement in the local governance. Through in-
depth case analysis, it is evident that Tianjin Shanxi NCC has demonstrated its influence in 
both policymaking and policy implementations. However, its influence in policymaking is 
constrained in a specific policy area, while its influence in policy implementation is limited. 
This variation could be explained with Tianjin Shanxi NCC’s establishment initiative and 
network strategy. To be specific, Tianjin Shanxi NCC’s “bottom-up” establishment 
initiatives determines its connection with business circle, and its state-network oriented 
strategy enhances its “hook” with local states and secures the channel for their influence. 
Coupling NCCs kept in line with the advancement of party-state’s penetration in order to 
achieve more influence. However, they are losing the autonomy and legitimacy from their 
membership enterprises in this coupling process with local party-state (Yang, 2012a). It 
does not work when it is too close to state, as the consequence of being too close to the 
state was erosion by the state, especially in the lobbying independence (motivation) and 
lobbying capacity (Thornton, 2013). Therefore, Coupling NCCs’ network strategy of 
binding with local party-state did broaden the channel for their participation in local policy 
process. However, due to the fact that the channel only covered specific issues, Coupling 
NCCs’ influence was quite limited within specific policy areas and could not exert 
influence more widely.   
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Chapter 5 Independent NCCs’ influence in the local policy 
process – the Case of Tianjin Guangdong NCC 
Independent NCCs, as the name suggests, are the most independent type among all 
categories. Their operation is comparatively independent from the local state and business 
networks. This type of autonomy is mainly reflected in two NCC features: first, most 
Independent NCCs are bottom-up initiated with high independence from local states. 
Second, Independent NCCs run their activities with flexibility and freedom, with the aim 
of keeping business for business. In other words, Independent NCCs are more like business 
agents with their own profit seeking activities, and they can choose both local states and 
membership enterprises as their clients. Unlike other types of NCCs, independent NCCs do 
not have a clear aim of influencing the local policy process, but they expand their business 
network within local state and market. In the context of local state competition in GDP 
growth and investment attraction, Independent NCCs’ function has been highlighted and 
enhanced. In order to illustrate Independent NCCs’ existence, development and their 
interaction with local states, as well as their engagement in the local policy process, this 
chapter will choose Tianjin Guangdong NCC to exemplify this type of Independent NCCs. 
Tianjin Guangdong NCC is a classic independent NCC. It was established by Guangdong 
provincials and townsmen in Tianjin in 2007, and it is currently under the supervision of 
Tianjin Economic Cooperation Office and registered in the Tianjin Administration Bureau 
of Social Organizations. It is further guided by the Guangdong Economic and 
Informatization Committee and the Guangdong Government’s Beijing Liaison office.  
Guangdong NCC does not have a long history in Tianjin, but achieves great influence 
especially in attracting investment and business coordination between Tianjin and 
Guangdong. Compared to other types of NCCs, Guangdong NCC demonstrated several 
distinct characteristics in Tianjin’s local context. First, in contrast to Shanxi NCCs 
introduced in chapter 4, Guangdong NCC is much more business oriented with its own 
profit-seeking activities. Second, Guangdong NCC is comparatively financially 
independent and has independent personnel. Third, most of the Guangdong NCC members 
are established entrepreneurs with strong economic strength. Rather than getting access to 
local officials through the channel of Guangdong NCC, they are most frequently the 
targets of incorporation for Tianjin local officials. Therefore, coordinating business 
cooperation for both sides has become the focus of Tianjin Guangdong NCC’s work. 
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Finally, Guangdong NCC is not interested in exerting influence in the local policymaking 
and promoting policy change. It would rather concentrate its efforts on achieving 
preferential policies for membership enterprises or promoting regional business 
cooperation, so as to improve its capacity in professional service.  
In this chapter, I will outline the current situation of Guangdong NCC in Tianjin, as well as 
its cultural, historical and institutional context. Then the two main dimensions of 
Guangdong NCC in Tianjin will be explicitly introduced – namely the establishment 
initiatives and their network strategy, followed by comparative case studies in order to 
show how Guangdong NCCs interact with local state and be engaged in the local policy 
process. Through a comparison of different policy cases that Guangdong NCC has engaged, 
I will argue that Independent NCCs have exerted some but restricted influence on the local 
policy process, especially in local policy implementation. However, they have become an 
increasingly important broker in regional business cooperation. 
5.1 The current situation of Tianjin Guandong NCC  
Guangdong NCC in Tianjin was established by Guangdong provincials and townsmen in 
Tianjin in June 2007 122 , and evolved from its predecessor of Tianjin Guangdong 
Association of Fellow Provincials (Tianjin Guangdong tongxiang lianyihui), which was a 
bottom-up initiated voluntary fellow organization. Tianjin Guangdong NCC acts like a 
civil chamber of commerce, which pays attention to service provision to membership 
enterprises. It had more than one hundred member enterprises in 2012,123 ranging from real 
estate, construction and decoration materials, electromechanical equipment, automobile 
dealing, household supplies, food and beverage service, logistics, financial service, 
telecommunication and creative advertising. Their investment in Tianjin reached more than 
10 billion RMB by 2012 (Ibid). Since its establishment, Guangdong NCC insisted on 
providing good service to Guangdong enterprises located in Tianjin, and endeavored to 
solve the practical problems of member enterprises. In 2007, Tianjin Guangdong NCC got 
the ISO9001 Great Wall quality management system certification,124 and became the first 
                                                 
122 Source from Tianjin Guangdong NCC’s establishing diary from WJS: “天津市广东商会在广东省驻京办
事处的指导下，于 2006年 4月开始发起筹备工作，2007年 6月 6日成功召开了天津市广东商会第一
届会员代表大会” (internal report). 
123 广东商会在津投资数千亿, 天津日报, 2012-03-20 
http://www.tjcoc.gov.cn/html/2012/shangwuyaowen_0320/645.html, last accessed on 27th July, 2016. 
124 This is an international-standard certification in terms of the quality of management and services that 
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social organization that complied with the international standards to building and 
improving member service management systems in China.125 Thanks to hard work and 
great efforts, it was awarded “The Advanced Unit for Two-way Services” (shuangxiang 
fuwu xianjin danwei) in 2008 and 2009 respectively. In 2009, it initiated ‘the national 
committee of secretary-generals of Guangdong NCCs’ together with Shanghai Guangdong 
NCC, and held the first meeting in Shanghai, which indicated the start of a higher-level 
cooperation and communication among all the Guangdong NCCs nation-wide. 
By June 2012, Tianjin Guangdong NCC had 4 full-time staff, including the Secretary-
general.126 Unlike the Shanxi NCC, the Secretary-general, rather than the president, is the 
key person in Tianjin Guangdong NCC’s development. WJS is the first Secretary-general 
of Tianjin Guangdong NCC and he is still in post. He used to work in a government-run 
enterprise and developed comprehensive skills to deal with public relations with 
governments. He was born in Guangdong province where his parents originally came from, 
but grew up in Tianjin. Therefore, his knowledge of and affection for both places 
motivated him to initiate the Tianjin Guangdong NCC together with other Guangdong 
entrepreneurs in Tianjin in 2006 and 2007. 127 
Tianjin Guangdong NCC experienced 16 months’ preparatory time before its official 
establishment. The proposal to establish Tianjin Guangdong NCC was put forward in a 
Chinese New Year catch-up of Guangdong Fellow Association members, most of who 
were Small and Medium Enterprises (SME) business people. Due to lack of network 
resources with officialdom, they had to approach and cooperate with other important 
figures with Guangdong connections in Tianjin, so as to smooth out the process of 
administrative approval and registration. According to data I have collected from their 
annual report, they have approached around 35 people during the period from 25 February 
2006 when the proposal was put forward, to 6th June 2007 when the first Tianjin 
Guangdong NCC general assembly of members was formed. 128 
                                                                                                                                                   
social organizations provide. 
125 Jinyue Jiayuan Newsletter, the first issue 津粤家园. 
126 Information from Tianjin Guangdong NCC’s official website: http://www.tgcoc.com/info/12-499.html. 
Last entry 09/04/2015. 
127 Ibid. 
128 The data was sourced from the annual inner report of Tianjin Guangdong NCC in 2006 and 2007. 
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Guangdong NCC in Tianjin has kept a low profile in its daily operation and activities. 
Compared to other influential NCCs, it has kept its influence within the range of business 
circles rather than in the public affairs and local governance. “Keeping business within 
business” is its motto in its engagement with local affairs, which can be reflected on the 
following operational aspects:  first, Guangdong NCC sets itself as a service provider or 
agent to membership enterprises and local governments and their departments. Therefore, 
it pursues a certain amount of profit in its business service. For example, it has a specific 
commission rate in coordinating business cooperation between membership enterprises or 
business between two localities in Tianjin and Guangdong. In this sense, it regards itself as 
equal market players as enterprises.  
Second, it has a clear target within the interaction with local bureaucracies. In the context 
of local governments’ competition for GDP growth, local bureaucrats especially in the 
business departments have been designated specific investment tasks. In order to maximize 
their influence in business cooperation between local government and non-local enterprises, 
Guangdong NCC endeavored to get access to the business departments at the municipal 
and district levels respectively. By introducing potential business cooperation projects, not 
only did they meet the requirements of local bureaucracies, but they also enhanced their 
lobbying capacity for Guangdong business clients.  
Third, as a harbor of business information and policy orientation from both Tianjin and 
Guangdong, Tianjin Guangdong NCC developed the resources to become an important 
“broker” in promoting regional business cooperation. Guangdong Province, as the pioneer 
of reform and opening up, has the most flourishing private business in China, and their 
investment beyond Guangdong Province and nation-wide is ranked top in 2015.129 Relying 
on the strong economic strength of Guangdong Province, most Guangdong NCCs in China 
have become the objects of cooperation for local business departments, which gave them 
prestigious status in business lobbying (Interview with WW, Official in Guangdong ICF). 
However, rather than expanding influence in a wide range of local governance, Tianjin 
Guangdong NCCs’ local engagement has not exceeded beyond business and the economic 
arena. They show preferences to staying in a more controllable range of policy stages and 
sphere, and abiding by the principle of “Keeping business within business” (Ibid.). 
                                                 
129 Data from the “Chinese Corporate Globalization Report 2015” 中国企业全球化报告(2015) , issued by 
中国与全球化智库及社科文献出版社 on 9th Nov, 2015. 
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Tianjin Guangdong NCC developed in two main stages and in 2012 it reached a milestone.  
From 2007 to 2012, it focused on inner capacity building. For example, on 16th May 2007, 
even before the official launch of Tianjin Guangdong NCC, the secretariat started the 
certification-training program of ISO 9000 international quality standard, which indicated 
the level of their professional service for membership enterprises.130  Another example was 
all the staff working in Tianjin Guangdong NCC had to get the training and pass the 
examination of social worker for civil organizations by 2013. The second stage ran from 
2012 until present, when Guangdong NCC tried to develop its outreach activities and 
expand its influence to a wider range, though its efforts were hampered by reality. 
Guangdong NCC’s influence kept decreasing with less and less public engagement. Since 
my fieldwork was completed in 2012, I did not collect information about Guangdong NCC 
after 2012. However, through secondary material and information online, it is evident that 
Guangdong NCC’s development was far from satisfactory. One of the reasons may be that 
along with the increase of individual enterprises’ lobbying capacity, they did not need 
Tianjin Guangdong NCC as the platform anymore. At the same time, due to Guangdong 
NCC’s profit driven activity, its reputation was greatly affected. It seemed impossible for 
Guangdong NCC to maintain its independent status in the interaction with local state and 
business society. 
In the summer of 2012, I spent two weeks in Tianjin Guangdong NCC to conduct 
participant observation. Therefore, I reviewed the process of Tianjin Guangdong NCC’s 
operation and its interaction with local state and membership enterprises. Guangdong 
NCC’s business orientation was very obvious, which was not just reflected on its business 
network building with membership enterprises and Guangdong private enterprises, but also 
reflected on its position in state-business relations.  As the Secretary-general WJS said, the 
NCC would like to achieve the targets of “managing government” and “managing 
enterprises”. This could be interpreted as follows - when cooperating with local states, it 
would help the state to attract more investments, and tackle the administration problems of 
local business; but when cooperating with enterprises, it would help the business to 
negotiate with local states for preferential policy or policy exception. Whatever position it 
was in, it sought to maintain the independence and liberty to prioritize its own interests. 
Unlike other NCCs, it took local governments as its clients rather than patrons, which to 
                                                 
130 Interview with HK, 14th May, 2012. 
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some degree broke the traditional relationship between grass-root NGOs and local state, 
and also explained the decline of Tianjin Guangdong NCC after 2012. 
Tianjin Guangdong NCCs’ organizational structure was simple but functional, as shown in 
Figure 5.1. The president (part-time) was the Chairman of the board of a famous private 
real estate company in 2012. Due to the limited number of full-time working staff, 
Guangdong NCC just kept the essential departments, like Department of Administration, 
Department of Service and Rights Protection, Department of Cooperation and 
Communication, which were all accounting to the Secretariat. Guangdong NCC’s 
membership size and industry coverage were relatively small scale, but it was starting to 
attract more big enterprises with strong economic strength to join it. For example, in 2010, 
it had successfully preached China Guangfa Bank, China Minsheng Bank, and Shenzhen 
Development Bank as its vice-presidential membership unit, which were all state-owned or 
state holding companies, different from Guangdong NCC’s other member enterprises. In 
addition, it had opened the membership qualification to Tianjin local small and medium 
enterprises (SME) in order to promote more business cooperation within membership 
enterprises and boost its influence in business service, like providing platform for business 
information, introducing local governments’ preferential policy on investment, etc.  
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Member Congress 
 ↓ 
           Advisory Committee      Council     Party Organization (Youth League, Trade Union) 
↓ 
supervisory committee       Standing Council       Presidents’ meeting 
 ↓ 
Secretariat 
 ↓ 
              Department of Administration       Department of service and rights protection       
 Department of Cooperation and communication 
Figure 5.1 The Organizational Structure of Tianjin Guangdong NCC  
To sum up, Tianjin Guangdong NCC is a very young NCC in Tianjin, but has achieved 
substantial influence, especially in attracting investment and bridging the economic 
communication between Tianjin and Guangdong. This will be illustrated in the following 
case analysis. Among all the activities Guangdong NCC has engaged in and promoted, 
coordinating the relations between local government departments and entrepreneurs has 
been always their focus, but have never endeavored to engage into the wide local policy 
process.131 
5.2 The historical and cultural background  
Guangdong merchants have been nourished and very much influenced by Guangdong 
business culture. As the pioneer for foreign trade and reform and opening up policy, 
Guangdong has created an unparalleled private sector in China, and Guangdong private 
entrepreneurs have been doing business throughout the world. 
For centuries, Guangdong has been the frontier of Chinese foreign trade. Its trade history 
started during Tang dynasty, or even earlier.132 In mid-Tang Dynasty, since the Silk Roads 
                                                 
131  Refer to the conversation with WJS, the Secretary-general of Tianjin Guangdong NCC on the way to 
Changchun for Jilin Guangdong NCC’s fifth anniversary. 
132 Some historians argued that Guangzhou’s trade with foreign countries started in the 3rd century in Jin 
Dynasty when the Han people migrated to Guangdong area and promoted the trade between inland China and 
foreign countries. This had made Guangzhou become the most important harbor for maritime trade since then 
in the Chinese history. Source from 黄秋菊, “六朝时期广州对外贸易的发展”, 中国评论学术出版社. 
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had been blocked inland, the Maritime Silk Road started to develop. As one of the most 
important starting points of Maritime Silk Road, Guangzhou had gradually become the 
center for foreign trade and business. In 1684, the Emperor Kangxi gave four harbors the 
permission to allow foreign businessmen to do business within their jurisdiction, which 
were Guangzhou in Guangdong province, Fuzhou in Fujian province, Ningbo in Zhejiang 
Province, Songjiang in Shanghai. This policy catalyzed the business culture in east and 
south coastal area of China. However, this policy did not last long. Later in 1757, in the 
mid-Qing period, the Emperor Qianlong abolished the four harbors’ trade policy and only 
reserved Guangzhou as the only one harbor for foreign trade, which was historically called 
“One Port for Trade” (yikou tongshang). 133  At that time, all the foreign firms from 
European and American countries were located in the Thirteen Firm Street that was 300 
yards from the Pearl River, and the Qing government had designated “Guangzhou Shisan 
Hang” as the only institution to be in charge of the whole country’s foreign trade affairs.  
The “One Port for Trade” policy then made Guangzhou the only city to monopolize 
China’s foreign trade, and rapidly gain international reputation. Guangzhou became the 
third biggest city in the world, just below Beijing and London.134 Though the Opium War 
had shaken Guangzhou’s monopoly status in foreign trade in mid-nineteen century, 
Guangdong’s business culture continues to date. 
Reviewing the history of Guangdong merchants, this group of people has played a 
significant role in the political arena, especially in the Republican era. Since Guangdong 
had accumulated the majority of the country’s private capital, and had the biggest number 
of private entrepreneurs, it enjoyed the relative freedom of thought, compared to the inland, 
which made it become the birthplace of the revolutionary ideas in late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century. Great thinkers and political philosophers like Kang Youwei, Liang 
Qichao, Sun Yat-sen all came from the Guangdong province and then spread their ideas 
around the whole country. On the other hand, Guangdong merchants sponsored a large 
number of revolutionary activities in modern China, and had been very active in engaging 
with Chinese politics. However, no matter the level of cooperation they developed with 
states, they always endeavored to sustain their own independence and set their business as 
the priority in the era of great change. 
                                                 
133 Source from Guangdong Museum website: “十三行”-广东海外贸易, 
http://www.gdmuseum.com/edu_text.php?blogid=1565&title=广东历史&classid=73 
134 Source from “Top 10 Cities of the Year 1800” on the website of www.about.com. 
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Guangdong merchants have a long history of doing business home and abroad. The most 
famous period is Hong merchant from mid-Qing Dynasty. During the period known as the 
Canton trade system (1757–1842), Hong merchants acted as exclusive liaisons between 
foreign traders and the Chinese. Holding the license to trade issued by the Chinese 
government, the Hong merchants enjoyed considerable power. All foreign trade was 
required to be channeled through them. They purchased most of the imports, arranged 
exports to foreign countries, and made sure Westerners followed customs and duty 
regulations. The Hong merchants cultivated close relationships with Western traders and 
provided them with valuable guidance. The system devised by the Chinese for carrying on 
the foreign trade was a masterpiece of wisdom. In no part of the world could operations of 
such magnitude be carried out with so much ease. The only merchants allowed to do 
business with foreigners were the Hong merchants.135  
Apart from doing business with foreign traders, Guangdong merchants also started the 
trade with inland provinces from early on. The history of Guangdong merchants in Tianjin 
dates to 300 years ago, when the great canal connected the south-north trade, and most of 
the riverboats parked in Tianjin port came from Guangdong, Chaozhou and Fujian area. 
The trade was very popular with Guangdong Merchants everywhere around Tianjin port. 
In order to facilitate the business and convene more Guangdong merchants, they raise the 
funds to build up the “Fujian and Canton Guild Hall” in Tianjin136, which became one of 
the earliest Guild Halls in China. With the increasing number of Guangdong merchants in 
Tianjin, Tang Shaoyi, who came from Guangdong and worked at the Tianjin Custom at the 
time, proposed to raise funds in order to establish the Tianjin Guangdong Guild Hall in the 
downtown of Tianjin in 1903. Relying on the contributions of Guangdong merchants, the 
Guangdong Guild Hall was build up in 1907, and its main function was to provide 
accommodation and other relevant services when Guangdong merchants firstly arrived at 
Tianjin.  They then helped them to seek business opportunities using the guild hall as a 
platform. In those times, the guild hall was not only the place for residence, but also an 
important venue for business cooperation, fellow party and holiday entertainments. Along 
with the establishment and development of Tianjin Guangdong Guild Hall, Guangdong 
merchants together with their business associations, like various merchant groups, and 
chambers of commerce, became the very important part of Tianjin’s water transport culture 
and business culture. 
                                                 
135 Refer to Haward Business School website, http://www.library.hbs.edu/hc/heard/canton-trade.html. 
136 Tianjin Guangdong Guild Hall: http://baike.baidu.com/view/67597.htm. 
Chapter 5 
 139 
5.3 The institutional context of Tianjin Guangdong NCC 
Guangdong provincial government has been doing well in social reform and policy 
innovation, with a clear aim to become a responsive government. Besides complying with 
the central governments’ policy on social innovation, they would always try to tailor the 
inner-provincial policy in accordance with their discretionary power (Interview with GYK, 
Guangdong ICF). With reference to social organizations’ administration, Guangdong 
government initiated the cancellation of supervision units for social organizations, and 
designated the civil affairs departments to unify the process of registration and 
administration of social organizations in 2006.137 This made Guangdong the first province 
to comprehensively break the shackles of “Dual Management System” in China. This 
policy move reflected that Guangdong government was a pioneer in social organization’s 
administration reform and explained why it kept an open attitude towards Guangdong 
NCCs’ development nation-wide. 
Guangdong government supported the Guangdong NCCs’ development in an 
unprecedented way. First, it delegated Guangdong Liaison Offices in different regions to 
help Guangdong merchants build up their own organization, comply with different 
situation in various localities and make full use of the Canton cultural heritage. For 
example, Tianjin Canton Guild Hall was built more than 100 years ago and has become the 
national cultural relic protection unit and historical tourism spot. Sun Yat-sen visited 
Tianjin Guangdong Guild Hall on 24th August 1912 and made a famous speech after he 
was elected president of the Republic of China. When Tianjin Guangdong NCC prepared 
to be established, it connected this heritage with Guangdong merchants’ current 
development in Tianjin, which enhanced the sense of identity of Guangdong NCC 
members in Tianjin (Interview with WTH, the vice-president of Tianjin Guangdong NCC). 
Second, all the Guangdong NCCs nation-wide had the same supervisory unit in the 
government of origin - Guangdong Economic Informatization Committee (EIC hereafter). 
Unlike in other provinces, EIC was an information coordination department that was good 
at integrating economic information from all over the country and become an essential 
information platform for Guangdong NCCs. This mechanism could profoundly limit the 
vicious horizontal competition of same level bureaucratic organizations and improve 
                                                 
137 Source from the “Blue Book of Civil Organizations (2011-2012)”,民间组织蓝皮书：广东率先全面突破
双重管理制度束缚, http://www.ssap.com.cn/web/c_0000000100120002/d_28837.htm, last entry on 16th 
May, 2016. 
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Guangdong Government’s efficiency to deal with different Guangdong NCCs’ requests. 
Thirdly, Guangdong government even gave financial support to Guangdong NCCs, which 
was quite unusual among all the bottom-up NCCs. Especially in the establishment period, 
Guangdong government had budget to support Guangdong NCCs in different host places 
to run their activities without prohibiting/interfering with their freedom and independence 
in operation. 
Generally speaking, the Tianjin government did not have any special policies towards the 
Guangdong NCC’s development, and Guangdong NCC kept a relatively low profile in 
government initiatives but maintained a prominent business network within their 
membership enterprises. Rather than building links with the Tianjin municipal government, 
Guangdong NCC preferred to interact more with district level governments, so as to access 
the updated economic information and preferential policies. From this point of view, 
Guangdong NCC was “practical and flexible” 138  in building up its official networks; 
“Keeping distance with politics but getting close to government”139 became Guangdong 
NCC’s motto in Tianjin. Guangdong NCC achieved satisfactory result from it. Thanks to 
the outstanding performance in coordinating Guangdong enterprises’ investment in 
Tianjin140 and directly helping with Tianjin’s investment attraction work, it was awarded as 
“the Advanced Unit for Two-way Services” (shuangxiang fuwu xianjin danwei) in 2008 
and 2009141 respectively, and “The Advanced Unit in Introduction of 500 Competitive 
Domestic Enterprises” (yinjin guonei wubaiqiang qiye xianjin danwei) in 2009 (Official 
website, Tianjin Guangdong NCC). Among all the NCCs in Tianjin, Guangdong NCC 
significantly kept its independent status and adopted a different philosophy compared to 
other NCCs. Yet, it showed a strong capacity in business cooperation and business 
lobbying in some specific projects. 
Because of the interests of Tianjin bureaucrats in attracting investment from Guangdong 
enterprises, Tianjin Guangdong NCC became the target for Tianjin business departments 
to cooperate. Moreover, some local bureaucracies could get interest dividends by taking 
advantage of Guangdong NCCs.142 In Tianjin, the whole city was composed of 6 districts, 
                                                 
138 From the interview with Tianjin Guangdong NCC membership enterprise-legend Culture.  13/06/2012. 
139 Speech from WJS at the Secretary-general seminar in Changchun, Jilin Province. 19/05/2012. 
140 This will be introduced in the first policy case in this chapter.  
141 This award was especially designed for those organizations that contributed greatly in interprovincial 
communication and regional cooperation in Tianjin. 
142 This “interest dividends” idea was mentioned in the interview with WJS, but he has not come to the 
details. Explain more. 
Chapter 5 
 141 
4 suburb districts, and 5 counties, and each district level government was given investment 
attraction tasks, which directly related to the district leaders’ promotion prospects. In this 
context, the districts were faced with fierce competition when there was a big potential 
investment project from Guangdong coming to the city. In order to get useful negotiation 
information, Guangdong NCC usually became the target of different district governments 
to cooperate. At the same time, Guangdong NCC needed to negotiate with district 
governments to fight for the best policy for potential investors and best commission rate 
for themselves. Therefore, Tianjin Guangdong NCC and local bureaucracies’ interests 
coincide in the aspects of investment attraction and business cooperation (Interview with 
WJS, Tianjin Guangdong NCC). 
5.4 Tianjin Guangdong NCC’s establishment initiatives 
Tianjin Guangdong NCC was absolutely bottom-up initiated, even though Guangdong’s 
liaison office in Beijing did give substantial guidance and assistance during its 
establishment. It evolved from a pure grass-roots fellowship association (tongxianghui) in 
2007, and the Secretary-general of Guangdong NCC was the key person in the process of 
its establishment.  
Whether a NCC is bottom-up or top-down initiated is judged by its source of finance. 
Tianjin Guangdong NCC had three sources of income. First, it had its own income-
generating service, such as the ISO 9000 certification project, the social worker for civil 
organizations training program, etc. Tianjin Guangdong NCC charged service fee by 
providing these services to its membership enterprises or other social organizations. 
Besides these, they also charged commission for the services they provided in coordinating 
business cooperation. Second, the membership fee also contributed to Guangdong NCC’s 
revenue. As most of the membership Guangdong enterprises’ economic volume was of 
considerable scale, their membership fee contribution and other donations would help 
Guangdong NCC to get through the most difficult establishing period (Interview with HK, 
Tianjin Guangdong NCC). Third, rewards were received from both host government and 
home government towards Guangdong NCC’s outstanding job in investment attraction. As 
all the local governments in China had budgets for rewarding organizations that 
contributed to the local investment attraction work, Guangdong NCC’s effort in promoting 
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business cooperation would pay off in this respect (Participant observation in Tianjin 
Guangdong NCC, May 2012). 
5.5 Tianjin Guangdong NCC’s network strategy 
NCCs’ network strategy indicates what the key networks are for NCCs to build up, and 
what methods they use to enhance their networks. Network strategy is important for NCCs, 
as it directly affects how they build up their external networks, and subsequently 
influences their lobbying behavior. In this thesis, as stated in Chapter 3, network strategy 
refers to NCCs’ orientation in their network building, either local state network oriented, or 
business network oriented. 
Tianjin Guangdong NCC had an obvious business network orientation since its 
establishment, even though it had tried to build up its state network but failed. Deeply 
influenced by the Canton business culture, the new Guangdong merchants still held a 
strong mercantile tradition. They ran their business pragmatically and flexibly, but were 
not as good at interweaving expansive networks with non-local states. However, the 
intensity of their business network among Guangdong entrepreneurs was quite strong. 
According to internal statistics in Tianjin Guangdong NCC, Guangdong NCCs’ success 
rate of business cooperation within membership enterprises was the highest among all the 
NCCs in China (Interview with WW, 14th May 2012). 
“We Guangdong entrepreneurs are different from those from Zhejiang and Fujian. 
Most of them came to Tianjin to make money, while we are different. We came 
here with money, with investment. That is why they are so keen to know the local 
official, but we don’t have to.”  
“Another difference is that they [Zhejiang entrepreneurs and Fujian entrepreneurs]” 
all compete for the position of president or vice-president of Non-local Chamber 
of Commerce, while Guangdong entrepreneurs seldom do this way. You could see 
that, the most powerful Zhejiang entrepreneurs are always the president of 
Zhejiang NCCs and have a big business and state network, while the most 
powerful Guangdong entrepreneurs are always mysterious, and you do not know 
who they are. Zhejiang and Fujian people like business Baotuan (抱团)， but we 
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like to work alone or with a few trusted partners” (Interview with a Guangdong 
Entrepreneur in the five year anniversary ceremony of Jilin Guangdong NCC in 
Changchun 18th May, 2012). 
According to the interview above, we can probe the reason of Guangdong NCC’s 
insistence on business network. Guangdong entrepreneurs have developed their own 
philosophy in business operation and lobbying. They do not believe that the local states 
would help them in business expansion, but that would most definitely interfere with their 
liberty through cooperation. However, their business networks within Guangdong 
merchants are very strong. The best examples to prove this are the internationally 
renowned Chaoshan merchants (chaoshan shangbang) and Hakka merchants (kejia 
shangbang) originally from Guangdong Province. The intensive Guangdong merchant 
business network has helped Guangdong entrepreneurs to expand their business kingdom 
all over the world and to grow into the most influential merchant group in China nowadays 
(Interview with HXM, the vice-president of Jilin Guangdong NCC on 17th May 2012). 
To sum up, Tianjin Guangdong NCC’s network strategy was business network oriented 
with a focus on network intensity rather than network span.   
5.6 Comparative case analysis: Independent NCCs’ influence in 
the local policy process 
5.6.1 Policy case selection 
Tianjin Guangdong NCC’ bottom-up establishment initiatives and network strategy affect 
its way of lobbying with local state. Before coming to the case analysis, we should be 
aware that, unlike the way of lobbying in western democratic countries, lobbying in China 
is much related to the role of local state and institutional context. At the local level, the 
local states’ policy towards NCCs’ participation in the local policy process enormously 
affected their outcome of lobbying. Therefore, in order to control the effects of local states, 
all the cases that I choose here and in the following chapters are based in Tianjin. This way 
I can specifically examine how NCCs’ establishment initiatives and network strategy 
influence their lobbying behavior in the case of controlling the constant variables. 
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I selected two cases regarding Tianjin Guangdong NCCs’ interactions with the local state 
in Tianjin. The first one was the case of Gree Electrics in seeking for land in Tianjin for 
new plants, where Tianjin Guangdong NCC was the most important broker and factor in 
the final decision-making stage. It significantly demonstrated Guangdong NCC’s lobbying 
capacity in business negotiation and coordination. In contrast, the second case was the 
proposal to establish the Circum-Bohai-Sea Social Organizations’ Economic Development 
Research Association in Tianjin, which was a failed case in the local policy process. 
Tianjin Guangdong NCC did not find the best strategy and tactics to exert influence on 
local policy makers, or even did not get the right place to submit its proposal. Through the 
comparison of these two cases, I would expect to get some interesting findings regarding 
how the establishment initiatives and network strategy affected NCCs’ influence on the 
local policy process. 
5.6.2 Case1 Tianjin Guangdong NCC’s lobbying for Gree Electrics in 
seeking for land of the new plants in Tianjin 
Guangdong merchants, based in the most advanced private economy in China, have been 
good at seeking investment opportunities beyond their hometown, like mainland China, 
Southeast Asia, etc. In the process of these private enterprises negotiating business deal 
with non-local host government or potential business partners, Guangdong NCCs have 
been greatly engaged and played an important role in promoting the business cooperation 
based on their robust business network and negotiating strategy. In the following cases, we 
could see that the bottom-up establishment initiatives of Guangdong NCCs made it easy to 
access and accumulate business information from membership enterprises. Further, the 
business oriented network intensity strategy improved its capacity in lobbying the deal 
with local states on some specific policies.  
Due to the policy advantages of Guangdong since early 1990s, it has produced many 
enterprises with famous brands. After years of development and business expansion in 
Mainland China, some large Guangdong enterprises decided to relocate their production 
headquarters to other locations based on the consideration of reducing the cost and 
increasing the market. Gree Electric and Openin Kitchen are two examples in this case. 
Gree Electric Appliances Inc. (Zhuhai Geli Dianqi Gufen Youxian Gongsi) is a Chinese 
major appliance manufacturer headquartered in Zhuhai, Guangdong province. It was the 
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world's largest residential air-conditioner manufacturer in 2009. 143  Gree had been the 
leading enterprise in the air-conditioning industry. It offered two types of air conditioners: 
household and commercial air conditioners, and their business income reached 100 billion 
in 2012.144 In the process of choosing new plantation locations around China, Gree Electric 
tried to get the best deal in land usage price and other preferential policy, but they had 
limited energy and knowledge of negotiation as well as limited contacts with different 
local governments. In this situation, Guangdong NCCs located in different localities 
became the priority of their choice to partnership.   
Tianjin Guangdong NCC’s bottom-up establishment initiatives indicated its strong base 
within business networks both in Guangdong and Tianjin. As mentioned before, the 
secretary-general of Tianjin Guangdong NCC - WJS, was born and spent his childhood in 
Guangdong, but had lived and worked in Tianjin for more than forty years. Due to his past 
working experience in foreign trade industry, he was very sensitive to local governments’ 
business promotion policy and investment opportunities. Besides, he insisted on going to 
China Import and Export Fair (Canton Fair) every year, where he got to know investment 
information from representatives in Gree Electrics in his Guangdong merchants’ business 
network in 2009. After rounds of conversations, in 2010, Guangdong NCC was formally 
entrusted by Gree Electric to carry out the preliminary investigation and seek locations of 
new plantation as its production headquarters in North China. Tianjin Guangdong NCC 
started investigation and negotiation with district governments in Tianjin after they agreed. 
Their activities could be divided into three stages. First, they carried out the informal 
meeting with officials in district Commercial Bureau (Zhaoshang Ju) and Commerce 
Committee (Shangye Weiyuanhui) respectively, and inquired about the willingness and the 
best offer they could make. Second, they liaised with the commercial departments in 
Guangdong Provincial Government or Guangdong government’s non-local liaison offices, 
and explored their support in the aspects of promoting economic cooperation with Tianjin. 
In this case, Tianjin Guangdong NCC successfully got supportive funding from their home 
supervision department---Guangdong Economic and Informatization Committee 
(Guangdong Jingji yu Xinxihua Weiyuanhui, Guangdong EIC). Third, after these 
preliminary investigations, Tianjin Guangdong NCC shortlisted the best two choices for 
Gree Electrics to do the final decision. They accompanied the decision-makers of Gree 
Electrics to organize more field investigations and formal meeting with district bureaus. In 
                                                 
143 See www.businessweek.com Guangdong Visions: Forging China's Future. Retrieved on 2009-08-11. 
144 Source from Gree Electric’s official website: http://www.gree.com.cn. 
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this final decision-making process, Tianjin Guangdong NCC did exert quite substantial 
influence to the final deal between enterprise and local governments, which was claimed as 
‘managing governments’ (jingying zhengfu) by them.145 
Tianjin Guangdong NCC’s strong business network in Tianjin helped it gather all the 
necessary information for the final negotiation process, while its independent status made 
it a distant but efficient negotiator in the lobbying process. In the final list that Guangdong 
NCC submitted to Gree Electrics, the two suggestions for the new plantation location were 
made namely, Beichen District and Jinghai District, which were two districts within 
Tianjin jurisdictions. Due to the existence “Promotion Tournament Model”146 (Zhou, 2004 
& 2007) among local officials in China, all the district-level government officials were 
given investment attraction assignments from municipal government each year, which 
directly influenced their promotion path. So there appeared vicious competition among 
different district governments when facing the same investment projects. Tianjin 
Guangdong NCC absolutely understood this situation and advised Gree Electric to slow 
down the process of making final decisions and leave time for Tianjin Guangdong NCC to 
do the final round of negotiations. During this period, Guangdong NCC gathered 
information from its local business network regarding the preferential policies that other 
enterprises had been given, and also organized informal meetings with government 
officials to inquire about the bottom-line offer of each district. At the beginning of the 
negotiations, both Beichen and Jinghai district governments gave similar quotes for the 
land and tax rebate policies. Gree Electrics was inclined to choose Beichen district, based 
on its geographical advantage and preferential policies. However, at the same time, 
Guangdong NCC was still continuing the informal negotiation with Jinghai District. At the 
end, Jinghai Government offered zero-price land usage and satisfactory supporting 
infrastructure surrounded to Gree Electrics, and they also offered the preferential policy in 
employee’s social welfare rather than just economic preferences, such as building the 
school and hospitals within development zone, the opening of new bus lines, etc. After 
considering all the compressive factors, Gree Electrics finally chose Jinghai District as the 
location for production headquarters just several days before signing the contract with 
Beichen District.  
                                                 
145 Interview with WJS. 
146 This academic concept will be detailed introduced in chapter 6. 
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Figure 5.1: The administrative divisions of Tianjin 
Source: "中华人民共和国行政区划沿革 (1949-2006)"(the history of administrative divisions in People's 
Republic of China). www.gov.cn, official website of the Government of the People's Republic of China. 
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In this case, Tianjin Guangdong NCC demonstrated great potential in business lobbying 
based on the resources it could mobilize. Tianjin Guangdong NCCs’ bottom-up initiatives 
determined its natural link with enterprises, so they could understand the request from 
investment companies, and quickly formed a partnership coalition. In this case, when the 
Secretary- General WJS got to know Gree Electrics’ investment demands, he immediately 
provided the useful information and professional service for their needs. Besides, Tianjin 
Guangdong NCC’s independent status and business-oriented network helped it to fully 
display its lobbying capacity.  Guangdong NCC was comparatively independent and kept 
distance with local states apart from business issues, so they could keep their flexibility 
and principles without being assimilated when they approached district governments and 
other government departments. As a result of Tianjin Guangdong NCC’s contribution on 
this project, it was awarded 200,000 RMB from Tianjin municipal government as a prize 
for attracting investment for Tianjin147. Apart from it, they also got the operating funds 
from Guangdong Government and the high commission fee from Gree Electrics. 
5.6.3 Case analysis 
The above case revealed the significant lobbying capacity and great potential of Tianjin 
Guangdong NCC in promoting business cooperation between non-local enterprises and 
local governments. When the Secretary-General was describing the process of liaising 
local governments and enterprises, or host government and home government, he used the 
term ‘Managing Governments’. This term was interpreted by him that, based on the 
interests of membership enterprises, Tianjin Guangdong NCC used the multi-sourced 
information and wide-spread network to negotiate with different levels of governments, so 
as to get the best offer for membership enterprises. Therefore, “Managing Governments” 
could be summarized as the method of business lobbying of Tianjin Guangdong NCCs.   
Tianjin Guangdong NCCs’ success in “Managing Governments” in this case was attributed 
to its “bottom-up” establishment initiatives and business-oriented network strategy. As 
outlined in the above case, “bottom-up” establishment initiatives demonstrated its strong 
base within business networks both in Guangdong and Tianjin, which helped Tianjin 
                                                 
147 Source from Tianjin Guangdong NCCs’ official website in 15 June, 2010. 
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Guangdong NCC to perceive and acquire first-hand investment demands from membership 
or non-membership enterprises. Its in-depth understanding of business logic enabled it to 
flawlessly make decisions and take action to the next step, which reflected its 
professionalization in brokering business cooperation. Moreover, its business-oriented 
network contributed to its lobbying success by gathering all the essential information in the 
final negotiation process, while making independent but efficient negotiation with local 
state departments. In the whole process, it was noteworthy that the Network Intensity 
strategy, which Tianjin Guangdong NCC adopted, was proven significantly useful in 
brokering and promoting business cooperation. 
5.6.4 Case 2 Tianjin Guangdong NCC proposing to establish the 
Circum-Bohai-Sea Social Organizations’ Economic Development 
Research Association 
Based on the various successful experiences of coordinating business cooperation between 
enterprises and local states, Tianjin Guangdong NCC developed an idea on how to 
establish a research association based on the existing formal mechanism Circum-Bohai-
Sea Regional Cooperation Mayors’ Joint Committee (Huanbohai Shizhang Lianxihui). 
However, due to Guangdong NCC’s limited connections with officialdom and limited 
resources to mobilize within its network, this proposal was suspended at the drafting stage.    
The Bohai Economic Rim (BER) is the economic region surrounding Beijing and Tianjin. 
It also includes areas in Hebei, Liaoning and Shandong that surrounds the Bohai Sea. This 
region has gone through major economic changes and changes in infrastructure. This 
emerging region is rising as a northern economic powerhouse and rivals the Pearl River 
Delta in the south and the Yangtze River Delta in the East.148 Since 2005, the central 
government has made it a priority to integrate all the cities in the Bohai Bay rim and foster 
economic development. This includes building an advanced communications network; 
better highways, offer increased education opportunities and scientific resources as well as 
tapping natural resources off the Bohai rim149. The Bohai Economic Rim as an economic 
region has been supported by many administrative cooperation mechanisms.  
                                                 
148 "Foreign investment shows trend of "moving northward"". china-embassy.org. 2004-05-14. Retrieved 
2015-01-09. 
149 Gain a strategic advantage in the Bohai Bay region sdic.com.cn 2007-06-11, last entry 2015-01-16 
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Figure 5.1: The location of Bohai Economic Rim 
In the Bohai Economic Rim, there has been an effective regional cooperation mechanism: 
Circum-Bohai-Sea Regional Cooperation Mayors’ Joint Committee (the Mayors’ Joint 
Committee hereafter), which was the first regional cooperation organization among local 
governments in domestic China and initiated by Li Ruihuan150 in 1986. In the initial stage, 
it included 14 member cities that are mainly the cities in the coastal area. During the past 
thirty years, the Mayors’ Joint Committee was devoted to eliminating administrative 
barriers and reducing the impact of local protectionism, and the number of its membership 
cities increased to 45 in 2013.151 Due to the work of the Mayor’s Joint Committee in 
promoting and facilitating cooperation among members of the Cities, until 2011 it had 
cumulatively facilitated more than 12,000 cooperation projects among member cities, and 
amounted to more than 410 billion Yuan. 152  With the active participation of the 
membership city governments in the Bohai Sea region, this regional cooperation 
                                                 
150 Li Ruihuan was the Mayor of Tianjin then in 1986. 
151 衡水等四城市申请加入环渤海区域合作市长联席会, 中国经济新闻网 2013-07-08. 
152冯娟. 环渤海区域合作成果. 新华网. 2011-5-23, June 1, 2011. 
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mechanism was aimed at constructing a diversified, multi-level, and multi-field regional 
cooperation mechanism with increasing cohesion and growing influence. It has become 
one of the most influential regional cooperation organizations with the largest membership 
size and most extensive coverage.153 By 2013, the member cities of the Mayors’ Joint 
Committee included Tianjin, Shenyang, Dalian, YingKou, Jinzhou, Panjin, Huludao, Fuxin, 
Chaoyang, Dandong in Liaoning province, Shijia Zhuang, Qinhuangdao, Tangshan, 
Cangzhou, Chende, Xingtai, Langfang, Baoding, Handan, Hengshui in Hebei province, 
Jinan, Binzhou, Dezhou, Dongying, Yantai, Weihai, Qingdao, Zibo, Weifang, Liaocheng, 
Rizhao, Zaozhuang in Shandong Province, Taiyuan, Changzhi in Shanxi Province, 
Huhehaote, Tongliao, Hulunbeier, Manzhouli, erduosi, Baotou, Chifeng, Wulancha, 
Xilinguole from Inner Mongolia, and Anyang, Puyang from Henan Province.  
In the context of regional cooperation in Bohai Sea area since the early 2000s, Tianjin as 
the central city in this area was under the spotlight and showed great potential in leading 
regional cooperation. In 2005, the Bohai Sea coastal part of Tianjin – Binhai New Area 
was included into the eleventh “Five Year Plan” (shiyiwu guihua), and the national 
development strategy. Since then, this central part of Bohai Sea area has become the 
national level new area with the great support from the State Council. Under this 
background, quite a few of social organizations came up with new initiatives to raise their 
profile in the regional cooperation process of Bohai Sea area. Tianjin Guangdong NCC 
was one of them. In early 2012, Tianjin Guangdong NCC came up with the idea of 
establishing the Circum-Bohai-Sea Social Organizations’ Economic Development 
Research Association (Huanbohai shehui zuzhi jingji fazhan yanjiuhui154), aiming to be the 
first initiator to promote the social organizations’ regional integration in this area. 
According to the explanation of General-secretary of Tianjin Guangdong NCC, this new 
proposed association aimed at promoting regional cooperation among social organizations 
in the Bohai Sea area, by way of providing consultancy to membership city governments 
on how to respond to social requests from society, deal with social crisis, and integrate 
social organizations into local governance. Besides, they also proposed to establish a 
training center for staff working in social organizations in Tianjin, in order to improve the 
professional level of the service they provided. They also introduced a research team to 
                                                 
153See衡水等四城市申请加入环渤海区域合作市长联席会, 中国经济新闻网, 2013-07-08. 
154 环渤海社会组织经济发展研究会. 
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study the problems in NCCs’ development and explore more ways to pursue profits 
(Interview with WJS, Tianjin Guangdong NCC).  
What Tianjin Guangdong NCC proposed was to establish a new social organization with a 
main focus on doing research and consultancy. The reasons why I selected it as a policy 
case to illustrate Tianjin Guangdong NCC’s engagement in the local policy process will be 
presented here. There were two reasons for my selection. First, it was noteworthy that the 
focus of Tianjin Guangdong NCC’s initiative was to attach this new proposed association 
to the existing high-level mechanism of the Mayors’ Joint Committee, and make it a 
subordination or extension of this long existing successful regional cooperation mechanism. 
(Ibid.) To achieve this goal, it was essential to get the top leaders’ approval in Tianjin and 
possibly include some other membership cities in the Mayors’ Joint Committee. Second, 
this proposed association related to the regional cooperation of social organizations in the 
Bohai Sea area, so it needed the cooperation of various parties in Tianjin and beyond. This 
new proposed organization would target social policy’ making and implementation in this 
region. Therefore, this proposal was leaning more towards a local policy initiative rather 
than being a normal administrative issue.  
The reasons why Tianjin Guangdong NCC came up with this proposal were more than it 
publicly stated. First, as an independent NCC, Tianjin Guangdong NCC did not have 
strong links with local states, which made its influence more and more marginalized 
beyond the field of business cooperation. In order to maintain its strength and expand the 
range of influence, they set up a goal to become the pioneer in social organizations’ 
professionalization building in Tianjin. Similar to what they did to acquire the ISO9001 
Great Wall quality management system certification, they would like to explore more 
professional functions suitable for NCCs’ long-term development. In the interviews, staff 
working in Tianjin Guangdong NCC also mentioned that their plan was to become the 
training base for all the social organization workers in Tianjin, and even the Bohai area.155 
Second, Tianjin Guangdong NCC had been successful in promoting intergovernmental and 
regional business cooperation, but its influence was confined within this special area and 
hard to maintain. When the local officials were replaced or policy context towards social 
organizations changed, Guangdong NCC had to adjust its way of behaving and strategies. 
                                                 
155 Staff mentioned that employees working in the social organization needed to be professionally trained 
before work, as specialized skills and strategy were essential for this coordinating job especially in NCCs. 
The current situation of employees in Tianjin social organizations was far behind satisfactory.   
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To bid farewell to this unstable environment and passive way of working, it had to explore 
new independent activities to guarantee its revenue for daily operation. Third, though 
NCCs existed in China for many years, its role had not yet been recognized by the public. 
Tianjin Guangdong NCC drafted the proposal to establish this research association about 
social organizations, aiming to improve public awareness, and at the same time to raise its 
own profile and acquire the attention from top leaders in Tianjin (Interview with HK, 
Tianjin Guangdong NCC). 
In order to get this proposal onto the local policy agenda, Tianjin Guangdong NCC carried 
out the following activities. First, it invited scholars from universities and research 
institutes to give feedback. According to my participant observation in the fieldwork, they 
inquired with scholars from Nankai University, Tianjin University of Finance and 
Economics, Tianjin Academy of Social Sciences to comment on the proposal. Because the 
proposal was brief and did not make clear the specific mechanism and key missions of this 
research association, feedback from scholars varied and they could not reach an agreement. 
However, this did not affect Guangdong NCC’s moving to the next stage. According to the 
Secretary-general, they did not have enough time to re-consider each suggestion and 
advice from different scholars, as they were aiming to meet the deadline in submitting their 
proposal, which was just after the new top leader’s arrival in Tianjin in November 2012 
(Interview with WJS, Tianjin Guangdong NCC). Second, Tianjin Guangdong NCC kept 
informal communication with its “supervision unit” Tianjin ECO and other NCCs in 
Tianjin in order to gain extensive support from them. Officials in Tianjin ECO showed 
interest in this initiative in the beginning, but suggested that this association being 
proposed would be a social organization with a nature of research and consultancy, which 
was beyond their official functions. So they suggested Tianjin Guangdong NCC to discuss 
this idea with Tianjin CAB for more advice (Interview with LX, officials in Tianjin ECO). 
Regarding the communication with other NCCs in Tianjin, Tianjin Shanghai NCC, Tianjin 
Sha’anxi NCC, and Tianjin Inner-Mongolia NCC showed oral support to Tianjin 
Guangdong NCC, but without signing their names in the policy proposal being submitted 
(Interview with HK, Tianjin Guangdong NCC).  
Finally, after rounds of efforts in amending the proposals according to scholarly 
suggestions and coordinating various parties, in January 2013, Tianjin Guangdong NCC 
submitted this policy proposal to Tianjin Municipal Government Office, which was the 
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main department to directly in contact with top leaders in Tianjin Municipal Government 
156 . Tianjin Guangdong NCC, then considered to have finished the procedural work, and 
had to wait for the response from Tianjin Municipal Government Office. However, from 
the perspective of Government Office, due to the busy administrative business in daily 
operation, they could not spare time to interpret each policy proposal to top officials, since 
it was not an emergency issue (Interview with GDJ, scholar in Nankai University). 
Therefore, the proposal was delayed in the Municipal Government Office for a few months. 
During this period, Tianjin Guangdong NCC did not exert any more efforts and missed the 
most important timing to push forward the process of getting this proposal on the local 
policy agenda. Along with the new leader who was also engaged in increasingly busy work 
schedule and policy-making, the chance to put this policy proposal of establishing the 
mechanism to promote social organizations’ cooperation and research into local policy 
agenda was missed. Therefore, Tianjin Guangdong NCC’s attempt to influence this local 
policy decision failed.  
5.6.5 Case analysis 
In the case above, Tianjin Guangdong NCCs did not successfully deliver their policy idea 
to the policy makers in Tianjin, and put it on the policy agenda. According to the empirical 
evidence in the case, I will try to probe and analyze the causes for their failure in lobbying. 
First, Tianjin Guangdong NCC did not engage in this kind of policy issue before, and had 
neither experience about the efficient way of how to put their policy ideas onto the policy 
makers’ agenda, nor the strategy of mobilizing within NCCs in Tianjin and manufacturing 
the network effect. As outlined in the first case of this chapter, Tianjin Guangdong NCC 
was very skilled and experienced in lobbying local officials regarding business cooperation 
and investment attraction. However, its negotiating skills were not transferred to the case 
of regional political or administrative cooperation. For example, when delivering its policy 
proposals, it selected the Tianjin Municipal Government Office, which was not the best 
choice. As Government Office was the main government department to assist the top 
leaders in Tianjin to deal with the more important administrative issues, they did not spare 
time and energy to push forward this policy proposal without enough incentives. Besides, 
                                                 
156 The main function of Tianjin Municipal Government Office is to assist government leaders to deal with 
the requests, decisions and policies from central government, and inquiries regarding policy implementation 
from lower level district government. At the same time, it also deals with the intergovernmental visits of 
other provincial level officials in other regions.  
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Tianjin Guangdong NCC did not exert more effort to push this proposal onto policy 
agenda after they submitted it to the Government Office. In practice, the period of time 
after publicly putting forward a policy idea is a very important time to do mobilization 
through media, public and social networks (Zhu, 2008; Chen, Zhao & Xue, 2010). 
Second, the mechanism of social organizations’ cooperation in the Bohai Sea area was a 
big systematic project and needed efforts from various government departments within 
different provinces, as well as support from social organizations in this area. It is essential 
to undertake years of preparatory work, negotiation and coordination in advance. In this 
case, it was too rushed to prepare and submit the proposal in such a short time. Moreover, 
Tianjin Guangdong NCC put up with this policy idea by itself without acquiring enough 
endorsements from other NCCs, social organizations and local government departments. 
The extent to attract attention from local decision makers was too limited, and local top 
leaders did not pay attention to the proposal. 
Third, the proposal itself had several prominent problems and the key concepts were not 
well elaborated. First of all, the name for the proposed association - the Circum-Bohai-Sea 
Social Organizations’ Economic Development Research Association was hard to 
understand. It could be interpreted as an association focusing on social organizations or 
regional economic development. In the consulting stage, scholars had significantly pointed 
out this problem, but did not catch the attention of Tianjin Guangdong NCC (Interview 
with LMY, scholar in Tianjin University). Moreover, how this proposed association would 
be organized, what were the key missions for this new association, and would its service 
area cover Tianjin or the whole Bohai area, were all questions that remained unanswered 
by Tianjin Guangdong NCC. Further, they appeared unable to make them clear in the 
proposal.  
Finally, what is most important, the bottom-up establishment initiative and business-
oriented network of Tianjin Guangdong NCC were not fully utilized in this case. It was 
doubtless that the biggest strength of Tianjin Guangdong NCC was its connection with 
business circle since establishment and its strong business network. However, in this case, 
their business network was not fully utilized to produce the mass effect. According to 
Kingdon’s Multiple Streams Framework, when the problem stream, the political stream, 
and the policy stream converge, new public policy can emerge and policy change can 
occur (Kingdon, 1995 & 2003). The problem stream recognizes the problems and their 
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nature. The policy stream generates solutions to the problems. The political stream refers 
to people engaging in political activities, which generate the ‘national mood’ (Lv, 2015). 
Analyzing this case, the problem stream and policy stream existed, since there were lots of 
social issues entangled the future of Bohai Sea area’s regional cooperation, and the 
proposal raised by Tianjin Guangdong NCC was a kind of solution aiming at addressing 
these problems by doing some research. However, the political stream was absent in this 
case, as Tianjin Guangdong NCC did not have a strong state network to help with the 
promotion of this policy idea, and its business network did not have sufficient channels to 
influence in this policy sphere regarding regional administrative cooperation. Further, 
Network intensity strategy did not help in this case.  
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Figure 3.2: The member citis of Bohai Rim Mayors' Joint Committee 
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Figure 5.3: The provinces of Bohai Sea area 
5.7 Comparison and analysis 
Comparing these two cases, we can find that in different policy area and different stage of 
policy process, Tianjin Guangdong NCC behaved dramatically different.  
Tianjin Guangdong NCC’s engagement in the local policy process is centered on the 
business cooperation policy area. By providing professional coordinating services, Tianjin 
Guangdong NCC successfully promotes the business cooperation between different 
regions and between foreign enterprises and local governments. It has demonstrated great 
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potential in business cooperation and negotiation. However, when it comes to the regional 
administrative cooperation, like the administrative cooperation in the Bohai Sea area, as 
showed in case 2, it cannot exert the same influence as in the business cooperation sphere. 
It is noteworthy that Tianjin NCC keeps distance from the local states in order to maintain 
its independence and efficiency in serving their membership enterprises and protecting 
their own profit. “Managing governments”157 has indicated what the main features of its 
lobbying approach are in the local policy process. 
There are two more features about Tianjin Guangdong NCC’s lobbying need to be pointed 
out through the comparison of two cases. First, Tianjin Guangdong NCC is not interested 
in exerting influence on the local policymaking and promoting policy change. They would 
rather concentrate on their efforts in achieving preferential policies for membership 
enterprises or promoting the regional business cooperation, so as to improve their capacity 
in professional service. Second, Tianjin Guangdong NCC’s influence in the local policy 
process mainly focus on the local policy implementation especially in the business policy 
sphere. As outlined, in the case of Gree Electrics when looking for a site for new plantation 
in Tianjin it became an increasingly important broker in regional business cooperation, but 
its lobbying strategy and capacity did not work in other policy areas, such as the regional 
administrative cooperation. 
5.8 Conclusion 
Comparing and analyzing Independent NCCs dramatically different performance in 
different policy areas and different stages of policy process, I can see that Independent 
NCC’s business-oriented network secures its resources for lobbying, but its distance from 
local states does not help to build up channels for its lobbying in the local policy process. 
However, local business cooperation policy is an exception. That is because, in business 
policy area, Independent NCCs meet the demands of local officials’ performance in 
growing local GDP. Due to that, Independent NCC’s interests coincide with the interests of 
local governments. They always become the target of cooperation for local governments 
rather than the other way around. Therefore, Independent NCC’s limited state links but 
powerful business networks make it exert some but restricted influence on the local policy 
process.   
                                                 
157 This term was mentioned in the interview with WJS, the secretary-general of Tianjin Guangdong NCC. 
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Chapter 6 Decoupling NCCs’ lobbying in the local policy 
process – the case of Tianjin Zhejiang NCC 
Decoupling NCCs, unlike Coupling NCCs introduced in Chapter 4, are NCCs with an 
intrinsic state linkage and a strong business network relying on both their political and 
economic resources to engage in local governance and the local policy process. 
Decoupling NCCs’ state linkage is intrinsic, because they are mostly top-down initiated 
with support from their governments of origin or host government. They try, however, to 
separate from their official status and build up strong business networks in their later 
development. Because of their strong initial state connections and acquired network 
building strategy, Decoupling NCCs have become one of the most influential types of 
business associations in China.158 
Decoupling NCCs are the most influential NCCs among all the four types, and their 
influence was reflected on the following aspects:  First, Decoupling NCCs kept close 
connections with both home governments and host governments, through numerous 
membership entrepreneurs serving in the local NPC (National People’s Congress) and 
local CPPCC (Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference). This enabled 
Decoupling NCCs to have more chances and channels to engage in local policy process. 
Second, Decoupling NCCs were founded on a strong business network, embracing the 
enterprises with strong economic strength, which indicated that Decoupling NCCs could 
mobilize a large amount of economic resources and demonstrate the collective economic 
advantages in the state-business cooperation and negotiation; third, besides their 
engagement in local politics and business, Decoupling NCCs were also active in trying to 
improve their influence in the local social policy process, with focus on public media, 
philanthropy and social advocacy. In this sense, Decoupling NCCs could influence broader 
policy agenda than other types of NCCs. All these features made Decoupling NCCs a 
promising external actor to the local policy process. However, there were still constraints 
on their independence and limits of their participation in certain policy stages. This chapter 
focuses on Tianjin Zhejiang NCC to exemplify the Decoupling NCC type and illustrate its 
interaction with local state. 
                                                 
158 Interview with WW, YW, in Zheshang Annual conference in Hangzhou, June 2012. 
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Tianjin Zhejiang NCC was a classic Decoupling NCC with interweaving political and 
business network both in Tianjin and Zhejiang, and engaged actively in Tianjin local 
governance and policy process. Tianjin Zhejiang NC was initiated and established by 
Zhejiang’s Provincial Government’s liaison office in Tianjin in 1998, registered in Tianjin 
Municipal Bureau of Social Organizations, and mainly composed of representatives of 
Zhejiang entrepreneurs with their business located in Tianjin. It accepted the ‘guidance’ 
(zhidao) from both Tianjin Economic Cooperation Office and Zhejiang Economic 
Cooperation Office, which means these two departments supervising Tianjin Zhejiang 
NCC in business. Tianjin Zhejiang NCC was regarded as the most influential NCC in 
Tianjin, and its influence was derived from its capacity to mobilize political and economic 
resources within its established network. Tianjin Zhejiang NCC was chosen as an example 
of a Decoupling NCC, for the following reasons. First, Tianjin Zhejiang NCC was top-
down initiated by the Zhejiang’s Tianjin liaison office, which indicated their close relations 
with both Zhejiang government and Tianjin government, and also guaranteed their access 
to policy makers. Second, Tianjin Zhejiang NCC decoupled from government agencies in 
terms of finance, personnel, and administrative hierarchy in 2003, but retained its informal 
links to officialdom, which enabled it to develop its business network without restriction 
whilst retaining their political resources at the same time; third, Zhejiang NCC successfully 
developed its state network and business network, where the state network guaranteed the 
channel for lobbying and the business network guaranteed the resources for lobbying. This 
was quite special in NCCs’ lobbying, and also the main characteristic of Decoupled NCCs’ 
interaction with local states. 
This chapter will outline the current state of Tianjin Zhejiang NCC, with its historical, 
cultural and institutional context, followed by two dimensions of Zhejiang NCC--- its 
establishment initiatives and network strategy. Finally, specific comparative cases will be 
discussed to show how Zhejiang NCC engaged in the local governance and policy process. 
Through case studies, I argue that Decoupling NCCs’ top-down establishment initiatives 
and network strategy with both local state and business contributed to their success in 
exerting influence in the local policy process. To be specific, their connections with local 
states both in origin and network helped to expand the chances and channels of access to 
policy agenda, while their connections with business actors contributed the largest sources 
of resources for lobbying. 
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6.1 The current situation of Tianjin Zhejiang NCC 
Tianjin Zhejiang NCC started from 1998, and evolved from the “Tianjin Zhejiang 
Economic Development Association” which was initiated by the Zhejiang Tianjin Liaison 
Office together with other enterprises and institutions. In 2005, it was officially named 
“Tianjin Zhejiang Economic Development Association - Tianjin Zhejiang Chamber of 
Commerce”. Tianjin Zhejiang NCC was registered with Tianjin Administration Bureau of 
Social Organizations and under the supervision of Tianjin Economic Cooperation Office. 
By 2016, it had around 3000 registered memberships including 2,500 membership 
enterprises, and set up branches like the lighting branch, the Yueqing branch and the 
Taizhou branch, 159  which were industrial and regional branches respectively. Tianjin 
Zhejiang NCC exerted great influence in coordinating business cooperation between 
Tianjin and Zhejiang over the past 18 years, and had become the first five-star social 
organization in Tianjin in 2008.160 It actively participated in attracting investment, serving 
members and involving in charitable activities, and other aspects of local governance. 
Since 2004, it had been designated by Tianjin Government as the representative of 
business attraction in Tianjin and consecutively won the “Special Award of Business and 
Investment Attraction in China”, the “Two-way Service Advanced Unit”, the “Advanced 
Association” and other honorary titles. Besides its engagement in business and politics, 
Zhejiang NCC also actively engaged in welfare causes and other non-profit activity, for 
example it created a 10-million RMB Zhejiang Merchant (Zheshang) special education 
fund, and set up golf, painting, calligraphy and photography clubs in order to enrich the 
leisure life of Zhejiang businesspeople in Tianjin.   
Since China’s reform and opening up in late 1970s, Zhejiang businessmen started to come 
to Tianjin and set up their business. By 2013, there were more than 7,000 enterprises set up 
by Zhejiang entrepreneurs and over 260,000 Zhejiang businessmen working in Tianjin, 
which invested accumulatively 400 billion RMB and contributed 12 billion RMB of tax 
and 700,000 posts for Tianjin.161 Their businesses ranged from real estate, finance, and 
light industry to trade and logistics, high-tech and other fields. Some of them are even 
                                                 
159 Lighting branch was an industrial branch that focused on lighting industry in Tianjin, while the Yueqing 
branch and the Taizhou branch were all regional branches, as Yueqing and Taizhou were both names of 
municipal cities in Zhejiang province. 
160See more details in天津浙江商会积极建设新型异地商会, from 中华工商时报 2016-06-02，
http://www.zytzb.gov.cn/tzb2010/S1818/201606/25b7f6858c5946c59a34efc8f79f2179.shtml , last entry 
06/06/2016. 
161 From Tianjin Economic and Cooperation Office’s statistic yearbook, 2014. 
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famous brands and large enterprises nationwide.162 Among all the migrant business groups 
in Tianjin, Zhejiang group ranked No.1 both in quantity and size.163  Tianjin Zhejiang 
NCC’s mission, according to their constitution, was to unite Zhejiang business people in 
Tianjin, pass on the Zheshang business spirit, deepen Zhejiang business culture and make 
innovative improvement in servicing membership enterprises and two governments in 
Tianjin and Zhejiang.164 
Zhejiang NCC’s development could be separated into two stages with the year of 2003 as a 
milestone. From 1998 to 2003, it had official status and was a de facto GONGO. Since 
Zhejiang NCC was established by Zhejiang’s Tianjin Liaison Office, it not only got 
political support from the official bodies, but also received financial support from Zhejiang 
Economic Cooperation Office.165 During that period, Zhejiang NCC (It was actually called 
Tianjin Zhejiang Economic Development Association then) was working together with 
Zhejiang’s Tianjin Liaison office, with the mission of promoting economic cooperation 
between these two places. Tianjin Zhejiang NCC shared the office, personnel and finance 
with Zhejiang government’s Tianjin Liaison Office, placed its president from officialdom. 
Tianjin Zhejiang NCC and Zhejiang government’s Tianjin Liaison Office overlapped in 
most important practices and operations, such as coordinating the economic cooperation, 
assisting provincial-level officials’ visit, and promoting the investment environments of 
Tianjin and Guangdong. Thus Tianjin NCC lacked the capacity and the resources to 
independently initiate activities. Much of their work was focused on arranging the 
reception of senior leaders’ visits from Zhejiang to Tianjin. In 2003, there appeared quite a 
few voices within academic and official institutions nation-wide to propose the 
“Decoupling Reform” between government agencies and business associations, including 
trade associations and local industrial chambers of commerce. 166  In response to this, 
Zhejiang’s Tianjin Liaison Office carried out the “Decoupling Reform” with Zhejiang 
NCC. Thus Zhejiang NCC got its independence in terms of personnel and finance. 
Especially it had the first ever election within membership enterprises, and elected its first 
                                                 
162 Source from Tianjin Zhejiang NCC’s official website, last entry 30/05/2016. 
163 From Tianjin Guangdong NCC Website, last entry 20/05/2015. 
164 Ibid. 
165 Interview with Tianjin Zhejiang NCC SWP 27/06/2012. 
166 This discussion appeared around the country along with the on-going administrative reform in China at 
that time. During that administrative reform, a lot of local industry bureaus were cancelled, thus the trade or 
industry associations affiliated to these bureaus had to give up their administrative status and became social 
organizations. Because there was no official central policy towards this issue, different provincial 
governments responded to this discussion differently, some governments like Zhejiang government took 
actions the first time, while other government took a rather late action. 
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entrepreneurial president and vice-presidents. However, most of them had already held the 
representative position of Tianjin NPC and CPPCC committee, and had close connections 
with officialdom. Since 2003, Tianjin Zhejiang NCC had entered into a new stage to 
realize operational independence and improve influence. It initiated a great amount of 
networking activities to build up the connections with Zhejiang entrepreneurs and 
promoted investment opportunities to Zhejiang investors and new start-ups. It also 
developed new services for Zhejiang enterprises and business people, like market research, 
assistance with the child care of Zhejiang business people, as well as elderly care. By 
doing this, Zhejiang NCC accumulated great business resources and networks and exerted 
increasing influence on business cooperation between Tianjin and Zhejiang. However, 
Zhejiang NCC had remained in close relations with the Zhejiang’s Tianjin Liaison Office 
and even inherited the traditional function of arranging receptions for high-level leaders’ 
visit to Tianjin. In other words, Zhejiang NCC had successfully kept its original state 
connections in a informal way and greatly expanded its business network within Zhejiang 
entrepreneurs from 2003 to present. 
Tianjin Zhejiang NCC developed its organizational structure following the guidance of 
‘The Provision about Tianjin Non-local Social Groups’ Application for Establishment and 
Registration’ (yidi zaijin shehui tuanti shenqing choubei chengli dengji shishi banfa),167 
which were composed of the general assembly, the president, the board of directors, the 
standing boarder of directors, and the secretariat. Under the secretariat, there were five 
departments in charge of all the routine work, which covered investment, legal rights, 
memberships, promotion and advertisement, and members training. Among all the 
components of Zhejiang NCC, only the secretariat had full-time staff, which made it the 
key department to liaise with all other parts of the NCC. The secretariat was in charge of 
membership management, legal services, public relations, coordinating business 
cooperation, receiving visitors, and organizing meetings and conferences for the Zhejiang 
NCC and other ones designated by Tianjin or Zhejiang governments. In addition, the 
secretariat made great efforts to engage in the liaising activities between enterprises and 
officialdom as well as coordinating the membership enterprises to take initiative in policy 
advocacy and publicity in recent years. 
                                                 
167 See more details in “异地在津社会团体申请筹备成立登记实施办法”. 
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The Secretariat was a permanent institution in Tianjin Zhejiang NCC, responsible for daily 
work and routine activities, and had 22 full-time staff in 2015.168 Zhejiang NCC set up its 
full-time secretariat in 2003 and was the first NCC in Tianjin to be professionally managed 
by a full-time team. The current Secretary-general ZL started her term of office in 2003. 
Before her position as the Executive President and Secretary-General of Zhejiang NCC, 
she also held posts in several official bodies and “United Front”169  (tongyi zhanxian) 
institutions. For example, she served as the member of National Youth Committee, as the 
Vice-President of Tianjin Youth Federation, as a member of Tianjin CPPCC Standing 
Committee, and as a member of the Democratic National Construction Association in 
Tianjin. Interestingly, she was also one of the Executive Directors in Zhejiang Investment 
Holdings Limited.170 The Secretary-general had positions ranging from the official bodies 
to individual enterprises, which also indicated the network strategy of Zhejiang NCC as a 
whole. From membership enterprises to the institutional settings, Zhejiang NCC 
endeavored to build up a strong network within local state and business. 
Zhejiang NCC’s emphasis on building up extensive networks with the state side and the 
market is important. On the one hand, Zhejiang NCC has strong linkage with officialdom, 
which enables them to get access to the policy arena much more easily than any other 
bottom-up NCCs. It was one of the first NCCs established in Tianjin, and initiated from the 
top down by the Zhejiang Government Tianjin Liaison Office. Due to this historical 
government-linked structure, Tianjin Zhejiang NCC kept close relations with both home 
and host governments, which made it convenient for them when dealing with the 
organization’s quotidian operational issues, like the organization’s annual inspection by the 
Tianjin Civil Affairs Bureau (CAB), and activities applications to the Tianjin Economic 
Cooperation Office (ECO). On the other hand, after 2003 Zhejiang NCC started to shift its 
focus to membership enterprises rather than solely maintaining contact with the state. It 
established four key priorities in its routine work:  opening to the outside world, attracting 
investment, serving membership enterprises and devoting to philanthropy. The Secretary-
general and Executive-president ZL, used a metaphor to describe Zhejiang NCC’s role: 
                                                 
168 Interview with SWP of Zhejiang NCC on 27/06//2015. 
169 The United Front Work Department is an agency under the command of the CCP of China. Its main 
function is to manage relations with the non-Communist Party elite, including individuals and organizations 
holding social, commercial, or academic influence, or who represent important interest groups, both inside 
and outside China. In so doing, this institution seeks to ensure that these groups are supportive of and useful 
to Communist Party rule. The United Front work departments were set up in different levels of local 
governments in China,  
170 Source from Tianjin Zhejiang NCC’s official website: 
http://www.tzcc.net.cn/bencandy.php?fid=95&id=783, last entry 06/06/2016. 
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“As a bridge of connecting enterprises and governments and a ligament between 
enterprises, Zhejiang NCC acted as a liaison to pass the thread through the eye of a needle 
and connected all the Zhejiang enterprises in Tianjin which were like the scattered pearls, 
shining separately but without collective effect”.171 
Another way Zhejiang NCC was dedicated to extending its network was to jointly 
interweave a strong ‘Zheshang’ national network with other Zhejiang NCCs in other 
provinces. Relying on the significant political support from local governments, Zhejiang 
NCCs put great efforts in knitting their local, national even international ZheShang 
business network. Since 2010, Zhejiang Government started to encourage and sponsor 
Zhejiang entrepreneurs to do investment return in their hometown. Thus it supported the 
Zheshang assembly at different levels. For example, the World Zhejiang Entrepreneurs 
Convention (shijie zheshang dahui) was the largest and most influential Zheshang event, 
and it was the most important initiative of a strategic platform for the Zhejiang government 
to support innovation and attract investment return. This convention was held biennially 
since 2011, and in 2015 the third convention, the Zhejiang Entrepreneur Federation 
(Zheshang Zonghui) was established and the executive chairman of Alibaba Group Ma 
Yun was elected to be the first president of the Federation.172 Mechanisms like the World 
Zhejiang Entrepreneurs Convention helped Zhejiang NCCs in different places to enhance 
their national even international business network. On top of this, Zhejiang NCCs also 
organized quite a few meetings and conferences every year with the support of the 
Zhejiang Economic Cooperation Office and Zhejiang Federation of Industry. For example, 
the national regular work meetings of the Zhejiang NCCs Secretary-general were held 
annually in different cities and Tianjin Zhejiang NCCs just organized the meeting in May 
2016. 173  Tianjin Zhejiang NCC tried to cooperate with the huge national and even 
international Zheshang Network in order to improve their lobbying capacity and general 
influence. Whether they did the brand building or consolidated Zhejiang merchants’ 
(zheshang) business culture in Tianjin, Tianjin Zhejiang NCC benefitted a lot from the 
great Zheshang network. By strengthening their influence based on business networks and 
substantial economic power as well as the resources they could mobilize in the officialdom, 
                                                 
171 Interview with ZL on 27/06/2012. 
172 Source from the official website of World Zhejiang Entrepreneurs 世界浙商网, http://www.wzs.org.cn, 
last entry on 06/06/2016. 
173 Source from Tianjin Zhejiang NCC news http://www.tzcc.net.cn/bencandy.php?fid=1&id=1455, last entry 
on 06/06/2016. 
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Tianjin Zhejiang NCC exerted significant influence on the local policy process, which will 
be discussed in the following section. 
6.2 The historical and cultural background   
Zhejiang merchants have been regarded as the first merchant group in contemporary China, 
and they have been known as most innovative Chinese merchant group in the European 
business circle. There were more than eight million Zhejiang merchants doing business 
outside Zhejiang by 2012, and the GDP they generated was equal to that of Zhejiang 
province annual total GDP. For centuries, Zhejiang merchants have greatly contributed to 
China’s economic development. 174  Zhejiang merchants (Zheshang), together with 
Guangdong merchants (Yueshang), Shanxi merchants (Jinshang), Anhui merchants 
(Huishang) and Suzhou merchants (Sushang), were collectively known as the “Five 
Merchant Groups” in Chinese history (Wu, 2008).  
Zhejiang Province in east China is regarded as the country's cradle of private enterprise 
and contains the country's largest cluster of small and medium-sized private companies. 
Thanks to the prosperous private sector, “Zhejiang Model” has been recognized within and 
outwith China, and become a new experience of promoting economic development. 
Zhejiang merchants are renowned around the country for their entrepreneurship, 
hardworking attitude and great market knowledge. Zhejiang merchants could be found 
virtually everywhere. Beijing has a "Zhejiang Village" where Zhejiang businessmen sell 
various inexpensive products. In Shanghai, there are more than 50,000 Zhejiang 
enterprises.175 Zhejiang merchants have also established businesses in Europe, Africa, and 
the Middle East. As a group, these businessmen are, to a certain degree, synonymous with 
the business concepts of shrewdness, fortitude and success.  
Even though Zhejiang merchants only became well known during the last few decades, 
their history dates back to 473 BC. Fan Li, the earliest ancestor of Chinese merchants, was 
a famous government official of the Yue state (from 473BC to 306 BC), and was located 
on the site of today's Zhejiang province (Zhu, 2005). Since the Tang Dynasty, China’s 
economic center moved to the south near today’s Jiangsu and Zhejiang provinces. 
Commodity economy started to emerge and there appeared the earliest seeds of capitalism. 
                                                 
174 Source from 浙商网 http://biz.zjol.com.cn, last accessed on 27th June, 2016 
175 Nanhua news, 05/03/2013 doc *5. 
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In Qing Dynasty and early Republic era, Zhejiang merchants became the backbone of 
Chinese industry and commerce. Later in period of the Republic of China, the Zhejiang 
merchant group was the economic foundation of the National Government (Zhu, 2005). 
Since the 18th century, the emergence of capitalism in China and the Shanghai port 
operation opened up the region to the outside world and provided a good opportunity for 
Zhejiang merchants to trade with outside world. Merchants from Ningbo were 
representative of the Zhejiang merchants from an early stage. Rising in prominence during 
the 19th century, they are considered to be the most powerful regional group of merchants 
following the Hui and Shanxi merchants. Their work ethic, their willingness to take risks, 
and their pragmatic approach to business helped them stand out in China's business sector. 
Other parts of Zhejiang, such as Wenzhou, Yiwu, and Taizhou, also boast a tradition of 
business and commerce. It is commonly believed that people in Zhejiang are born 
conscious of market principles and business in general (Wu, 2008).  
Yang Yiqing, the executive director of the Zhejiang Merchants Research Association, said 
that even though there were many differences between each and every individual 
businesspeople from Zhejiang, they all shared one common characteristic:  
"If we have to use one phrase to summarize the general character of Zhejiang 
merchants, I guess ‘grass-roots business people’ would be the most appropriate. 
Most of the successful Zhejiang businessmen have humble beginnings; nearly 80 
percent of them are from farming families, and 70 percent only hold middle school 
diplomas. They start from the bottom of society and have experienced many 
hardships along the way."176 
She explains that just as a camel finds an oasis in the desert by instinct, Zhejiang 
merchants have a similar instinct for discovering markets; hence why they are so good at 
making money.  
"This has a lot to do with the regional culture of Zhejiang, which attaches great 
importance to trade and business from ancient times. Secondly, Zhejiang merchants 
are thought to be pragmatic, low-key, smart and honest when conducting business. 
They are also courageous in taking risks."  
                                                 
176 Interview with YYQ in Hangzhou, 06/07/2012. 
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Over the years, Zhejiang merchants played the role of both cooperators and competitors for 
other traditional merchant groups in the country, such as Shanxi, Hui and Chaozhou 
merchants. They have proven successful in learning from other merchant groups and have 
managed to retain their own uniqueness. Zhejiang province covered only 1.06% of the 
national territory, with its population taking up 4.06% of the whole population in China, 
but it contributed 6.7% to the total GDP, and ranked the fourth highest within the 
country.177 
6.3 The institutional context of Tianjin Zhejiang NCC 
Tianjin Zhejiang NCC has developed very fast and exerted substantial influence in 
Tianjin’s local governance. Its development could not be separated from the support from 
its home government and host government. Talking about the institutional context of 
Tianjin Zhejiang NCC will help us understand how institutional arrangement and policy 
affects NCCs’ lobbying in the local context (Wang, 2014).  
Zhejiang government was known for its innovation and reform in China. It initiated several 
unprecedented policy innovations in China, including the “County directly administrated 
by province” in financial policy and “Promoting public participation in policy process” 
policy (Interview with YJX, Zhejiang University). As early as 1990s, Zhejiang provincial 
government and its municipal city governments started to set up liaison offices and 
economic development associations in different provinces. For example, Zhejiang’s 
Tianjin Liaison Office was set up quite early in 1990s, and Zhejiang NCC’s predecessor 
Tianjin Zhejiang Economic Association was set up in 1998; Ningbo government set up the 
Tianjin Ningbo Economic Development Association in November 1990. 178  These 
institutions had played a significant role in coordinating regional cooperation and helped 
with the private sector’s development and spread nationwide in the early stages of market 
economy. The local states in Zhejiang province kept an open approach to outside world, 
which adapted to the trend of Zhejiang businessmen’s migration around the world, and 
also smoothed the channel for them to explore the new market and start their business 
(Interview with SY& ZDM, Hangzhou Development and Research Center).  
                                                 
177 From www.cribeyondbeijing.com, 2011-11-08 11:24:35.  
178 Source from Tianjin Ningbo NCC website 
http://www.tjnbcc.org/index.php?case=archive&act=list&catid=8, last entry on 06/06/2016. 
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Zhejiang government adopted quite flexible policies towards Zhejiang NCCs’ development 
nation-wide. Zhejiang’s case was quite special in NCCs’ development, due to its 
innovative business culture and prosperous merchant groups in various municipal cities. 
Zhejiang province produced the earliest NCCs in China, like Wenzhou NCCs and Ningbo 
NCCs. When they started to emerge in different cities, there had been no rules and 
regulations to follow. For example, in Tianjin, Tianjin Wenzhou NCC was set up in 1999 
and Tianjin Ningbo NCC was set up in 2001, and they were all established before Tianjin 
Zhejiang NCC in 2003. The rule of “one place one association” in “Administrative 
Measures of Non-local Chamber of Commerce” promulgated in 2001 179 , ruled that 
municipal NCCs in the provincial level established before 2004 could be exempted from 
the rule of “one place one association”; for the future municipal NCCs, it could only be 
established in the same administrative level, or as exist as a branch in the provincial level 
NCC. For example, if Tianjin Wenzhou NCC was established after 2004, it could only be 
the Wenzhou Branch under Tianjin Zhejiang NCC. Therefore, this rule in 2001 did not 
apply in Zhejiang’s case. That was why Tianjin Ningbo NCC, Tianjin Wenzhou NCC and 
Tianjin Zhejiang NCC coexist in Tianjin. Under the coordination of the Zhejiang 
government, these three NCCs realized effective cooperation in Tianjin, in holding 
conferences, sharing business information, and constructing platforms for business 
cooperation. Tianjin Zhejiang NCC even invited Tianjin Wenzhou’s NCC’s president to be 
the Honorary President of Tianjin Zhejiang NCC.180 
The Tianjin government substantially supported Zhejiang NCCs’ development, as reflected 
in the following aspects. First, high-level leaders attended Tianjin NCC’s anniversary 
celebration and other important events. For example, Zhejiang NCC could successfully 
invite the vice-mayor or Chairman of ICF for their annual membership assembly, which 
was rare in other NCCs’ cases.  As Zhejiang NCC had inherited the official duties, such as 
the reception of Zhejiang officials’ visit, and providing assistance to Zhejiang’s liaison 
office in Tianjin and Beijing, it kept a frequent and close interaction with Zhejiang 
officialdom. In order to maintain the good intergovernmental relationships with Zhejiang 
government, the Tianjin local government also emphasized Zhejiang NCC as an important 
platform (Interview with ZJ, official in Tianjin ECO). Second, Zhejiang entrepreneurs 
were the most active and influential merchant group in Tianjin with a high proportion of 
                                                 
179 2001 年颁布的异地商会管理条例, check？ 
180 Interview with SWP on 27/06/2012. 
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Tianjin NPC and CPPCC representatives. For example, the president of Zhejiang NCC 
LLG held simultaneously the positions of member of national CPPCC, vice-president of 
Tianjin ICF and member of the standing committee of the Democratic National 
Construction Association in Tianjin. Being the earliest migrant business group in Tianjin, 
Zhejiang merchants started to come to Tianjin in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and most 
of them had established successful industry by 2000. Later they showed interest in local 
politics and started to acquire political status within local legislative bodies, such as the 
local NPC, CPPCC, United Front bodies, and other democratic parties (Interview with 
LLG, the president of Tianjin Zhejiang NCC). Third, Tianjin government entrusted 
Zhejiang NCC with administrative issues. Zhejiang NCC is a flagship of Tianjin NCCs’ 
development and has always been designated as the representative of Tianjin NCCs in 
experience sharing and policy advocacy. It had become an assistant of Tianjin ECO in 
managing and coordinating private sectors’ development in Tianjin (Interview with LX 
and ZJ, officials in Tianjin ECO). 
As discussed above, Zhejiang NCC developed an open and flexible relationship with both 
sides, namely Zhejiang and Tianjin. As the flagship and cradle of private economy in 
China, Zhejiang government has been open-minded and supportive of institutional 
innovation and policy participation, while, the reason why Zhejiang NCC has got a 
comparative open and democratic environment is due to its nature and behavior coinciding 
with local interests of government agencies. 
6.4 Tianjin Zhejiang NCC’s establishment initiatives 
Tianjin Zhejiang NCC was top-down initiated by the Zhejiang Government Tianjin liaison 
office, named initially Tianjin Economic Development Association (1998 -2003), and 
presided by officialdom. In the beginning, Zhejiang NCC was dominated by the Zhejiang’s 
Tianjin Liaison Office in operation, finance and personnel, and did not have close 
connections with Zhejiang entrepreneurs. In the period between 1998 and 2003, Tianjin 
Zhejiang NCC was financially dependent on Zhejiang’s Tianjin Liaison office, and the 
membership fee only contributed a small proportion to its total revenue. The president was 
designated by the Liaison Office, and there were no full- time staff working in the 
Secretariat (Interview with XXX, official in Zhejiang ECO). At this stage, Tianjin 
Zhejiang NCC had significantly promoted intergovernmental cooperation between Tianjin 
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and Zhejiang, yet most of the negotiation took place at official level, where Tianjin 
Zhejiang NCC operated as a de facto GONGO. In 2003, in response to the transformation 
of government functions and streamlining of government agencies, Zhejiang’s Tianjin 
Liaison office decided to decouple from Tianjin Zhejiang NCC, and give back the 
autonomy to this social organization. The “Decoupling” reform in 2003 gave Tianjin 
Zhejiang NCC the so called “independent” status; however, the strong connection with 
officialdom and state networks remained. This enabled Zhejiang NCC to have more 
opportunities and channels to access policymakers and exert influence on local policy 
process (Interview with ZL, Tianjin Zhejiang NCC). 
6.5 Tianjin Zhejiang NCC’s network strategy 
NCCs’ network strategy indicates the focus and range of NCCs’ network building. Taking 
the focus of network building as the criteria for classification, NCCs’ network strategy 
could be classified as state network oriented and business network oriented. Taking the 
range of network building as the criteria for classification, NCCs’ network strategy could 
be divided into network span and network intensity. For example, if an NCC just focused 
on one type of network, such as state network, its network strategy would be state oriented 
with a focus on network intensity.  
Echoing Tianjin Zhejiang NCC’s development process, its network strategy was also 
divided into two stages. From 1998 to 2003, Tianjin Zhejiang NCC focused on state 
network building, with little attention to liaising with businessmen and the rising Zhejiang 
entrepreneurs. After 2003 when it decoupled from the official liaison office, Tianjin 
Zhejiang NCC shifted its focus on expanding their business network. At the same time 
they retained some of the official duties such as keeping close connections with 
officialdom. Currently, we could see that Tianjin Zhejiang NCC attached importance to 
both state network and business network, just as the vice-secretary-general SWP said in 
2012:  
“We are becoming the indispensable assistant for Tianjin government to manage 
private sectors, which saved quite a lot of energy for them. And at the same time 
we have got great support from private business, and have become the 
representative to voice their opinions, we are happy to build up the mutual trust 
with our membership enterprises.”  
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In order to realize its network strategy in practice, Tianjin Zhejiang NCC strengthened 
their network building capacity, and undertook unprecedented activities to enhance these 
networks. 
Regarding the state network building, Zhejiang NCC strengthened its political lead, 
responded to political slogans, and especially enhanced the political and ideological work, 
setting up party branch and youth league branch within the organization. Since 2002, the 
CPC started developing party organizations within private sectors, and tried to absorb the 
private entrepreneurs to expand their range of party members. In 2012, the 18th party 
congress promulgated the No. 11 document regarding party building work among private 
sectors (non-public economic organizations) and social organizations (two new 
organizations – liangxin zuzhi).181 Since then, many NCCs started party branch building 
work. Business network oriented NCCs like Tianjin Guangdong NCC were not into these 
political proposals; while NCCs with state network orientation, like Tianjin Shanxi NCC 
and Tianjin Zhejiang NCC, took this as an opportunity to enhance their political 
connection with local states. Therefore, Tianjin Zhejiang NCC established the party branch 
and Youth League branch in 2010, and enriched its function in uniting party members and 
Youth League members within membership enterprises (Interview with SWP, Tianjin 
Zhejiang NCC). On top of this, Tianjin Zhejiang NCC emphasized the political status of 
NCC’s leadership. Among its current leadership, there were four people who served as 
vice-presidents of Tianjin ICF, one as a member of national CPPCC, and three as members 
of Tianjin CPPCC Standing Committee. By doing all this political work, Tianjin Zhejiang 
NCC achieved substantial influence within the political arena, and smoothed the channels 
for it to exert policy influence on the local policy process (Interview with ZL, Tianjin 
Zhejiang NCC). 
Regarding the business network building, Tianjin Zhejiang NCC also explored new ways 
to consolidate the connections with business circles both in Tianjin and Zhejiang. It 
gradually constructed eight platforms to serve Zhejiang and Tianjin entrepreneurs, 
including platforms for investment attraction, financing service, legal service, credit check 
services, technology services, young start-up services, “Internet” service and 
internationalization services. It was noteworthy that some of these services did help 
membership enterprises to survive during difficult periods. For example, after the 2008 
                                                 
181 Source from the Communist Party Congress news website: 
http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/67481/89000/89001/100587/101410/, last entry on 08/06/2016. 
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economic crisis, many private enterprises faced financial problems. Due to restrictions to 
bank loans, lots of enterprises were at the risk of capital chain breaking. In this situation, 
Tianjin Zhejiang NCC established the long-term cooperation with banks such as the Bank 
of Zheshang and the ICBC to offer guarantees for membership enterprises, and helped 
them to successfully get loans to achieve the transformation and upgrading (Ibid.). Another 
example was that it timely grasped the youth entrepreneurship through providing a 
platform for new start-ups and mature investors. Since 2014, China entered into the era of 
mass entrepreneurship, and thousands of young entrepreneurs appeared to demonstrate 
potential in the future market. Different from the old generation of Zhejiang merchants, 
these young Zhejiang entrepreneurs were more adaptive to Internet usage, globalization 
and high-tech industries (Ibid.). To adapt to this new situation, Tianjin Zhejiang NCC 
pragmatically tailored their financing and internationalization services for young 
entrepreneurs and helped them connect with the ideal investors. These young Zhejiang 
entrepreneurs also enriched Tianjin Zhejiang NCC’s business network (Interview with 
TML, the member of Tianjin Zhejiang NCC). 
To sum up, Tianjin Zhejiang NCC undertook a network span strategy focusing on both 
state and business network building. It simultaneously adopted state a network oriented 
and business network oriented strategy, and tried to expand its network span between state 
and society in order to maximize its ability to mobilize resources within these networks.  
6.6 Comparative case analysis: Decoupling NCCs’ influence in 
the lcoal policy process 
6.6.1 Case selection 
Tianjin Zhejiang NCCs’ top-down establishment initiatives and network span strategy 
have affected their way of lobbying with the local state. Unlike Shanxi NCC and 
Guangdong NCC introduced in Chapters 4 and 5, Zhejiang NCC has held sustainable 
political channels and political resources, which demonstrated a significantly different 
mechanism of lobbying in the specific policy cases. Generally speaking, Zhejiang NCCs’ 
engagement in the local policy process is much broader in policy areas and policy stages. 
However, its participation is to a certain degree dominated by governmental agencies and 
political orientation.  
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In this section, I choose two cases to show Tianjin Zhejiang NCCs’ interaction with local 
policymakers in Tianjin. The first one is the Blue-seal Household Registration Policy in 
Tianjin, where Tianjin Zhejiang NCC worked together with the media and individual 
lobbying to get the case on the policy agenda. The second case is Tianjin Zhejiang NCCs’ 
interaction with local governments in putting their business initiatives into practice, where 
Tianjin Zhejiang NCC demonstrated its influence in local policy implementation, 
especially in the business policy sphere.  
6.6.2 Case 1 Blue-seal Household Registration Policy in Tianjin 
The Blue-seal household registration policy (lanyin hukou) was introduced in Tianjin in 
1994. As discussed in chapter 2, the household registration (hukou) is very important for 
people living in China, as it determines whether they can enjoy the residential treatment 
and welfare in the cities they live in, in terms of social pension insurance, medical care, 
education, etc. The Blue-seal household registration was a household registration in-
between temporary household registration and official household registration. As the 
Public Security Bureau used a blue-seal to stamp this kind of household registration, it 
became known as “Blue-seal Household Registration”. According to “the Interim 
Provisions on the Blue-seal household registration management”182 promulgated in 1995 in 
Tianjin, the scope of Blue-seal household registration in the initial stage only included one 
type, that is the introduction of talent. In order to attract talented people to work in Tianjin, 
Tianjin government offered a Blue-seal household registration to this group of non-local 
people. Later on, around 2000, the scope of Blue-seal household registration applicants 
was expanded to include non-local entrepreneurs with large investment in Tianjin, and 
people who purchased properties in Tianjin to settle there (Interview with ZL, Tianjin 
Zhejiang NCC). In most cities that carried out Blue-seal policy, the Blue-seal household 
registration holder could apply for the official household registration after two years of 
residence in the city without any criminal record or the violation of “one child” policy.183 
China's first Blue-seal household registration appeared around 1992, and initially most of 
them existed in the small and medium-sized cities. After 1994, cities like Beijing, 
Shanghai, Shenzhen, Tianjin and Guangzhou started to implement this policy. In many 
                                                 
182 See details of this provision, refer to “the Interim Provisions on the Blue-seal household Management”, 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/house/tj/2013-12-23/c_118670650.htm, last accessed on 27th July, 2016 
183 In 1990s, the “one child” policy was the policy redline, its implementation was connected with lots of 
other policies at the local level in order to ensure the enforcement of this policy. 
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places, this policy became one of the means of real estate sales. For example, the Blue-seal 
household registration policy introduced in Guangzhou in 1998 was initially intended to 
contribute to reducing the backlog of vacant commercial housing in Guangzhou, to 
stimulate the real estate market, and thus boost local economic development.184 However, 
after 2000, since the big cities encountered problems of  population overload beyond their 
carrying capacities, Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Shenzhen and other places started to 
cancel this Blue-seal household registration policy.185 Besides, in recent years, the central 
government has gradually liberalized the city policy of settling in small and medium-sized 
cities, and the city house buyers can be settled through applying directly for official 
household registration (Interview with HSJ, Tianjin Wenzhou NCC). This indicated that 
the Blue-seal household registration policy, which had been implemented for almost 20 
years, was coming to an end. By 2012, Tianjin was the only city retaining the Blue-seal 
account policy in China.186 
Similar to other cities, the maximum demands of Blue-seal household registration came 
from the immigrants for College Entrance Examination (Gaokao) and medical care.187  
According to recent data, during the past twenty years, Tianjin government approved a 
total of 312,687 applicants of various types of Blue-seal household registrations.188 But 
why did Tianjin become the only city to have kept this Blue-seal household registration 
policy? The reasons could be traced back to the institutional context in Tianjin and 
stakeholders’ significant lobbying towards the maintenance of this policy. It was 
noteworthy that Tianjin Zhejiang NCC was one of the most influential stakeholders in this 
policy case. On the one hand, from the perspective of local governments, compared to 
other big cities like Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou, the economic development rate of 
Tianjin was relatively low. In order to boost economic development, Tianjin municipal 
government utilized the existing policy and introduced new policies to stimulate the local 
economy. As the Blue-seal household registration policy significantly contributed to real 
estate sales in Tianjin, Tianjin government was reluctant to cancel it following other cities’ 
                                                 
184 Source from蓝印户口被重提以救房市 支持反对者各半, http://www.sina.com.cn  25th October, 2008 
185 Source from天津蓝印户口馅饼变陷阱, 想转常住户不容易, 2013 年 07月 27日 经济观察报, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/china/20130727/002516258450.shtml, last accessed on July 27, 2016. 
186 Ibid. 
187 The immigrants for College Entrance Examination (Gaokao), is called “gaokaoyimin” in China, which 
means the students and their parents migrating to another city for the benefits of Gaokao through buying 
houses in the target city.  The logic for people seeking for medical care is the same. 
188 Source from天津蓝印户口实行近 20年：已演变为“升学利器”, 2014 年 04月 20日, 新华网, 
http://www.chinanews.com/gn/2014/04-20/6084153.shtml, last accessed on June 12, 2015。 
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steps. However, this policy started to contradict with the city’s development and Tianjin 
residents’ interests and thus there were many problems in the implementation process, 
which will be introduced below (Interview with LWK, Tianjin Social Organization 
Management Bureau). On the other hand, from the perspective of stakeholders, which 
mainly included the current Blue-seal household registration holders and other non-local 
people who wanted to apply for this, these stakeholders carried out quite a lot of lobbying 
activities to stop this policy from being abolished in Tianjin. In this process, Tianjin 
Zhejiang NCC became a lead in this policy campaign.   
As outlined before, Tianjin Zhejiang NCC was quite broadly engaged in the social 
activities and local governance in Tianjin. There were more than 200,000 Zhejiang people 
residing in Tianjin in 2012, some of them already acquired the official household 
registration, some held the Blue-seal household registration, and the rest of them did not 
have the household registration “hukou”. As individual membership of Tianjin Zhejiang 
NCC or the employees in the Zhejiang NCCs’ membership enterprises, these non-local 
Zhejiang people took Tianjin Zhejiang NCC as a platform to collectively express their 
interests and voice their opinions. As an organization representing the interests of 
membership enterprises, Tianjin Zhejiang NCC mobilized all the resources within their 
state network and business network to exert influence on this specific policy process 
(Interview with ZL, Tianjin Zhejiang NCC). 
In 2009, after the 2008 financial crisis, the Blue-seal household registration policy became 
the focus of discussion in Tianjin. This was because the Tianjin government relaxed the 
policy of Blue-seal household registration in 2009 to stimulate the sluggish real estate 
market, but this action to rescue the property market was criticized by public opinion.189 
One interviewee said:  
“Such a policy will lead to problems in employment, health care, education and 
other issues, in particular, will lead to reduction of occupancy of educational 
resources and educational opportunities, which is both unfair to the people of 
Tianjin. Moreover, Tianjin will come across increasing urban pressure in the 
next few years or ten years” (Interview with DJY, a resident in Tianjin). 
                                                 
189Source from 特别调查:蓝印户口天津独舞, 2012 年 04月 18日, 法治周末, 
http://news.ifeng.com/shendu/fzzm/detail_2012_04/18/13978961_1.shtml, last accessed on July 27, 2016. 
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It was evident that abandoning the Blue-seal policy helped the real estate market, 
stimulated the economy, and attracted talented people to work in Tianjin, but it also 
contradicted the interests of Tianjin residents. It was at this time that this policy had been 
criticized as a policy that hindered the reform of household registration system in China. 
Under internal and external pressure, Tianjin Municipal Government decided to convene 
the relevant government departments to restart the assessment of this long-existing policy 
(Interview with ZJ, official in Tianjin ECO).  
From 2010, Tianjin Zhejiang NCC started to engage in this policy case and exerted 
significant influence on the interaction with local state and society. In the following text I 
chronologically introduce Tianjin Zhejiang NCCs’ lobbying behavior and outcome. There 
are few written materials about Tianjin Zhejiang NCCs’ engagement in this case, thus most 
of the empirical evidence used here were based on the interview and observation I 
conducted in the fieldwork between 2011 and 2012.  
First, in early 2010, Tianjin Zhejiang NCC organized a workshop among member 
enterprises regarding this issue and invited local journalists to report the discussion on the 
meeting (Interview with SWP, Tianjin Zhejiang NCC). As introduced before, Tianjin 
Zhejiang NCC had its own public relations office, which was in charge of coordinating the 
media coverage in this case. Due to its coordination, the mainstream media coverage of 
this workshop was towards the direction of affirming the positive role of this Blue-seal 
policy. As a result of Tianjin NCCs’ engagement in the discussion of the policy, more 
debates appeared in the Tianjin’s local media and online forums, and it became the focus 
of public opinion and part of a heated debate again.  
Second, after the success in organization the workshop, Tianjin Zhejiang NCC delegated a 
research team to carry out an investigation survey among individual members and 
membership enterprises, which mainly focused on gathering the opinions towards the 
Blue-seal household registration policy from non-local entrepreneurs and employees. Then 
based on the survey data, the research team drafted a white paper report, which 
systematically analyzed the advantages and disadvantages of abolishing or retaining this 
policy from the point view of foreign investors and non-local entrepreneurs. This report 
was initially forwarded to Tianjin Wenzhou NCC, Tianjin Ningbo NCC, Tianjin Fujian 
NCC, etc. seeking advice and feedback. After acquiring other NCCs’ signature support, the 
report was quickly submitted to Tianjin Land Resources and Housing Bureau, Tianjin 
Chapter 6 
 179 
Public Security Bureau, Tianjin ECO, and Tianjin CAB respectively, in the name of 
“providing consulting information for future policy making” (Interview with ZL, Tianjin 
Zhejiang NCC).  
Third, after submitting the investigation report to all relevant government departments, 
Tianjin Zhejiang NCC started to lobby within its state network. First of all, they contacted 
the officials of their closest partner and initiator – Zhejiang Government’s Tianjin Liaison 
Office, and secured their support in relation to this policy issue. Most importantly, the 
Liaison Office, acting as an intermediary, introduced Tianjin NCCs’ investigation report to 
Tianjin Government Office.190  The Tianjin Government Office was the main department 
to promulgate and supervise the implementation of this Blue-seal household registration 
policy. Until then, Tianjin Zhejiang NCCs’ policy idea was successfully delivered to the 
key policymakers in the main government department. However, their efforts did not stop 
there; they continued to keep informal meetings and communications with relevant 
departments, like the Tianjin Land Resources and Housing Bureau, Tianjin Public Security 
Bureau, Tianjin ECO, and Tianjin CAB, etc. to seek their views on the Blue-seal 
household registration policy and enlist their support. As mentioned by interviewees in 
Tianjin ECO and Tianjin CAB, Tianjin Zhejiang NCC kept them updated with the progress 
made from submitting the report until the decision of sustaining Blue-seal policy was 
finally made at the end (Interview with ZJ in Tianjin ECO, and FXZ in Tianjin CAB). 
At the end of 2012, a decision was made to retain the existing Blue-seal household policy 
until the conditions191 no longer permitted. Tianjin Zhejiang NCCs successfully lobbied in 
this policy case by significantly utilizing its state network and business network together. It 
should be noted that the Blue-seal household registration policy in Tianjin was finally 
abolished on May 31st, 2014, as Tianjin has established multi-level access channels to 
household registration. The new residence-permit system and points settled policy started 
to be implemented from January 1st, 2014.192 On the 30th of July 2014, the State Council 
promulgated “Opinions on Further Promoting the Reform of the Household Registration 
System” (guanyu jinyibu tuijin hujizhidu gege de yijian), which announced the official end 
                                                 
190 One function of Tianjin Government Office was to deal with the high-level officials visit from other 
provinces, which coincided with one of the most important functions of Zhejiang’s Liaison office in Tianjin. 
Therefore, these two department kept very good relations during daily operations. 
191 Conditions like new law or regulations being promulgated are contradicting this Blue-seal Policy and do 
not allow it to continue exist. 
192天津 5月将取消蓝印户口政策, 或引发津郊楼市降价, 2014 年 04月 18日,京华时报, 
http://politics.people.com.cn/n/2014/0418/c1001-24914910.html, last accessed on 20th June, 2016 
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of the Blue-seal household registration policy nationwide. 193  By then, the Blue-seal 
household registration that had existed in China for more than twenty years finally bid 
farewell. 
6.6.3 Case analysis 
In the case of Blue-seal household registration policy, Tianjin Zhejiang NCC showed a 
skillful lobbying strategy and behavior in terms of creating public opinion effect, looking 
for alliances and directly contacting decision-makers. During the whole lobbying process, 
Tianjin Zhejiang NCCs’ top-down establishment initiatives and its network strategy 
focusing on both state network and business network played the determining role towards 
its success in the lobbying.  
First, in order to pressurize decision-makers within the government, Tianjin Zhejiang NCC 
used its strength in public relations management to manufacture the media effect and cause 
public discussion. In this way, the public had a strong awareness regarding this policy，
and the decision-makers were under the spotlight and had to make decisions and respond 
to public concerns in a short period of time. Thus, this social mobilization through media 
coverage created a favorable atmosphere for Tianjin Zhejiang NCC. 
Second, Tianjin Zhejiang NCC successfully found the alliances to jointly submit their 
investigation report to relevant government departments. Seeking for endorsement from 
other NCCs, not only improved the intensity of the proposal, but also reduced the risk of 
being blamed from its members and the local government. More importantly, with the 
signature supports from quite a few NCCs in Tianjin, this investigation report represented 
to a certain degree the voice of non-local business associations. As non-local entrepreneurs 
were very important resource for local economic development, the Tianjin government 
was forced to seriously consider their suggestions and eventually did not make decisions at 
the cost of the local economic interests. 
The reason why Tianjin Zhejiang NCC could finish the investigation report and gain 
supports from peer NCCs was attributed to its strong network in the local business circle. 
                                                 
193 蓝印户口正式退出历史舞台 天津最后一个终结此政策, 2014 年 08月 03 日,中国青年报, 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/finance/2014-08/03/c_126826467.htm, last accessed on 27th July, 2016 
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In this case, Tianjin Zhejiang NCC did policy lobbying in order to represent the interests of 
non-local entrepreneurs and employees in Tianjin (not just limited within Zhejiang 
immigrants), which indicated its close relationship with membership enterprises and 
individual members. Through this case, Tianjin Zhejiang NCC received unprecedented 
reputation among membership enterprises and business networks (Interview with LY, 
Tianjin Wenzhou NCC). 
Third, Tianjin Zhejiang NCC’s strategy of mobilizing its state network significantly 
contributed to the good result of this lobbying approach. Zhejiang Government’s Tianjin 
Liaison office as the most important state network of Tianjin Zhejiang NCC, played an 
indispensable role in this lobbying case. As the initiator and sponsor of Tianjin Zhejiang 
NCC, the Liaison Office successfully connected Tianjin Zhejiang NCC with the key 
decision-makers in Tianjin Government Office. This was the direct channel to deliver 
policy ideas in this case. Accompaning with other indirect channels through Tianjin Land 
Resources and Housing Bureau, Tianjin Public Security Bureau, Tianjin ECO, and Tianjin 
CAB, Tianjin Zhejiang NCC made full use of its state network in this case. Therefore, we 
could conclude that Tianjin Zhejiang NCC’s state network secured the channels to have its 
policy proposal reached the policy makers and eventually led to policy changes. 
6.6.4 Case 2 Tianjin Zhejiang NCC’s new business initiatives in Tianjin  
On top of their wide engagement in local governance and social policy, Tianjin Zhejiang 
NCC was a pioneer in introducing new business initiatives and putting them into practice. 
For example, Tianjin Zhejiang NCC was the first NCC in Tianjin to build up its own 
building - Zhejiang Merchants Building (zheshang dasha), and the first NCC to initiate to 
establish the commercial bank for Zhejiang merchants –Zheshang Bank (zheshang yinhang) 
(Interview with LX, officials in Tianjin ECO). Different from Guangdong NCC in 
promoting business cooperation between enterprises and local governments, Tianjin 
Zhejiang NCC focused on improving cohesion and cooperation among Zhejiang merchants 
in Tianjin, aiming to build up the increasingly influential “Zhejiang Merchant (Zheshang)” 
Brand. In the process of putting up with these business initiatives and realising these ideas, 
Tianjin Zhejiang NCC interacted with local government departments and district level 
government frequently, and influenced the local policy implementation.  
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One example of Tianjin Zhejiang NCC’s positive role in putting up new business 
initiatives was the experiment of establishing mutual-aid type of financial instituions 
within their membership enterprises. After the 2008 financial crisis, quite a number of 
small and medium-sized Zhejiang enterprises (SME) in Tianjin were hit with challenges in 
manufacturing and sales. Some of them faced the serious problem with corporate finance. 
In order to avoid the risk of funding strand breaks, these SMEs asked help from Tianjin 
Zhejiang NCC. Tianjin Zhejiang NCC had always been very good in responding 
membership enterprises’ requests, and organizing workshops or seminars on the issues that 
membership enterprises were struggling with. In this case, facing the requests from 
membership enterprises, Tianjin Zhejiang NCC initiated the establishment of microcredit 
financial institutions within NCCs to deal with enterprises’ financial problems. In 2010, a 
small cooperative financial institution – Tianjin Zheshang Financial Group was established 
within membership enterprises of Tianjin Zhejiang NCC. This small financial institution 
exclusively provided financial services to Zhejiang enterprises and entrepreneurs, with the 
mission of collectively responding to the challenges from external and international 
markets. The operation of this small financial institution was like this: when a membership 
enterprise encountered financial problems and needed to raise funds from this financial 
group, it needed to apply both at the Tianjin Zhejiang NCC and the Tianjin Zheshang 
Financial Group. Tianjin Zhejiang NCC was responsible for checking its member credit 
history and decided whether they wanted to be this enterprise’s guarantor in this lending 
relationship. The financial group could lend the funds only on condition that the Tianjin 
Zhejiang NCC was the guarantor. In this way, membership enterprises helped each other to 
survive in the most difficult time and minimized any risks through Tianjin Zhejiang NCC. 
This was one example of “doing big things by holding together”, as stated by the president 
of Tianjin Zhejiang NCC (Interview with LLG, Tianjin Zhejiang NCC). 
Another example was the construction of Zhejiang Merchant Building (zheshang dasha) in 
the Binhai New Area. In this case, they negociated with local district government to get the 
central piece of land, and their plan for this area was integrated into the national plan for 
Binhai CBD area in Tianjin. 
In the above two examples, Tianjin Zhejiang NCC sought support from the local 
government, especially their preferential policy in terms of tax rebate, infrastructure 
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service, etc., and demonstrated significant influence on the interaction with local states in 
relation to policy implementation.  
6.7 Comparison and analysis  
Tianjin Zhejiang NCC’s influence on the local policy process is much broader in policy 
areas and policy stages. Its policy engagement is not just limited within the business area, 
but expanded to a wide range of social policies, such as household registration and other 
social welfare issues. Besides, its influence in the local policy process is not constrained 
within the stage of local policy implementation, but extended to creating policy agendas 
and influencing policymakers’ decisions.  
Among all the four types of NCCs, only this Decoupling NCC - Tianjin Zhejiang NCC has 
demonstrated the typical policy lobbying. Tianjin Zhejiang NCC has successfully 
influenced the local policymakers to sustain the controversial Blue Seal household 
registration policy in Tianjin. And it has interacted extensively with local government in 
local business policy implementation in terms of putting its new business initiatives into 
practice. This indicates that Tianjin Zhejiang NCC has been exerting influence on both 
local policymaking and policy implementation, and demonstrates the potential of 
Decoupling NCC to become a promising external actor in the local policy process. 
However, there are still great constraints on their independence and limits to their 
participation in certain policy area and stages. 
6.8 Conclusion 
Why do the Decoupling NCCs develop a strong lobbying capacity and exert influence? 
The reason can be explored in terms of their origins and networks. Decoupling NCCs focus 
on building both state and business networks. In the process of exerting their influence on 
the local policy process, their state network guarantees the channels for lobbying, and their 
business network guarantees the resources for lobbying. To be specific, Decoupling NCCs’ 
state links from “origin” and “network” secure the opportunities and multi-channels for 
them to access the local policy process and approach local policymakers. Moreover, their 
acquired strong business networks secure the biggest resource to be mobilized in the 
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lobbying process. This special mechanism can also be summarized as the main 
characteristic of Decoupling NCCs’ interaction with local states. 
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Chapter 7 Conclusion 
The final chapter of this thesis will draw together the discussion and provide an answer to 
the question of what NCCs are, how they exert influence on the local policy process and 
what explains the variation of their influence. This chapter is set out as follows: First, it 
will briefly present NCCs’ emergence and development in China, and the variation of their 
development. Second, it will illustrate the main findings of this research by discussing how 
NCCs influence the Chinese local policy process and what explains the difference in NCCs’ 
lobbying outcomes. This will be followed by a discussion of the limitations of previous 
studies. Third, it will introduce other interesting points through the comparison of different 
types of NCCs. Then I will detail how my study of NCCs contributes to an understanding 
of NCCs’ lobbying in China and how it contributes to existing studies of external actors’ 
influence on the Chinese local policy process. Further, I will outline how my thesis 
contributes to the understanding of China’s local policy process. Finally, I will 
demonstrate the limitations of this research, and the thesis will finish with some final 
comments and suggestions on future research.  
7.1 How did NCCs emerge and develop 
7.1.1 NCCs’ emergence and development 
As a new burgeoning business association, NCCs started to emerge in China in 1995. 
NCC’s emergence was one of the consequences of private sector development in China, 
but the direct cause can be attributed to the push efforts from non-local business people 
and support from Chinese local governments. The interests of non-local entrepreneurs 
coincided with the interests of local governments, which led to the rapid development of 
NCCs around China during mid-1990s. Nevertheless, NCCs’ emergence was still plagued 
with obstacles and involved negotiations with their home and host local governments. This 
initial lobbying led to variation in NCCs’ development in terms of their growth mode and 
behavior strategies.  
NCCs’ emergence in China follows a trajectory from south to north, from east to west. 
Non-local Wenzhou NCCs were the pioneers of all NCCs in China, in terms of legislation, 
relations with local states, lobbying behaviors and network building activities. In this piece 
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of research, Wenzhou NCCs have been introduced as an example of the earliest and most 
prominent NCCs in China nation-wide, where the role of their home government - 
Wenzhou government has been discussed as well. 
In spite of the factors of non-local business people and support from their home 
governments, the local institutional context is also a significant factor in NCCs’ 
development. In order to show how regional factors affecting NCCs’ development, Tianjin 
and Hangzhou, which represent a more state-dominated economy versus a more private 
sector economy, were chosen as two case localities to illustrate NCCs’ development in 
China.  
7.1.2 The variation of NCCs’ development 
NCCs’ development in China has demonstrated great variation. This variation is not just 
reflected on the aspects of their registration, organizational structure, growth mode and 
behavior strategy, but also reflected on their interaction with local states, as well as their 
political engagement. NCCs political engagement varied according to the changes in 
regions, industries and policy spheres. In order to understand and explain this variation, a 
theoretical framework is needed. 
7.1.3 NCCs’ typology 
Based on the existing literature on business lobbying and empirical findings from my 
fieldwork, this research has developed a typology based on NCCs’ two important 
dimensions – “Origin and Network”. According to these two dimensions, all the NCCs are 
categorized as four types: Independent NCC, which was illustrated using the case of 
Tianjin Guangdong NCC; Coupling NCC, illustrated using the case of Tianjin Shanxi NCC; 
Decoupling NCC, illustrated using the case of Tianjin Zhejiang NCC; and Dependent NCC 
with a representative of Tianjin Sha’anxi NCC, that was not illustrated in case chapters, 
but will be explained later in this chapter. 
NCCs in China range along a spectrum in terms of their relationship with the local states. 
For example, among the above four types of NCCs, Dependent NCCs are the closest NCC 
to the local state whilst Independent NCCs are the furthest NCC from local state. Coupling 
NCC and Decoupling NCC are the ones in-between. Existing studies have showed that 
Chapter 7  
 187 
state links play an important role in these organizations’ influence on the policy process. 
Yet, it still remains unknown what kind of state links can exert the biggest influence; 
would it be the closest links or the ones neither too far nor too close? In this research, I 
used case studies to examine the influence of different types of NCCs on the local policy 
process, aiming to explore the kind of relationship the grass-root NCCs keep with the local 
states, in order to maximize their influence of lobbying.  
 
Figure 4.1: The spectrum of NCCs' distance from the state 
7.2 Main findings: NCCs’ influence in the local policy process 
The main research questions for this thesis are: how do NCCs influence the Chinese local 
policy process and what explains the differences of their lobbying outcome.  Further I set 
out to explain what shapes their success in lobbying. In the following section I embark on 
answering these questions. 
7.2.1 How do NCCs influence the Chinese local policy process 
NCCs have developed unique ways to influence local policy process, which is different 
from that of environmental NGOs, think tanks, and national level state-affiliated business 
associations. Besides, the local level of policy process in China is different from that in the 
central level. In the local policy process, it is rare to see obvious and grand policy change, 
but lots of policy changes take place at the implementation stage, thus external actors’ 
influence on the local policy process was hard to examine.  
NCCs’ influence on the local policy process was embedded in the interaction with local 
states. This complexity has brought challenges for researchers. Yet examining the process 
of NCCs’ interaction with local states would fulfill the details of local policy process and 
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elaborate on how policy influence has taken place at the local level. In their interaction 
with local states, different type of NCCs take different approaches to exerting influence, 
focusing on how they interweave the networks and mobilize resources. In summary, based 
on the different historical and institutional context, different types of NCCs are looking for 
the best method to maximize their influence. Coupling NCCs sacrifice their autonomy, 
Decoupling NCCs give up some of their state links, and Independent NCCs try to focus on 
a specific goal or limit their influence on a specific policy sphere and area. For example, as 
outlined in previous chapters, Tianjin Shanxi NCCs sacrificed their autonomy in the 
“coupling” process, Tianjin Zhejiang NCC gave away part of their state links in the 
“decoupling” process, and Tianjin Guangdong NCC limited their lobbying behavior within 
the area of business cooperation and negotiations.  
7.2.2 Origin and network: explaining the difference in NCCs’ lobbying 
outcomes 
Variations of NCCs’ influence are revealed. Some NCCs demonstrate success in lobbying 
while others do not, even if in the same policy sphere. Some NCCs exert more significant 
influence than others, even if in the same local context. Independent NCC demonstrate 
strengths in some policy areas; for example, Guangdong NCC is more capable of 
influencing regional business cooperation, but silent in political or administrative 
cooperation. Coupling NCCs and Decoupling NCCs engage in much broader issues in 
local governance and policy process, like household policy (Zhejiang NCC’s case on Blue 
Seal household registration), private sector’s employee welfare policy (Shanxi NCC’s case 
on labor law’s local implementation). However, Coupling NCCs do not deliver successful 
lobbying due to their close links with the local states, while Decoupling NCCs demonstrate 
potential and strength in both local policymaking and policy implementation.  
Coupling NCCs’ influence in the local policy process 
Coupling NCCs are engaged in the local policy process by binding with the local party-
state in terms of party cell organization construction as demonstrated in chapter 4, assisting 
local government to straighten out the state-business relations, etc. As outlined in Chapter 
4, “Managing the bosses”194 summarizes the character of Coupling NCCs local political 
                                                 
194 This term was mentioned and emphasized several times in the interview with ZSL, the president of Tianjin 
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engagement. However, Coupling NCCs do not carry out the typical independent lobbying 
in the sense that we would usually think of it. In their interaction with the local state, 
Coupling NCCs have gained influence and raised their influence in the local governance. 
For instance, Shanxi NCC has been chosen by the local state as the model of “social 
organization construction in the new era”.195  
Nevertheless, Coupling NCCs’ influence on the local policy process is not successful. First, 
the leadership of Coupling NCCs do not have strong incentives and motivation to influence 
the local policy. Second, its network resources to be mobilized for lobbying are limited. 
Most importantly, due to the state-network oriented strategy, Coupling NCCs get too close 
to the state, which has wrecked their lobbying motivation and capacities. Hence, even 
though Coupling NCCs are established as a “bottom-up” initiative with a grass-root base, 
their network strategy has directly affected their capacity to influence the Chinese local 
policy process.   
Therefore, as outlined in Chapter 4, Coupling NCCs’ influence on the local policy process 
is summarized as follows: Coupling NCCs’ strategy of binding with local party-state did 
broaden the channel for their participation in the local policy process. However, due to the 
fact that the channel only covered specific issues, Coupling NCCs’ influence was quite 
limited within specific policy areas and could not exert influence more widely.  
Independent NCCs’ influence in the local policy process 
Independent NCCs’ engagement in the local policy process is centered on the business 
cooperation policy area. By providing professional coordinating services, Independent 
NCCs successfully promote the business cooperation between different regions and 
between foreign enterprises and local governments. They have demonstrated great 
potential in business cooperation and negotiation. However, when it comes to the regional 
administrative cooperation, like the administrative cooperation in the Bohai Sea area, as 
showed in chapter 5, they cannot exert the same influence as in the business cooperation 
sphere. It is noteworthy that Independent NCCs keeps distance from the local states in 
order to maintain its independence and efficiency in serving their membership enterprises 
                                                 
195 Interview with ZJ, official in Tianjin ECO. 
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and protecting their own profit. “Managing governments”196 has indicated what the main 
features of their lobbying approach are in the local policy process. 
There are two more features about Independent NCCs’ lobbying need to be pointed out. 
First, Independent NCCs are not interested in exerting influence on the local policymaking 
and promoting policy change. They would rather concentrate on their efforts in achieving 
preferential policies for membership enterprises or promoting the regional business 
cooperation, so as to improve their capacity in professional service. Second, Independent 
NCCs’ influence in the local policy process mainly focuses on the local policy 
implementation especially in the business policy sphere. As outlined in chapter 5, in the 
case of Gree Electrics when looking for a site for new plantation in Tianjin, Tianjin 
Guangdong NCC became an increasingly important broker in regional business 
cooperation, but its lobbying strategy and capacity did not work in other policy areas, such 
as the regional administrative cooperation. 
Comparing and analyzing Independent NCCs’ dramatically different performance in 
different policy areas and different stages of policy process, I can see that Independent 
NCCs’ business-oriented network secures their resources for lobbying, but their distance 
from local states does not help to build up channels for their lobbying in the local policy 
process. However, local business cooperation policy is an exception. That is because, in 
business policy area, Independent NCCs meet the demands of local officials’ performance 
in growing local GDP. Due to that, Independent NCCs interests coincide with the interests 
of local governments. Independent NCCs always become the target of cooperation for 
local governments rather than the other way around. Therefore, Independent NCCs’ 
limited state links but powerful business networks make it exert some but restricted 
influence in the local policy process.  
Decoupling NCCs’ influence in the local policy process 
Decoupling NCCs influence on the local policy process is much broader in policy areas 
and policy stages. Among the four types of NCCs, the Decoupling NCCs are the only type 
that has done the typical independent lobbying that scholars assume. As outlined in chapter 
6, the Decoupling NCCs have become one of the most influential kinds of business 
association in China. Their policy engagements are not just limited within the business 
                                                 
196 This term was mentioned in the interview with WJS, the secretary-general of Tianjin Guangdong NCC. 
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area, but expand to a wide range of social policies, such as household registration and other 
social welfare issues. Besides, their influence in the local policy process is not constrained 
within the stage of local policy implementation, but extended to creating policy agendas 
and influencing policymakers’ decisions.  
Decoupling NCCs can influence the broader policy agenda and more policy stages than 
other types of NCCs. As demonstrated in Chapter 6, Tianjin Zhejiang NCC has 
successfully influenced the local policymakers to sustain the controversial Blue Seal 
household registration policy in Tianjin. And it has interacted extensively with local 
government in local business policy implementation in terms of putting its new business 
initiatives into practice. This indicates that Decoupling NCCs have been exerting influence 
on both local policymaking and policy implementation, and demonstrated the potential of 
Decoupling NCCs to become promising external actors in the local policy process. 
However, there are still great constraints on their independence and limits to their 
participation in certain policy area and stages. 
The reasons why the Decoupling NCCs develop strong lobbying capacity and influence are 
attributed to its network strategy, which focuses on building both state and business 
networks. In the process of Decoupling NCCs’ influence to the local policy process, their 
state networks guarantee the channels for lobbying, and their business networks guarantee 
the resources for lobbying. To be specific, Decoupling NCCs’ state links from “origin” and 
“network” secure the opportunities and multi-channels for them to access the local policy 
process and approach local policymakers. And their acquired strong business networks 
secure the biggest resource to be mobilized in the lobbying process. This special 
mechanism can also be summarized as the main characteristic of Decoupling NCCs’ 
interaction with local states. 
How “Origin” and “Network” explain NCCs’ policy influence  
How to explain the variation of NCCs’ policy influence in local China? After examining 
all the factors affecting NCCs’ influence and analyzing cases of lobbying by three different 
types of NCCs, NCCs’ “Origin” (establishment initiatives) and “Network” (network 
orientation and network strategy) are pulled out to contribute to the explanation.  
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“Origin” works towards their influence — NCCs establishment initiatives directly affect 
their access to the policy arena (Important finding 1). 
 “Network” works towards their influence — NCCs network strategy directly affects their 
capacity to influence policy, as resource-based lobbying indicates that network with 
resources is very important to NCCs. (Important finding 2).  
According to the analysis to Tianjin Shanxi NCC, it is concluded that the distance with 
local state affects NCCs’ lobbying motivation and capacity; and according to the analysis 
of Tianjin Guangdong NCC and Tianjin Zhejiang NCC, it is concluded that the state links 
of NCCs directly affect the access (channel) of their policy lobbying, while their business 
links directly affect the resources that they can mobilized in the lobbying, which to some 
degree determines the capacity and outcome of their lobbying in the local policy process.  
Based on existing studies of business lobbying in China, Therefore, this research confirms 
that state links affect NCCs’ influence in the local policy process, as the existing studies on 
business lobbying and other NGO’s policy influence have indicated; Besides, this research 
also contributes the new argument that NCCs’ strategy also played a import role in NCCs’ 
policy influence. This is the important finding in this thesis to respond to the current 
literature and existing studies.  
More implicitly, this study has introduced the concepts of Network Span and Network 
Intensity, and argue that NCCs’ network span influences policy making, while network 
intensity influences policy implementation. To be more specific, NCCs with Network Span 
strategy could influence more general policy agendas and policy sphere, while NCCs with 
Network Intensity strategy could exert more influence in specific policies especially in 
policy implementation stage. 
 
7.3 The limitation of existing studies 
Current studies on business lobbying in China fall into two categories. Scott Kennedy, 
Deng Guosheng and Yu Jianxing represent the first group (Kennedy, 2005 & 2011; Deng, 
Kennedy, 2010 & 2012; Yu, 2014). Their studies focus on national industrial business 
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lobbying, with lobbyers being mainly big enterprises, like State-Owned Enterprises (SOE) 
and Multi-National Corporations (MNCs), and industrial associations. However, these 
studies do not shed light on business associations’ lobbying at the local level. Deng and 
Kenney (2010) compare the lobbying of big companies and industrial associations but they 
used quantitative method and thus could not fully illustrate the mechanisms of business 
associations’ lobbying in China. Another study of theirs (2012) affirms that industrial 
associations’ “autonomy” affected their lobbying behavior. Different from their point of 
view, Yu (2014) asserts that business associations’ lobbying in China does not rely on 
autonomy, but “privileged access”. Whether “autonomy” or “privileged access”, they are 
explaining business lobbying behavior from the perspective of organization’s relationship 
with states.  
Therefore, the main limitations of their studies are first the fact that they focus only on the 
national level industrial policy, but do not explain the process of business lobbying at the 
local level; second, their explanations of business lobbying are restricted within the factors 
of business organizations’ nature, rather than their actual behavior, such as their lobbying 
strategies.  
The second category of studies is led by the new generation of Chinese scholars (Wang, 
2014; Huang, 2013). They focus on how the local state’s institutions and policy influenced 
entrepreneurs’ lobbying behavior and outcomes. This group of studies examined the main 
factors that shaped lobbying behavior of private entrepreneurs or business associations. 
They take the reverse approach and highlight the role of state network and political 
institutions in the behavior and outcome of business lobbying. They contribute to an 
understanding of the variation of business associations’ behavior. However, the main 
limitation of their studies is that they do not discuss how business associations’ internal 
features influence their lobbying motivation and capacity. Moreover, their studies focus on 
either a specific business association or one policy area, but do not systematically research 
the underpinning factors and mechanisms that shape the business associations’ lobbying 
behavior.  
Finally, the biggest limitation for current studies is that no systematic research has been 
conducted on NCCs’ influence in the local policy process. Research on NCCs is limited, 
and current studies focus on either a single case study or just brief descriptive introduction 
on this new burgeoning business organization and some phenomenon around them.   
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This thesis has developed a framework based on research about NCCs in China. NCCs 
establishment initiatives help create channels of engagement in the local policy process, 
while NCCs’ network strategy leads to the variation of NCCs’ policy influence. More 
specifically, network span strategy broadens the policy issues that NCCs can engage with, 
and network intensity helps in the specific policy area and stages such as local policy 
implementation. All these findings fill the research gap about NCCs and contribute to the 
substance of current studies on business lobbying and business associations in China. 
7.4 Other Interesting Points in the comparison of different types 
of NCCs 
According to the two dimensions of “Origin” and “Network”, all NCCs are categorized in 
four types: Independent NCC, Coupling NCC, Decoupling NCC and Dependent NCC. By 
comparing these four types of NCCs, more interesting findings are revealed, which will be 
demonstrated below. 
By comparing the six cases in chapters four, five and six, I summarize other interesting 
findings besides the main argument, especially in terms of how different NCCs approach 
the local policy makers, how they put forward their proposal about local policies, and what 
is the main role NCC leaders played in the whole process.   
Distinguishing Coupling NCCs and Decoupling NCCs  
In this thesis, Coupling NCCs and Decoupling NCCs are NCCs with strong connections 
with both state and business, and both adopt the network span strategy in the process of 
influencing local policy process. However, the differences between these two types of 
NCCs in terms of their policy influence and network strategy are evident.  
Regarding NCCs’ influence on the local policy process, Coupling NCCs’ influence reflects 
on the area of political propaganda and advocacy, and it is in this process that they 
gradually gain more influence from the government rather than exerting influence to the 
government. Decoupling NCCs’ influence was much broader in various kinds of local 
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policy, but their final goal was to improve their influence in the business circle, benefit 
their members and in the end exert wide range influence on businesses.197  
Regarding their Network Span Strategy, Coupling NCC and Decoupling NCC also have 
different focus. Coupling NCCs sacrificee part of their autonomy to develop closer links 
with the state, while Decoupling NCCs give up part of their state links to acquire more 
business connections. Therefore, in the end, Coupling NCCs are comparatively more state-
network oriented and Decoupling NCC more business network oriented.  
The Liaison Office’s role in NCCs’ interaction with local state 
The Liaison Office is a special mechanism of local governments in China, with its main 
function being bridging different regional governments. The former has played important 
roles in some NCCs’ emergence and development. For example, Zhejiang Government’s 
Tianjin Liaison Office initiated Tianjin Zhejiang NCC; Guangdong Government’s Beijing 
Liaison Office provided great financial and policy support to Tianjin Guangdong NCC. 
During NCCs’ interaction with local states, the Liaison Office acted as a sponsor to lead 
and protect NCCs’ development in the host places. However, it inevitably eroded NCCs’ 
independence when NCCs kept a very close relation with it. An example of this is the 
Dependent NCC - Sha’anxi NCC, which will be briefly introduced below.  
Future direction of Independent NCCs’ development 
In this research, Independent NCC demonstrates great significance in brokering business 
cooperation between different localities. However, its influence is restricted within specific 
business areas, and it is very hard for Independent NCCs to go beyond the influence in 
business cooperation. Therefore, it is doubtful whether Independent NCCs can maintain 
the momentum of development in the future. They may develop towards service-oriented 
enterprise, or sustain their status as business associations with marginal influence towards 
local policy process, which is worth studying in the future. 
The characteristics of local policymaking in China 
Analyzing all the policy cases in the case analysis chapters, it is evident that all the policy 
proposals are intended to be submitted or are already submitted to local administrative 
                                                 
197 Interview with LLG, the president of Tianjin Zhejiang NCC. 
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departments, rather than the local legislative department. This indirectly indicates the weak 
and awkward position of local legislative departments in the Chinese local policy process. 
There are very few and limited lobbyers trying to deliver their policy proposals through the 
legitimate channels like the local NPC (National People’s Congress) and the CPPCC 
(Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference), considering the efficiency and 
effectiveness of these channels. Through this, I can discern the characteristics of Chinese 
local policymaking: a significant part of local policymaking and local decision making are 
carried out by the local governments’ administrative departments, which are embedded 
within in the process of local policy implementation. 
NCC activists’ role towards NCCs’ policy influence 
As introduced in Chapter 1, NCC activists refer to the people who devote their time and 
energy to promoting NCCs’ growth and development with pioneering spirits and 
innovative courage. Most of the time, NCC activists are the presidents or secretary-
generals of NCCs, and sometimes they can be local officials in the government 
bureaucracy. The common feature across NCC activists are that they have directly or 
indirectly raised the profile of NCCs’ influence and engaged NCCs to be active actors in 
local governance. Personal social capital has been used to build up NCCs’ social network. 
In this case, Shanxi NCC used ZSL’s personal political resources to build up the 
connections with local state. To what extent is the lobbying success due to things like 
individual activists’ resources, rather than to the network intensity and span of the NCC? It 
remains to be further investigated. 
The type of Dependent NCCs- Tianjin Sha’anxi NCC 
Like traditional business associations, the Dependent NCCs are initiated by a host or the 
home government agencies and has intrinsic linkage with officialdom. It is closely related 
with non-local Liaison Offices (zhuwai banshichu or zhuwai bangongshi). More often than 
not the Dependent NCC and the Liaison Office are combined as “two names 
(organizations),[with] one management team” (liangkuai paizi, yitao banzi). 198  As a 
consequence, the Dependent NCC’s functions are mainly focused on dealing with inter-
governmental relations, including cooperation, official visits and regional negotiations. 
Due to the obliged duty and its financial and personnel dependency, it is highly dependent 
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on their home government and acts as the extension of bureau agencies. However, because 
of the strong linkage with the home government, dependent NCCs have more channels 
within the political and institutional system to get access to local policy process. Through 
the internal channels, they can exert certain influence on the local policy process especially 
in policy implementation, which it is hardly examined by scholars though.  
Regarding network building, the dependent NCC is very state network oriented and adopts 
the network intensity strategy. However, keeping a very close relationship with states, the 
Dependent NCC still distinguishes from other government organized business associations 
in terms of function and operation199. 
Dependent NCC’s binding with home government’s Liaison office inevitably eroded its 
own independence and flexibility, in terms of the content and function. Rather than saying 
it is a NCC with top-down initiatives, it is more accurate to define it as a government 
sponsored business association or GONGO (government organized NGO). Due to lack of 
empirical evidence and it being beyond the scope of this research200, I do not include an in-
depth analysis of Dependent NCC in this thesis. 
7.5 Research contribution 
As outlined in Chapter 1, this research makes three key contributions to current studies. 
First, this research on NCCs’ influence on the Chinese local policy process goes beyond 
the statist explanation and state-civil society debate. It has shown that state linkage 
affected NCCs’ influence on the local policy process, which also existing studies on 
business associations and other NGOs have shown. Beyond this, this piece of research also 
highlights what kind of state linkage that works best for NCC’s influence and how their 
strategies make a difference to their influence.  
Second, this research concentrates on the external actors’ influence on the local policy 
process in China, differing from central policy processes that previous studies have 
focused on. Chinese local policy process has been rarely systematically studied in the 
English literature, so this thesis contributes to this research gap in current studies. 
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200 Research about Dependent NCCs should focus on government-organized or government-sponsored 
business associations, while this research mainly focuses on external actors with grass-root bases towards the 
local policy process. 
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Moreover, I studied the external actors’ interaction with local states in the Chinese local 
policy process. Using NCCs as an example of external actors, this thesis showcases the 
mechanisms and procedures of these interactions. Considering the large-scale regional 
variations in local policymaking and implementation, this thesis develops a theoretical 
framework for explaining external actors’ influence in the Chinese local policy processes. 
Third, this research provides much empirical evidence about NCCs as well as local policy 
cases based on first-hand fieldwork material. Since NCCs are a new type of business 
groups understudied both in western and Chinese academia, the present thesis 
demonstrates the full story of NCCs’ emergence and development in China. This 
contributes to the understanding of the complexity of Chinese local politics and operational 
systems in local China. These rich empirical materials on NCCs and local policy cases 
expand our understanding of NCCs and the local policy process in China. Empirical 
evidence on how NCCs emerged and developed, their regional development variations as 
well as their interaction with local states and political engagement are all new knowledge 
about NCCs even in Chinese academia. These empirical materials contribute to knowledge 
about business associations in China. 
Finally, this thesis examines how NCCs, as an external actor in the local policy process 
and private sector business association, incorporate with other actors and expand their 
network in order to enhance their influence in the local policy process and exert political 
significance. The thesis therefore also makes a further important contribution to 
understanding other important issues in transitional China, such as the role of private 
sector in political participation, and etc.  
7.6 The implications of this research in China studies 
This research on NCCs’ interaction with local states has not just revealed the state-society 
relations and business lobbying in current China, but reflected on the complexity of 
Chinese political ecology, which has some implications for current China studies within 
and outside China.  
First, NCCs’ influence on the local policy process is an on-going process. As outlined in 
this piece of work, this on-going process has demonstrated certain degree of vulnerability 
and unsustainability. The timeframe of this research covers the period between 1995 and 
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2013, so it does not cover further developments in NCCs’ influence on local policy process 
after 2013. As indicated in the online news and reports about NCCs, the national top 
leaders change and the central policy context may have a significant effect on NCCs’ 
interaction with local states. When President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao were on 
stage, the space for NCCs’ development was more open and flexible. However, since the 
new president Xi Jinping took power in 2012, the space for NCCs and other social 
organizations has been restricted due to the implementation of more conservative central 
policies. Therefore, it is evident that external actors’ influence on the local policy process 
is much subject to the change of national top leaders and central policy context.  
Second, Chinese business lobbying is under the penetration from local party – state, so the 
relationship between CCP and NCC is a two-way relationship. Not just NCCs try to 
influence the decision-making from local party state, but reversely the local CCP 
departments are influencing NCCs’ function and activities as well. As outlined in Tianjin 
Shanxi NCC’s case, the consequences of Coupling NCC getting too close to the state is the 
state’s erosion of its lobbying independence (motivation) and lobbying capacity. In this 
thesis, Tianjin Shanxi NCC even though it has a “bottom-up” grass-roots base, it 
proactively approached the local state actors and proposed to set up party branches within 
social organizations. This is the example of Party-penetration. But in the case of Tianjin 
Guangdong NCCs, the penetration process is more passively through local officials’ active 
approach to Guangdong NCCs, based on the consideration of their local economic interests. 
This is an example of state penetration. Generally speaking, most of grass-rooted business 
associations lose their initial target either due to party-state penetration or due to individual 
economic interests. In an authoritarian state, where the state holds the majority of 
economic resources, business associations refrain from being independent and autonomous. 
NCCs in China started with an optimistic and promising future. However, due to 
institutional obstacles, local state’s involvement and their organizational limits, they are 
showing various facets with pessimistic outlook. This preliminary finding resounds to the 
current scholarly attention on the upsurge of PONGO (Party-organized NGO) building 
within social organizations in China (Thornton, 2013).  
Third, there are some implications for other external actors in the local policy process. 
Unlike general or national policy change, local policy process is complex with no clear 
boundaries. Therefore, it is hard to distinguish policy-making and policy implementation, 
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which also makes it hard to examine the actual mechanism NCCs’ use to influence the 
local policy process; as the influence is embedded in the interaction with the local states. 
Therefore, the implications for other Chinese local policy process studies are using case 
analysis with fulfilled empirical evidences to show the whole policy process in the local 
level. 
Moreover, despite continuing criticism on the Chinese authoritarian political system, the 
range of participants in the decision-making process has widened, with different social 
actors now playing an increasingly important role in the Chinese policymaking process 
(Zhu, 2010). This research on NCCs has confirmed this point of view and contributed to 
highlighting another significant external actor in the Chinese policy process to the 
academic discussion. 
7.7 Research limitations and future research 
However, this research has some limitations. Understanding these limitations will help 
carrying out further studies in the future. First, NCCs’ influence in the local policy process 
is an on-going changing process, but this research is restricted within a time frame from 
1995 to 2013. How much has changed since the main investigation for this thesis took 
place in 2012, we need to explore. 
Second, The influence of NCCs in the policy process is hard to measure. It is possible that 
NCCs’ real influence is less than what the interviewees working in NCCs expected and 
interpreted. Moreover, there is not enough evidence to prove a causal relationship between 
NCCs’ lobbying behavior and the outcomes in policy change. As in the local context, there 
are so many possible and potential factors could lead to change local policy. There is no 
way to control all the variables in this research apart from the geographical localities and 
institutional context. 
Third, the selection of case localities and policy cases is constrained by the researcher’s 
time and energy. Due to limits in research time and lack of empirical material, I gave up 
the locality of Hangzhou, and only selected Tianjin as the only case locality to examine 
four different types of NCCs. In this way, I have controlled the variable of geographical 
locality and institutional context, but given up the regional comparison among different 
types of NCCs. Moreover, some of the policy cases in the core case analysis chapters are 
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not rich and complete. As most of the policy case material was based on my interviews and 
participant observation in the fieldwork, different interviewees sometimes gave 
inconsistent answers and I could not do multi-party verifications. That may explain some 
of the incoherence in introducing some of the case policies. 
Finally, due to lack of relevant studies on Chinese local policy process, my understanding 
towards the actual operational mechanism of local governments in China has limitations 
and constraints. This affected my analysis towards the case policies in the core case 
chapters.  
Regarding the implications for future research, this study also indicates future directions. 
 Lack of time and energy to expand the analysis on Network Span, Network 
Intensity and Chinese local policy implementation. They all reserve for further 
study. 
 This thesis has developed a framework to analyze NCCs’ influence in the local 
policy process. It would be interesting to test how this framework applys in other 
type of external actors in the local policy process in the future studies. 
 This research only focuses on Tianjin, a north and high state-controlled city in 
China, but whether this finding would be apply in other cities like Hangzhou and 
Guangzhou, which needs to be further researched. 
 I did not manage to sample and interview all NCCs - discuss whether there could 
be some kind of bias to the kinds of NCCs I studied. Could there be other ‘types’ or 
examples that I have not identified? Could there be other dimensions to the NCCs 
that I have not been able to identify? All these limitations could only be overcomed 
with more in-depth studies about NCCs in different regions of China. 
 The insufficient empirical evidence led to the deficit in illustrating the casual link 
of the influencing mechanisms, especially in terms of how NCCs’ internal structure 
and operation affect their lobbying behavior and outcomes. Therefore, more 
investigations need to be carried out to explore the relations between NCCs’ 
internal factors and external factors towards their influence in the local policy 
process. 
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Appendix A: Sample interview outline 
Proposed Individual Interview Themes - for academics 
 
1. The characteristics of business lobbying in China 
2. How do you find the phenomena of NCCs’ emergence? Do they have influence on the 
local policy making? 
3. The space of NCCs’ participation into the local policy process 
4. The strategy and behaviour mode of NCCs’ influence on local policy process. (Formal 
or informal, directly or indirectly, which policy areas, which stage of policy circle) 
5. The structure of local governance and policy making process. 
6. Compared to the normal business association, what are the pros and cons of NCCs in 
lobbying? 
7. How will you define NCC? Could it be defined as the grass rooted civil society in China? 
8. Can you forecast the developing trend of NCCs in the next 10 years? 
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Proposed Individual Interview Themes -for secretary-generals or presidents of NCCs 
 
For your organization: 
1. How did your NCC get established? Did you get support from original or local 
governments? Which kind of barriers did you overcome? 
2. How do you recruit members? How do you make it attractive among non-local 
enterprises? 
3. Do you have routine mechanism to contact with original or local governments? 
4. Which kind of issues do you concern when you have a chance to communicate with 
local officials? 
5. Does your NCC have industrial focus here in this city? And how important is it to the 
local economy? 
6. Do you cooperate with other NCCs? Which kind of activities do you work on together? 
7. Are there any institutional channels for proposing and reflecting problems related to the 
organization and members to local government? 
8. How do you manage the relationship with media? 
9. How do you build your NCC’s influence? (Financial power, reputation, expertise, social 
network, and which is more important?) 
10. Compared to the normal business association, what are the pros and cons of your 
organization? 
11. How do you assess the developing situation and policy environment of NCCs? Can you 
anticipate the future of NCCs? 
For you individually: 
1. What is the motivation for you to be the president of NCC? 
2. Are you a party member? Have you been trying to be a representative in the local 
People’s Congress or local CPPCC? 
3. How did you expand and enhance your social network? 
4. Have you been invited to a policy consultancy meeting by local government? Do your 
suggestions work? 
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5. Have you considered inviting some local celebrities to join your NCC? 
6. Which kind of charity work did you do in recent years?  
7. As a non-local businessman, what kind of policy do you concern most? How did you try 
to make your voice heard? 
8. If you can’t make a successful proposal to the government, what other ways will you 
think of to use? Illustrate it with examples. 
9. Do you think you and your organization’s efforts have influenced the policy making? 
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Proposed Individual Interview Themes - For ICF and Economic Coordination Office 
 
1. Introduction of your department and its affiliation to business association (especially 
NCC, how many memberships)  
2. How many NCCs in Tianjin now? How much investment did they bring from outside in 
2010? (More data) 
3. Are there special policies or regulations for NCCs’ development nationally and locally? 
4. How is the relationship among NCCs, their original locality government and your 
department? (Did you take NCCs as a channel to communicate with their original 
governments?) 
5. How many routine mechanisms do you have to interact with NCCs? How have they 
been carried out? (Monthly meeting, consultancy meeting or public hearings) 
6. Is NCC an effective actor in interest expressing? How did they do it? (Interest 
representation) 
7. Which policy areas do NCCs concern? How do they show their concern? Please give 
some examples. 
8. Do you think NCCs’ participation could influence policy? Can you give an example? 
9. Did you keep good relationships with some presidents of NCCs? Did you often attend 
their activities? (I think this one maybe a little sensitive) 
10. What is your opinion on the NCCs’ participation in the local governance? 
11. Can you forecast the developing direction of NCCs in future? 
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Proposed Individual Interview Themes (For social departments of government) 
 
1. Introduction of your department briefly. Which kind of policy-making is your 
department responsible to? Does it relate to NCCs? 
2. Does your department have involvement with NCCs or non-local people? Please give 
some example of your dealings with NCCs. 
3. How many routine mechanisms do you have to interact with NCCs? How have they 
been carried out? (Monthly meeting, consultancy meeting or public hearings) 
4. Which specific policy areas do NCCs concern? How do they show their concern? Please 
give some examples. 
5. Is NCC an effective actor in influencing policy? How did they do it? Do their actions 
work? 
6. Did you keep good relationships with some presidents of NCCs? Did you often attend 
their activities?  
7. What is your opinion on the NCCs’ participation in the local governance? 
8. Can you forecast the developing direction of NCCs in future? 
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Appendix B: Sample information sheet 
Consent to be interviewed for PhD project 
‘The Influence of Non-local Chambers of Commerce in Chinese Policy Process’ 
 
Information for the Interviewee - Please read this sheet carefully before completing 
the consent form 
The aim of this PhD project is to develop a framework to explain Chinese local policy 
process and examine the influence of Non-local Chambers of Commerce in policy-making, 
which intends to find the casual link between NCC’s lobbying and the outcome of policy. 
The focus of the study is the NCCs in Tianjin and Hangzhou and their participation into 
the policy process. The main research questions are on how NCCs influence policy process 
and why influence varies under different conditions. The purpose of the interview is to 
gather information of specific influential behaviors of NCCs and their interaction with 
policy makers in the formation of local policy. The data gathered from this interview will 
only be available to the investigator and the investigator’s PhD supervisor (contact details 
below).  
The accompanying consent form offers three degrees of anonymity with relation to use of 
data gathered from the interview in future work. The consent form relates to the immediate 
PhD project and planned publication of the thesis and journal articles written over the 
course of the project. If recording is consented to, the interviewee has the option to request 
that the data gathered from the interview is destroyed once the interviewer has transcribed 
the interview (from which the interviewee will not be identifiable).  
异地商会在地方政策过程中的影响力研究 
尊敬的被访谈人： 
您好，我是英国格拉斯哥大学社会与政治科学学院的博士生王华（HUA WANG），
感谢您配合我的调研工作。 
本研究的目的是通过考察异地商会在地方政策过程中的影响力，为中国地方政策过
程提供一个解释框架。调研重心是考察天津和杭州地区的异地商会并观察他们在政
策过程中的参与行为。研究的核心问题是异地商会如何参与政策过程，以及什么因
素影响到其影响力的发挥。本次访谈的目的是通过与您的交流得到异地商会自身内
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部建设以及与政策互动的基本情况，调研所得数据资料严格保密，仅限于访谈人王
华及其导师 Jane Duckett（联系方式见下方）。 
Contact Details 
Please find below relevant contact details for the investigator and the investigator’s 
supervisor. If you have any queries or questions about the research or the interview process, 
please do not hesitate to make contact to discuss the issues. Professor Duckett is able to 
handle queries or complaints that you may have about the investigator or the interview 
process. 以下是访谈者及其导师的联系方式。如果您对研究或访谈过程有任何的疑问，
请联系。Jane Duckett教授负责处理所有的咨询和投诉。 
Investigator 
Hua Wang 
PhD Researcher 
Department of Politics, University of Glasgow               
email: h.wang.3@research.gla.ac.uk 
710 Adam Smith Building, 40 Bute Gardens, Glasgow, G12 8RTphone: +44 (0)141 330 
8236  
 
Ethics officer 
 
Dr Valentina Bold 
College of Social Sciences ethics officer                                                                      
email: valentine.bold@glasgow.ac.uk 
 
 
Investigator’s Supervisor 
 
Jane Duckett 
Professor of Chinese & Comparative Politics 
Department of Politics, University of Glasgow                    
email: jane.duckett@glasgow.ac.uk 
1202 Adam Smith Building, 40 Bute Gardens, Glasgow, G12 8RT                                 
phone: +44 (0)141 330 2871 
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Appendix C: Sample consent form 
Consent to be interviewed for PhD project 
‘The Influence of Non-local Chambers of Commerce in Chinese Policy Process’ 
 
Please read the accompanying information sheet before completing this form. 
 
 
INTERVIEWEE INFORMATION 
Name: _______________________________________________ 
Position:  _____________________________________________ 
Organization: __________________________________________ 
Location: _____________________________________________ 
INTERVIEWEE CONSENT 
Please tick one as appropriate 
 
I give permission to quote me by name in published work unless     
I specify otherwise 
 
I give permission to quote or paraphrase me in published work,  
but without attribution unless I specify otherwise 
 
PERMISSION TO RECORD INTERVIEW 
Please tick one as appropriate 
 
I give my permission for this interview to be recorded 
 
I decline to give my permission for this interview to be recorded 
 
PERMISSION TO STORE INTERVIEW DATA 
Please tick one as appropriate 
 
I give my permission for the interviewer to retain a copy of the data 
indefinitely  
 
I request that the recording is erased and once the interviewer 
has transcribed the interview 
 
 
 
________________________________                                _________________________ 
Signature                                                                                 Date 
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Appendix D: List of interviews 
Interviewees Organizations Date 
Tianjin 
ZSL Tianjin Shanxi NCC 17/06/2011 & 
12/05/2012 
GSP Tianjin Shanxi NCC 12/06/2011 & 
12/05/2012 & 
15/05/2012 
HSJ Tianjin Wenzhou NCC 19/06/2011 
RSX Tianjin Fujian NCC 20/06/2011 
NXY Tian TEDA Administration Office 22/06/2011 
GRB Tianjin TEDA Chamber of Commerce 23/06/2011 
LYH Tianjin TEDA Chamber of Commerce 23/06/2011 
CX Tianjin TEDA Chamber of Commerce 23/06/2011 
ZM Tianjin TEDA Chamber of Commerce 23/06/2011 
LYZ Tianjin Association of Entrepreneurs 28/06/2011 
LWK Tianjin Administration Bureau of 
Social Organizations 
03/07/2011 
FXZ Tianjin Administration Bureau of 
Social Organizations 
03/07/2011 
TWH Tianjin Fujian NCC 13/07/2011 
ZTH Tianjin Hubei NCC  07/05/2012 
MZ Tianjin economic association 24/04/2012 
WJS Tianjin Guangdong NCC   14/05/2012 & 
17/05/2012 & 
22/05/2012 
KLZ Tianjin Shanxi NCC, Industrial Branch 24/05/2012 
WW Tianjin Government’s Guangzhou 
Liaison Office 
14/05/2012 
YD Tianjin Beichen district government 14/05/2012 
GJY Tianjin Inner-Mongolia Chamber of 
Commerce 
20/06/2012 
XXX Tianjin Sha’anxi NCC 20/06/2012 
ZX Tianjin Shanghai NCC 20/06/2012 
SWP Tianjin Zhejiang NCC  27/06/2012 
ZL Tianjin Zhejiang NCC 27/06/2012 
GYL Tianjin Shanxi NCC, Jinzhong Branch 27/06/2012 
LLG Tianjin Zhejiang NCC 28/06/2012 
RSS Tianjin Shandong NCC  29/06/2012 
MZH Tianjin Shandong NCC 29/06/2012 
WWQ Tianjin ICF 30/06/2012 
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LJY Tianjin CAB 04/07/2012 
GDJ Nankai University 17/06/2012 & 
05/07/2012 
LMY Tianjin University 05/07/2012 
CXL Tianjin Party School 06/07/2012 
LBL Nanjing University 25/06/2013 
WM Qinghua University 25/06/2013 
ZJ Tianjin ECO 10/07/2013 
LX Tianjin ECO 10/07/2013 
ZL Tianjin CAB 12/07/2013 
  Changchun  
CMX Jilin Guangdong NCC  17/05/2012 
HXM Jilin Guangdong NCC 17/05/2012 
LHX Shandong Guangdong NCC 17/05/2012 
TH Heilongjiang Guangdong NCC 18/05/2012 
YH Guangdong General Chamber of 
Commerce 
18/05/2012 
GYK Guangdong Informatization and 
Cooperation Office 
18/05/2012 
LZM Qingdao Guangdong NCC 18/05/2012 
CXQ Inner-Mongolia Guangdong NCC  19/05/2012 
SWF Yunnan Guangdong NCC 19/05/2012 
QW Jiangxi Guangdong NCC  19/05/2012 
WJ Guangdong Government’s Liaison 
Office in Beijing 
20/05/2012 
GDX Guangdong Government’s Liaison 
Office in Shanghai 
20/05/2012 
YDK Guangdong Government’s Liaison 
Office in Northeast Region 
20/05/2012 
LM Zhejiang Guangdong NCC 20/05/2012 
XY Sha’anxi Guangdong NCC 20/05/2012 
Hangzhou 
FQZ Hangzhou Taizhou NCC  25/03/2012 
XXX Hangzhou Hubei NCC 26/03/2012 
RDM Hangzhou Silk Industry Association 13/07/2012 
LYC Zhejiang/Hangzhou Hunan NCC 13/07/2012 
GDD Human Resources Association of 
Zhejiang Province, Overseas Center 
18/07/2012 
ZL Hangzhou Henan NCC  19/07/2012 
CHQ Zhejiang Chongqing NCC 19/07/2012 
MB Zhejiang Guangdong NCC  29/03/2012 
WWC Hangzhou Brand Association 29/03/2012 
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SXM Tian Tian Kai Xin Association 30/03/2012 
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